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ESSAYS ON GCC FINANCIAL MARKETS AND MONETARY POLICIES
by Wael Mohammad Alshewey
This dissertation explores economic integration in the context of the Gulf Cooperation
Council countries (GCC), which planned to form a monetary union, by assessing three
dierent but related empirical research questions regarding GCC nancial markets and
monetary policies. Chapter 2 presents the rst essay, which empirically investigates the
pairwise linkages and volatility spillovers between GCC stock markets. In particular,
the goal of Chapter 2 is to investigate the extent to which past volatility is transmitted
from one GCC stock market to another GCC market at the aggregate level (e.g., the
general stock markets' price indices), and to determine whether a past volatility in
one GCC market aects the current volatility in another GCC market. Furthermore,
Chapter 2 attempts to extend the investigation of the volatility spillover at a more
disaggregated level by capturing the intra-sectoral linkages and volatility spillover eects
among equivalent sectors across the GCC stock markets, namely the banking, industrial
and insurance sectors. Empirically, Chapter 2 exploits the causality-in-variance test
pioneered by Cheung and Ng (1996) and developed by Hong (2001), who introduced
a class of asymptotic N(0,1) tests for volatility spillover between two time series that
exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity and may have innite unconditional variances.
The second essay, Chapter 3, aims to examine the eect of the recent global economic
and nancial crisis originating in U.S. stock markets on the stock markets of the GCC
countries and to determine whether the sharp falls in these markets were due to the
existence of the phenomenon \contagion" or whether they just reect the continuation
of the strong economic and nancial linkages between the GCC economies and the U.S.
economy, which exist in all states of the world during good and bad times. In particular,
Chapter 3 investigates whether contagion exists from the U.S. stock market to the stock
markets of the GCC by comparing two sub-periods before (stable) and after (turmoil)
the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which is the largest bank to ll for bankruptcy
in U.S. history and has been widely used by many economists as a benchmark for
the U.S. economic and nancial crisis (see Bekaert et al. (2012) and Mishkin (2010)).
Empirically, Chapter 3 investigates the existence of contagion using the cross-market
correlations tests pioneered by King and Wadhwani (1990) and developed by Forbes and
Rigobon (2002), who criticized previous studies for their use of unadjusted correlation
coecients to investigate the presence of contagion across stock markets due to the
heteroskedasticity resulting from the bias in stock market returns of the crisis country.
Hence, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) introduced the adjusted cross-market correlation
iiiiv
coecient, which does not depend on the volatility (variance) of the crisis country,
especially during the turmoil period.
The last essay is presented in Chapter 4, in which I investigate the implications of
xing exchange rate on monetary policy in the context of the GCC countries whose
exchange rate regimes have been xed to the U.S. dollar for a long time. In particular,
Chapter 4 aims to assess the sensitivity of the GCC countries' interest rates to the U.S.
rate, since the theory of interest parity suggests that xing GCC exchange rates to the
U.S. dollar should force GCC domestic interest rates to equal the U.S. interest rate.
In addition, Chapter 4 interestingly attempts to assess the stability of this sensitivity
across time and to investigate whether there exists a pronounced decoupling for some
GCC countries over some sub-periods. Furthermore, the fact that some of the countries'
exchange rates have pegged to the U.S. dollar over specic sub-periods, then moved
away from the peg over some other sub-periods (e.g., Kuwait) also gives us a rich
setting through which to investigate the implications of xing the exchange rate on
monetary policy and to determine whether a country's interest rate has a stronger
association with a base country's rate under a pegged-period than under a non-pegged
period. Empirically, this is done by testing the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) of
each individual GCC country's interest rate, using the U.S.'s interest rate as the base
country. Chapter 4 considers the time series properties of the data and uses unit
root and co-integration tests. For each GCC country, it also utilizes a level regression
for each interest rate episode throughout the entire sample under investigation; uses
the Quandt (1960) Likelihood Ratio statistic (QLR) to determine the timing of any
potential structural break during which the country's interest rate sensitivity to the
U.S. interest rate changes; and applies the Error Correction Model (ECM) to capture
long-run dynamic behaviours between the GCC and U.S. interest rates.Contents
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Introduction
In 1981, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) established the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Since then, one of this
council's main goals has been to enhance economic integration among its member
states. A year after the GCC's creation, the Unied Economic Agreement (UEA)
among the GCC countries was signed, aiming at coordinating GCC economic,
monetary, and nancial policies with the ultimate objective of adopting a common
currency for the six countries. Article 22 of the UEA stated that \Member States shall
coordinate their nancial, monetary and banking policies and increase cooperation
among the Monetary Agencies and Central Banks, including an endeavour to establish
a common currency in order to further their desired economic integration." In 2001,
the UEA was replaced by a new economic agreement, in which the initiative of forming
the GCC monetary union by 2010 was ocially declared and a particular timetable
was laid down in order to accomplish the necessary requirements for the planned
monetary union.
In this regard, some considerable steps have been taken to strengthen GCC eorts
towards economic, monetary, and nancial integration, started with the GCC free
trade area in 1983, the GCC customs union in 2003, the six countries ocially pegging
their currencies to the U.S. dollar in 2003, the common market in 2007, and the
Monetary Union Agreement and the Monetary Council in 2009 (Table 1.1). However,
there have been some major setbacks delaying the achievement of the proposed GCC
monetary union. Oman ocially announced its withdrawal from the proposed
12 Chapter 1 Introduction
monetary union in 2006; Kuwait abandoned the U.S. dollar peg and re-pegged to a
currency basket in 2007; the UAE opted out of the proposed monetary union in 2009;
and the launching date of the monetary union (originally 2010) has been rescheduled,
and the exact date has not yet been set.
With regard to the GCC's economic characteristics, the GCC countries play a key role
in the global economy due to the volume of their oil and gas endowments, which leads
them to be considered major oil exporters. The six member states collectively produce
about 24% and 11% of the world's oil and gas, respectively, and account for 30% and
23% of the global oil and gas reserves, respectively (Figure 1.1). On a national basis,
the GCC countries share some common background characteristics, such as history,
language, culture, and, most importantly, homogeneous economic structures, that can
ease the process of economic and monetary integration. The GCC countries rely
heavily on the hydrocarbon sector as their main source of income, since this sector is
the largest contributor to GDP. As a bloc, the GCC countries had a combined nominal
GDP of 1.49 trillion U.S. dollars and an average per capita GDP of about 47 thousand
U.S. dollars in 2012. The largest economy among the GCC countries in terms of
population and output is by far that of Saudi Arabia, with a nominal GDP reaching
657 billion U.S. dollars and a population of 28 million people in 2012, representing
about 44% and 65% of the GCC's aggregate GDP and population, respectively.
Meanwhile Bahrain is GCC's smallest economy, with a nominal GDP reaching 26.50
billion U.S. dollars and population of about 1.15 million people in the same year,
accounting for about 2% and 3% of the GCC's aggregate GDP and population,
respectively (Table 1.2). Given their heavy dependence on oil and gas as main sources
of income, which results in high uctuations in output due to the oil price volatility,
the GCC countries have made some eorts to diversify their economies away from oil
and gas. However, the progress towards economic diversication is slow and ineectual,
which may limit the gains of the economic integration desired by the GCC countries.
Moreover, the GCC countries share a common exchange rate mechanism at which all
GCC currencies-except Kuwait-are pegged to the U.S. dollar for more than three
decades. In fact, from 1980 to 2002, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United
Arab of Emirates (UAE) currencies were de jure (formally) pegged to the International
Monetary Fund Special Drawing Rights (SDR) but were de facto (eectively) pegged
to the U.S. dollar, Oman was de facto pegged to the U.S. dollar and Kuwait to anChapter 1 Introduction 3
undisclosed basket of major world currencies of its main trading and nancial partners.
In January 2003, all the GCC countries including Kuwait ocially declared that their
national currencies were to be de jure and de facto pegged to the U.S. dollar as a step
towards the monetary integration. However, in May 2007 Kuwait announced that it
would abandon the dollar peg and return back to its previous exchange rate regime due
to the inationary pressure caused by the continuing depreciation of the U.S. dollar
against the other major currencies. Despite the fact that the pegged to the U.S. dollar
has limited the autonomy of the GCC monetary policy, the choice of the U.S. dollar as
an external anchor for the GCC monetary policy is viewed as credible and has been
serving the GCC economies well until recently, except for the last couple years when
the inationary pressure has risen due to the depreciation of the U.S. dollar.
With regard to nancial markets, GCC stock markets are relatively new compared to
stock markets in developed countries and some stock markets in the Middle East
region. The oldest stock market to be established was the Kuwait Stock Exchange in
1977, followed by the Saudi Arabia stock exchange in 1984, the Bahrain stock exchange
in 1987, the Oman Securities Market in 1989, the Qatar stock exchange in 1997, while
the Dubai Financial Market is the most recently established in 2000. GCC stock
markets have witnessed a notable growth in particular over the period 2003-2007,
which reected the oil prices boom, with aggregate market capitalization reached to its
highest levels in 2007 accounted for about 1.074 trillion U.S. dollars. However, in the
aftermath of the global economic and nancial crisis in 2008-2009, the aggregate GCC
market capitalization fell sharply and lost about half of its value to reach 565 billion
U.S. dollars in 2009 (Table 1.3).
GCC stock markets are considered relatively small when compared to advanced and
emerging stock markets in terms of market capitalization, number of listed companies,
and liquidity (measured by the value of traded shares). These characteristics make
GCC markets classied as frontier markets by Morgan Stanley Capital International
(MSCI).1 In this regard, Table 1.4 reports some GCC stock markets main indicators,
such as market capitalization, number of listed companies, and value of traded shares,
for the year of 2013. Saudi Arabia's stock market is by far the largest and the most
active and liquid market among its other GCC counterparts, with market
1Frontier market is commonly used to describe a subset of emerging markets with low market
capitalization and illiquid.4 Chapter 1 Introduction
capitalization reached about 460 billion U.S. dollars, which accounted for about 48% of
the total GCC market capitalization and the value of traded shares reached about 362
billion U.S. dollars, represented about 76% of the aggregate GCC value of traded
shares. On the other hand, both Bahrain and Oman stock markets are the smallest
and most illiquid markets among the GCC stock markets. In the case of Bahrain, the
market capitalization reached about 18 billion U.S. dollars, accounted for 2% of the
total GCC market capitalization, and the value of traded shares represented less than
1% of the total GCC value of traded shares. While the Oman market capitalization
and value of the traded shares accounted for 3% and 1% of the total GCC market
capitalization and value of traded shares, respectively.
The GCC countries have taken some major steps to promote the level of integration
among their stock markets. However, these steps are still modest and lag behind the
GCC desire to achieve a full economic and nancial integration. GCC investors face
some varying degrees of restrictions on stock ownership in some GCC stock markets.
In addition, GCC and non-GCC foreign investors are not equally treated with regard
to the access to GCC stock markets and the level of shares ownership. In this context,
Table 1.5 shows the foreign ownership restrictions for listed stocks in the GCC markets.
This dissertation explores economic integration in the context of the Gulf Cooperation
Council countries (GCC), which planned to form a monetary union, by assessing three
dierent but related empirical research questions regarding GCC nancial markets and
monetary policies. Chapter 2 presents the rst essay, which empirically investigates the
pairwise linkages and volatility spillovers between GCC stock markets. In particular,
the goal of Chapter 2 is to investigate the extent to which past volatility is transmitted
from one GCC stock market to another GCC market at the aggregate level (e.g., the
general stock markets' price indices), and to determine whether a past volatility in one
GCC market aects the current volatility in another GCC market. Furthermore,
Chapter 2 attempts to extend the investigation of the volatility spillover at a more
disaggregated level by capturing the intra-sectoral linkages and volatility spillover
eects among equivalent sectors across the GCC stock markets, namely the banking,
industrial and insurance sectors. Empirically, Chapter 2 exploits the
causality-in-variance test pioneered by Cheung and Ng (1996) and developed by Hong
(2001), who introduced a class of asymptotic N(0,1) tests for volatility spillover
between two time series that exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity and may haveChapter 1 Introduction 5
innite unconditional variances. Investigating the linkages between stock markets in
the context of the GCC countries is a central issue by which GCC policy makers gain
further insights on how and to what extent the GCC nancial markets are integrated.
Financial integration among the GCC countries is a vital issue, especially in the
critical stage before introducing the GCC common currency, to determine whether
these countries full one of the main requirements of the potential monetary union,
which enhances the union's macroeconomic stabilization. Moreover, nancial
integration improves risk sharing among the member states and the nancial stability
of such a union, which are very important aspects to be considered by GCC policy
makers in order to avoid any negative impacts and spillovers to the monetary union as
a whole. Furthermore, GCC-integrated stock markets will enhance the eciency of
capital allocation as well as the liquidity of stock markets within the GCC region. For
example, when the GCC markets are integrated, the liquidity of the stock markets will
be improved due to increases in the trading of individual nancial assets caused by
increases in cross-boarder ows of funds. This improvement in stock markets liquidity
will, in turn, lead to a decrease in the cost of capital for companies willing to raise
capital and lower transaction costs for GCC investors.
The second essay, Chapter 3, aims to examine the eect of the recent global economic
and nancial crisis originating in U.S. stock markets on the stock markets of the GCC
countries and to determine whether the sharp falls in these markets were due to the
existence of the phenomenon \contagion" or whether they just reect the continuation
of the strong economic and nancial linkages between the GCC economies and the U.S.
economy, which exist in all states of the world during good and bad times. In
particular, Chapter 3 investigates whether contagion exists from the U.S. stock market
to the stock markets of the GCC by comparing two sub-periods before (stable) and
after (turmoil) the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which is the largest bank to ll for
bankruptcy in U.S. history and has been widely used by many economists as a
benchmark for the U.S. economic and nancial crisis (see Bekaert et al. (2012) and
Mishkin (2010)). Empirically, Chapter 3 investigates the existence of contagion using
the cross-market correlations tests pioneered by King and Wadhwani (1990) and
developed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who criticized previous studies for their use
of unadjusted correlation coecients to investigate the presence of contagion across
stock markets due to the heteroskedasticity resulting from the bias in stock market6 Chapter 1 Introduction
returns of the crisis country. Hence, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) introduced the
adjusted cross-market correlation coecient, which does not depend on the volatility
(variance) of the crisis country, especially during the turmoil period. Studying
contagion is of particular interest to policy makers as well as investors in the GCC to
investigate the extent to which GCC stock markets are vulnerable to dierent
international nancial crises. If contagion exists, policy makers need to strengthen the
ability of the nancial system to absorb the adverse impact of any nancial crisis. This
can be done via improving regulations and supervisory frameworks at domestic levels,
increasing the depth of GCC nancial markets, pursuing a coordinated set of policies
among the GCC countries as a bloc (which would also be benecial for the formation
of the GCC monetary union) in order to make the GCC capable of reducing the
exposure to international nancial contagions in periods of crisis. Understanding
nancial contagion is crucial to the fact that gains from international portfolio
diversication are reduced when stock markets exhibit correlation, a revelation that
will be informative for investors and help them make better decisions regarding
portfolio diversication allocations. Finally, knowing that contagion has occurred
between two stock markets after a crisis may serve as a \wake-up call" for investors,
providing them with useful information for avoiding any future spreads of the crisis.
The last essay is presented in Chapter 4, in which I investigate the implications of
xing exchange rate on monetary policy in the context of the GCC countries whose
exchange rate regimes have been xed to the U.S. dollar for a long time. In particular,
Chapter 4 aims to assess the sensitivity of the GCC countries' interest rates to the U.S.
rate, since the theory of interest parity suggests that xing GCC exchange rates to the
U.S. dollar should force GCC domestic interest rates to equal the U.S. interest rate. In
addition, Chapter 4 interestingly attempts to assess the stability of this sensitivity
across time and to investigate whether there exists a pronounced decoupling for some
GCC countries over some sub-periods. Furthermore, the fact that some of the
countries' exchange rates have pegged to the U.S. dollar over specic sub-periods, then
moved away from the peg over some other sub-periods (e.g., Kuwait) also gives us a
rich setting through which to investigate the implications of xing the exchange rate
on monetary policy and to determine whether a country's interest rate has a stronger
association with a base country's rate under a pegged-period than under a non-pegged
period. Empirically, this is done by testing the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) ofChapter 1 Introduction 7
each individual GCC country's interest rate, using the U.S.'s interest rate as the base
country. Chapter 4 considers the time series properties of the data and uses unit root
and co-integration tests. For each GCC country, it also utilizes a level regression for
each interest rate episode throughout the entire sample under investigation; uses the
Quandt (1960) Likelihood Ratio statistic (QLR) to determine the timing of any
potential structural break during which the country's interest rate sensitivity to the
U.S. interest rate changes; and applies the Error Correction Model (ECM) to capture
long-run dynamic behaviours between the GCC and U.S. interest rates. Studying the
linkages between domestic and U.S. short-term interest rates in the context of six GCC
countries is an important issue, since the harmonization of monetary policy among the
GCC countries is a priority if the planned monetary union is to be achieved, especially
with the existence of a common central bank, which will be in charge of conducting a
single monetary policy among the member states. This is because, if it turns out that
all the GCC countries follow the U.S. monetary policy equally, one can conclude that
the GCC countries have achieved the harmonization in their monetary policies that is
required to make the common currency a success and to allow all members to reap full
benets from it.
The overall ndings of this dissertation suggest some policy implications, by which
promote nancial integration among GCC countries, as well as some recommendations
for GCC investors. In this context, despite the fact that the empirical results of the
rst essay nd evidence of strong linkages and volatility spillover among GCC nancial
markets, GCC countries still have a long path before reaching the required level of
nancial integration to enhance their eorts towards achieving a well functioning
monetary union. In this regard, in order to promote nancial integration among GCC
countries, GCC policy makers are advised to adopt a comprehensive set of policies and
regulations to improve the depth of the GCC nancial markets; strengthen convergence
across GCC nancial systems; increase cross-listed stocks; relaxing the stock ownership
restrictions facing both GCC and foreign investors; and, most importantly, put the
GCC common market process into practice. In addition, given the evidence found in
the second essay regarding the existence of contagion from the U.S. stock market to
the GCC stock markets after the global economic and nancial crisis originating in the
U.S., GCC policy makers need to set some coordinated and precautionary policies to
strengthen the ability of their nancial systems to absorb the adverse impacts of any8 Chapter 1 Introduction
future nancial crisis and to be capable of reducing the exposure to international
nancial contagions, which might cause destabilizations in the GCC economies.
With regard to portfolio diversication, empirical results of the second and the third
essays suggest that GCC investors are encouraged to diversify their portfolios away
from both GCC and U.S. stock markets, given the signicant levels of stock market
linkages and co-movements among the GCC stock markets from one side, and between
GCC and U.S. stock markets from the other side, by which the benets from
diversication within these markets will be evaporated. Hence, GCC investors would
be better o when diversifying their portfolios by investing in some other stock
markets which are less correlated with both the GCC and U.S. stock markets.
In the last essay, ndings show that, pegging GCC exchange rates to the U.S. dollar
has resulted in harmonization and convergence among GCC monetary policies in the
long-run, which is benecial if the planned monetary union is to be achieved, especially
with the existence of a GCC common central bank, which will be in charge of
conducting a single monetary policy among member states. However, there is some
evidence of short-run divergence for some countries (e.g. Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
UAE) over some specic periods, in particular, after the global economic and nancial
crisis in 2008. This divergence is attributed to the high ination rates faced by these
countries, which were caused by some specic domestic factors, such as increases in the
supply of credit, strong domestic demand, and a lack of supply in real estate markets
(Morsy and Kandil (2009)); and, in the case of the UAE, to the eect of the Dubai
debt crisis on increasing the UAE risk premium, which violates the validation of the
theory of interest parity in the case of the UAE. More specically, while the U.S.
monetary authorities continued to lower interest rates in order to curb high levels of
ination, monetary authorities in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE did not follow
these reductions. Hence, in order to make the GCC monetary union a success, policy
makers in these countries may consider adopting some policies that might help in
curbing ination, which caused a distortion in a country's monetary integration with
its GCC peers over specic periods. Options of these policies include increasing the
supply of real estate by encouraging private investment in this sector and slowing down
the growth of private credit.Chapter 1 Introduction 9
Date Achievements
1983 Free Trade Agreement among the GCC countries.
Dec 2001 endorsement of the new Economic Agreement
Jan 2003 GCC Custom Union launched and all the GCC currencies have
been ocially pegged to the U.S. dollar.
Dec 2005 approved upon the economic convergence criteria similar to those
of the European Union.
Jan 2008 GCC Common market launched.
Jan 2009 Heads of States authorised the Monetary Union Agreement and
the Statue of the Monetary Council.
March 2010 The board of the Monetary Council rst meeting.
Source:GCC Secretariat General
Table 1.1: GCC eorts and achievements towards monetary union.10 Chapter 1 Introduction
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Table 1.2: Economic indicators for the GCC countries as in 2012.Chapter 1 Introduction 11
Country 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Bahrain 21.12 28.13 21.17 16.93 20.42 17.15 16.06
Kuwait 128.94 188.04 107.16 95.93 119.62 100.86 97.09
Oman 16.15 23.06 14.19 17.30 20.26 19.71 20.10
Qatar 61.56 95.48 76.30 87.85 120.35 125.41 126.37
Saudi Arabia 326.8 515.1 246.3 318.7 353.4 338.8 373.3
UAEa 219.6 224.7 99.14 110.2 125.9 120.6 126.6
Total 774.25 1074.5 565.05 647.06 763.3 722.6 759.63
Source:World Bank, World Development Indicators 2013 and GCC national stock markets.
Table 1.3: GCC stock markets market capitalization in billions U.S. $ over the period
2006-2012.
aValues are for both Dubai and Abu Dhabi stock markets.12 Chapter 1 Introduction
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Table 1.4: GCC stock markets main indicators as in 2013.
aAs in 2012
bValues are for both Dubai and Abu Dhabi stock markets.Chapter 1 Introduction 13
Market Foreign Investment Ceiling
Bahrain GCC rms and GCC citizens can own up to 100% of listed Bahrain
companies; non-GCC rms or citizens may own up to 49% of listed
Bahrain companies.
Kuwait GCC and non-GCC citizens can own up to 49% of listed Kuwaiti
companies.
Oman GCC and non-GCC citizens can own up to 70% of Omani listed
stocks.
Qatar Non-resident foreign investors and GCC citizens may own up to
25% of a listed company that allows such ownership; there are
companies-imposed individual ownership limits. With approval,
listed companies can increase foreign ownership level to 100%.
Saudi Arabia GCC citizens can own up to 25% of Saudi listed company; the Saudi
stock market is closed to foreign(non-GCC) investors; currently
foreign investors have limited opportunities to invest using equity
swaps or via a small number of exchange-traded funds.
UAE Foreign investors are entitled to 49% ownership; dierent restric-
tions may apply to individual companies; up to 100% ownership of
listed company for GCC citizens with company's approval.
Source:Standard and Poor's Global Stock Market Factbook, 2013.
Table 1.5: Foreign Ownership Restrictions for Listed Stocks in the GCC Markets.14 Chapter 1 Introduction
Figure 1.1: Oil and Gas proved reserves and production at the end of 2012.
Source:BP Statistical Review of the world Energy, June 2013.Chapter 2
Volatility spillover among GCC
stock markets
2.1 Introduction
Volatility spillover between stock markets refers to the transmission of past shocks
from one stock market to another market. Studying volatility spillover provides useful
insights of how information is transmitted from one stock market to another foreign
stock market and vice versa. Absence of volatility spillover implies that, the major
sources of disturbances are changes in market-specic fundamentals, and a country
specic large shock increases the volatility only in its own market. In contrast,
existence of volatility spillover implies that, one country-specic large shock increases
the volatilities not only in its own market but also in other markets as well (Hong
(2001)).
The analysis of volatility spillover is crucial for market participants (e.g., investors and
risk managers) and policy makers. It is well known in the nancial economics literature
that, there exists potential gains from international portfolio diversication only if
markets are not signicantly correlated. Hence, the presence of volatility spillover
between markets severely reduces the benets of portfolio diversication. So, investors
and risk managers need to adjust their portfolios with lower correlated markets
Bekaert and Harvey (2003). Policy makers are also interested in understanding the
nature of volatility transmission across markets, because of its impact on the stability
1516 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
of the nancial system. For instance, when two markets exhibit a volatility spillover, a
shock occurred in one market may have a destabilizing eects on the other market.
Hence, policy makers need to recognize the volatility spillover between nancial
markets when implementing their policy coordination and formulate their regulations.
This chapter aims to explore the pairwise linkages and volatility spillover between
GCC stock markets, namely, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
United Arab of Emirates (Dubai). In particular, the goal of this chapter is to
investigate the extent to which past volatility or shocks are transmitted from one GCC
stock market to another GCC market's current volatility at the aggregate level (e.g.,
the general stock markets' price indices), and to determine whether a past volatility in
one GCC market aects the current volatility in another GCC market. Furthermore,
this chapter attempts to extend the investigation of the volatility spillover at a more
disaggregated level by capturing the intra-sectoral linkages and volatility spillover
eects among equivalent sectors across the GCC stock markets namely, the banking,
industrial, and insurance sectors. The purpose of making such a distinction between
these two types of volatility spillover eects-the aggregate and the disaggregate-is to
enable me to assess the exposure of dierent sectors-to-sector specic past shocks
within the region on one hand; on the other hand, such a distinction gives more
insights about which sector derives the volatility spillover at the aggregate level, if
exists, across the GCC stock markets. Figures 2.1 : 2.4 plot the daily closing price of
the GCC stock markets' general indices as well as the daily closing prices for the
GCC's banking, industrial, and insurance sectors indices.
Investigating the linkages between stock markets in the context of the GCC countries
is a central issue by which GCC policy makers gain further insights on how and to
what extent the GCC nancial markets are integrated. Financial integration among
GCC countries is a vital issue, especially in the critical stage before introducing the
GCC common currency, to determine whether these countries full one of the main
requirements of the potential monetary union, which enhances the union's
macroeconomic stabilization. Moreover, nancial integration improves risk sharing
among the member states and the nancial stability of such a union, which are very
important aspects to be considered by GCC policy makers in order to avoid any
negative impacts and spillovers to the monetary union as a whole. Furthermore,
GCC-integrated stock markets will enhance the eciency of capital allocation as wellChapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 17
as the liquidity of stock markets within the GCC region. For example, when the GCC
markets are integrated, the liquidity of the stock markets will be improved due to
increases in the trading of individual nancial assets caused by increases in
cross-boarder ows of funds. This improvement in stock markets liquidity will, in turn,
lead to a decrease in the cost of capital for companies willing to raise capital and lower
transaction costs for GCC investors. Accordingly, one would expect some degree of
volatility spillover and interdependence between the individual national markets of the
GCC, especially due to the presence of strong economic and nancial linkages and
policy coordination between these countries, which can link their stock markets
movement overtime.
Empirically, this chapter exploits the causality-in-variance test pioneered by Cheung
and Ng (1996) and developed by Hong (2001), who introduced a class of asymptotic
N(0,1) tests for volatility spillover between two time series that exhibit conditional
heteroskedasticity and may have innite unconditional variances. These tests are based
on a weighted sum of squared sample cross-correlations between two squared
standardised residuals using the conditional variances obtained from univariate
Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticty (GARCH) estimations. This
weighting scheme is to assign larger weights to more recent values to capture an
interesting feature in nancial markets, in which the volatility of a current asset or
market is often more aected by the recent past volatility of another asset or market
than the distant past volatility.
On the aggregate level, ndings show that, except for few cases, each GCC stock
market is vulnerable to past shocks that have happened in other GCC stock markets,
conrming the existence of a pronounced volatility transmission across the six GCC
stock markets. These ndings reect the fact that the GCC countries share strong
economic and nancial linkages and policy coordination, such that stock markets in the
region respond similarly to common shocks. Furthermore, results of the equity sectors
analysis indicate that volatility spillover across the six stock markets studied is driven
mainly by the linkages and spillover eects between banking sectors and, to lesser
extent, industrial sectors, while the insurance sectors played no role in the volatility
spillover eects across these markets.
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been documented in enormous research agenda, however less attention has been made
to the GCC stock markets. In this regard, this chapter contributes to the existing
literature of the volatility spillover between stock markets by adding empirical evidence
in the context of GCC countries using the causality-in-variance test. To the best of my
knowledge, unlike the previous studies of GCC markets, this is the rst study to
investigate the volatility spillover between all the six GCC markets pairs (a total of 30
pairs), as well as employing two relatively new causality-in-variance tests namely, Q1
and Q2 developed in Hong (2001) within the context of the GCC countries.
Furthermore, it is the rst empirical study that I aware of, to investigate the volatility
spillover at a more disaggregated level between the GCC stock market sectors. Finally,
analysing GCC stock markets co-movement also gives a measure on the level of
markets integration between GCC countries, which is of a great interest, especially for
the planned GCC monetary union.
The remaining of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 undertakes a brief
survey of the relevant literature. Sections 2.3 and 2.4 describe the methodology and
the data adopted for the study. Section 2.5 presents the empirical results. Section 2.6
concludes the chapter.
2.2 Literature review
An extensive research agenda has focused primarily on examining volatility spillover
between stock markets in developed countries (Hamao et al. (1990)seminal paper,
Susmel and Engle (1994), and Koutmos and Booth (1995)) were among these studies.
This line of studies analyses the linkages and volatility spillover between developed
stock markets such as New York, Tokyo, and London markets, and found some
evidence of the existence of volatility transmission among these markets. Other studies
extent the investigation of volatility spillover among stock markets in the context of
European countries, especially after the launching of the European monetary union
and the introduction of the Euro (Baele (2005), Kim et al. (2005), and Bartram et al.
(2007)). The main goal of these studies was to investigate whether European nancial
markets became more integrated after the formation of the European monetary union.
Kim et al. (2005) and Bartram et al. (2007) found some empirical evidence of increased
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common currency, however, Baele (2005) indicated that the European shock spillover
intensity increased primarily in the second part of the 1980s and the rst part of the
1990s suggesting that, economic integration as well as eorts to further liberalize
European capital markets were more important in bringing markets closer together
than the process towards monetary integration and the introduction of the single
currency. Moreover, enormous studies have focused on testing the volatility spillover
across either emerging markets or from developed markets to emerging markets.
Among these studies, Edwards and Susmel (2001) who modelled cross-market volatility
co-movements between Latin America stock markets and found evidence of existence
volatility spillover eects among Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Chile. Also, Gebka and
Serwa (2007) investigated returns and volatility spillovers between 12 emerging stock
markets from Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America, and South-East Asia. The
authors found evidence of volatility spillover eect in both intra-regional (countries
located in the same region) and inter-regional (countries located in dierent regions),
however, the volatility spillover was more pronounced in intra-regional countries. On
the other hand, given the growing signicance role of nancial and trade linkages
between emerging and developed countries, Liu and Pan (1997), Ng (2000), and
Miyakoshi (2003), examined the volatility spillover eect from the U.S. and Japan to
the Asian stock markets. The empirical results of these studies were dierent, in which
the rst two studies, suggested that the volatility spillover eect from the U.S. market
to the Asian stock markets was greater than the volatility spillover eect from the
Japanese market to the Asian stock markets, while Miyakoshi (2003) concluded that
the Asian markets are inuenced more by the Japanese market's volatility than by that
of the U.S stock market.
Despite the substantial numbers of studies investigating the volatility spillover among
stock markets, GCC stock markets have received a very little attention by researchers.
Most of the literature on GCC stock markets volatility spillover has focused mainly on
the spillover of oil prices on the GCC stock markets, reecting the fact GCC economies
are oil-based economies (Malik and Hammoudeh (2007), Hammoudeh and Choi (2006),
Arouri and Fouquau (2009), and Hammoudeh and Aleisa (2004)). All these studies,
found a signicant evidence of volatility transmission from the oil market to the GCC
stock markets.
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some selected GCC stock markets, not all of them. These studies have inconsistent
evidence with regard to the transmission of volatility across the GCC stock markets.
In particular, investigating volatility spillover across ve GCC stock markets (Qatar is
not included) from May 2004 to September 2006, using GARCH modelling approach,
Onour (2010) found that, there was a bi-directional volatility spillover eect between
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia stock markets while Bahrain and Oman stock markets are
neither inuenced each other nor aected the other markets in the region. These
ndings contradicted with the previous work of Abraham and Seyyed (2006), who
investigated volatility spillover between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain stock markets
during the period from 19 October, 1998 to 1 October, 2003, using a bivariate
EGARCH. The authors observed a volatility spillover eect from Bahrain stock market
to its Saudi counterpart but not vice-versa. Furthermore, Al-Deehani and Moosa
(2006) used the concept of stochastic volatility and structural time-series modelling to
investigate volatility spillovers among the stock markets of Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi
Arabia from January 1, 2000 to April 15, 2003. the empirical results of this study,
revealed a strong volatility spillover from Kuwait to the other two markets; while the
Saudi market exerted strong spillover eect on Kuwait market but had no eect on the
Bahrain market; however, Bahrain market had a positive eect on its Kuwait
counterpart but not on Saudi market. Finally, a more recent International Monetary
Fund (IMF)'s working paper by Saadi-Sedik and Williams (2011) analysed the impact
of global and regional spillovers to GCC equity markets from April, 2000 to September,
2010 using a trivariate GARCH model to identify the magnitude of spillovers and their
transmission mechanisms. The empirical results of this paper, suggested that cross
eects of past shocks in regional markets had an important spillover eects in local
equity markets, which emphasized the need to strengthen cross-border regulatory
frameworks.
2.3 Methodology
The objective of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which past volatility or
shocks are transmitted from one GCC stock market to another GCC market's current
volatility at the aggregate level (e.g., the general stock markets' price indices), as well
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insurance sectors. In this regard, the two-step causality-in-variance test pioneered by
Cheung and Ng (1996) and developed by Hong (2001) is applied. This is a new test for
investigating the volatility spillover using the sample cross-correlation function (CCF)
between two squared residuals standardized by their conditional variance estimators
obtained from the univariate Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroscedasticty
(GARCH) proposed by Bollerslev (1986). It is worth-mentioning that a potential
drawback of using this approach (pairwise comparisons) is that, it does not allow the
entire variance-covariance (e.g, volatility spillovers) interrelationships among GCC
stock market returns to be captured. In other words, unlike a multivariate approach,
pairwise comparisons might not allow us to discriminate between any direct and
indirect spillovers when investigating all GCC stock market returns.
First I estimate the univariate (GARCH) model for each GCC stock market general
(sectoral) returns series as follows:
Rit = bi0 +
p X
j=1
bijRit j + "it; i = 1;2;::::;6 (2.1)
where Rit = ln(rit=rit 1) is the daily returns, rit is the daily stock market (sectoral)
index of the ith GCC country, p is the number of lags, and
"it = zit
p
hit (2.2)
where fzitg is an innovation process. So, the GARCH (1,1) equation would be as in
equation 2.3
hit = !i + i"2
it 1 + ihit 1 (2.3)
where hit is a conditional variance at time t, i captures the eect of the past own
shocks of the Rit (ARCH eect), and i represents the own lagged volatility of the Rit
(GARCH eect). The sucient condition to ensure a positive conditional variance
(ht  0) is that the estimated GARCH parameters ^ !i > 0 and (^ ; ^ )  0 for each GCC
stock market.
The second step in the testing procedure is implemented by constructing the test
statistic under the null hypothesis as in equation 2.4, that stock market (sector) for
country B (R2t ) does not Granger-cause stock market(sector) for country A (R1t) in
variance with respect to It 1, where Iit, i = 1;2 is the information set of time series22 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Rit available at period t and It = (I1t;I2t). This can be written as:
H0 : V ar(z1tjI1t 1) = V ar(z1tjIt 1) (2.4)
Versus
H1 : V ar(z1tjI1t 1) 6= V ar(z1tjIt 1) (2.5)
where z1t is an innovation process of equation 2.2 with E(zitjIit 1) = 0 and
E(z2
itjIit 1) = 1. Although the squared innovations fz2
itg are unobservable, they can be
estimated by using centred squared residuals standardized by their conditional variance
estimators, respectively Hong (2001). The centred squared standardized residuals for
each pair of the GCC stock markets are obtained from equation 2.3 as
^ ut = (^ "2
1t=^ h1t)   1 and ^ vt = (^ "2
2t=^ h2t)   1. Thus, we can test H0 by checking if z2t
Granger-causes z1t in variance with respect to It 1. If H0 is rejected, one can conclude
that there is a volatility spillover from past R2t to R1t.
In order to test for H0, I follow Hong (2001) by using the sample cross-correlation
function between ^ ut and ^ vt, which can be written as:
^ uv(j) = f ^ Cuu(0) ^ Cvv(0)g
 1=2 ^ Cuv(j) (2.6)
where ^ Cuv(j) is the sample cross-covariance function
^ Cuv(j) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
T 1
T P
t=j+1
^ ut^ vt j; j  0;
T 1
T P
t= j+1
^ ut+j^ vt; j < 0,
and ^ Cuu(0) = T 1
T P
t=1
^ u2
t and ^ Cvv(0) = T 1
T P
t=1
^ v2
t.
Hong (2001) proposed the following test in equation 2.7 and its standardized version in
equation 2.8 as follows:
T
T 1 X
j=1
k2(j=M)^ 2
uv(j) (2.7)
where k(:) is a weighting function, j is the lag order, and M is a positive integer, which
can be considered as the number of the used sample cross correlations included for the
spillover e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function, where
k(w) =
8
<
:
1; jwj  1;
0; otherwise,
Q1 =
8
<
:
T
T 1 X
j=1
k2(j=M)^ 2
uv(j)   C1T(k)
9
=
;
.
f2D1T(k)g
1=2; (2.8)
where
C1T(k) =
T 1 X
j=1
(1   j=T)k2(j=M);
D1T(k) =
T 1 X
j=1
(1   j=T)f1   (j + 1)=Tgk4(j=M):
are approximately the mean and variance of equation 2.7 respectively. Moreover,
Q1 ! N(0;1) in distribution and Q1 diverges to positive innity in probability as
T ! 1 under a general class of alternatives. This implies that asymptotically,
negative values of Q1 occur only under H0. Therefore, Q1 is a one-sided test;
upper-tailed N(0;1) critical values should be used for testing Q1 (Hong (2001)). The
key feature of the Hong (2001) test is the using of the non-uniform weighting functions
k(:), on contrary to Cheung and Ng (1996), who used a uniform weighting, because
they give equal weighting for each lag. The main idea behind using such a non-uniform
weighting functions is that, recent past volatility has a larger inuence on current
volatility than remote past volatility. So, it gives a greater weight to lower lag order j.
In addition to Q1, Hong (2001) introduced another test statistic Q2 (equation 2.9) for
other causality hypothesis. More specically, when there is no prior information about
the direction of causality is available, it is more proper to test the bi-directional
hypothesis that neither stock market for country B (R2t ) Granger-causes stock market
for country A (R1t) in variance with respect to (I1t;I2t 1), nor stock market for
country A (R1t) Granger-causes stock market for country B (R2t ) with respect to
(I1t 1;I2t). In other words, we need to test that neither the stock market of country B
has a volatility spillover to that of country A, nor the stock market of country A has a
volatility spillover to that of country B.
Q2 =
8
<
:
T
T 1 X
j=1 T
k2(j=M)^ 2
uv(j)   C2T(k)
9
=
;
.
f2D2T(k)g
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where
C2T(k) =
T 1 X
j=1 T
(1   j j j =T)k2(j=M)
D2T(k) =
T 1 X
j=1
(1   j j j =T)f1   (j j j +1)=Tgk4(j=M);
In this respect, like Q1, Q2 has a null asymptotic N(0;1) distribution and Q2 is a
one-sided test; upper-tailed N(0;1) critical values should be used for testing Q2 (Hong
(2001)).
2.4 Data description
The empirical analysis of this chapter uses continuously compounded daily closing
prices (obtained from the data-stream) for the general indices of the six GCC stock
markets, namely, the Bahrain Stock Exchange all share index, the Kuwait Stock
Exchange, the Oman Muscat Securities Market index, the Qatar Doha Securities
Market index, the Saudi Arabia stock market all share index, and the United Arab of
Emirates Dubai Financial Market index. The data cover various starting date based on
the earliest availability of daily market data for each GCC stock market, as early as
22-10-1996 for Oman and as late as 31-12-2003 for Dubai. Hence, due to these
dierences in the starting date for each country, the sample size varies among the GCC
countries. Table 2.1 shows the starting date, end date, and sample size for each GCC
country's stock market. With regard to GCC stock markets' sectors, daily data
collected from data-stream cover the period from January 1, 2004 to February 6, 2013
for all GCC sectoral stock market indices-except for Saudi Arabia stock market, data
start in April 19, 2007 due to a new sector classications. The data is divided into
three sectoral price indices, namely, banking, industrial, and insurance sectors for all
the six GCC stock markets except for Dubai stock market as the industrial sector does
not exist in Dubai nancial market and no adequate data available for the insurance
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2.5 Empirical results
2.5.1 Aggregate levels
After applying the Partial Auto Correlation Function (PACF) and the Akaike
Information Criterion (AIC) as diagnostic tests to nd which AR (p) models are
adequate for the six GCC stock markets series. These tests suggest that, Bahrain is
AR (1), while Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are AR (6), both Qatar and Dubai are AR (8),
and Oman is AR (2). Table 2.2 (Panel A) summarizes the mean equation results
(equation 2.1) for each GCC stock market. Bahrain (AR(1)) results show that, the rst
lag is statistically signicant at the 1% level but the intercept is insignicant. For
Kuwait (AR(6)), the intercept, the rst, the second, the third, and the fourth lags are
statistically signicant at the 1% level, however the fth and the sixth lags are
insignicant. In the case of Oman (AR(2)), the results show that the intercept and the
rst lag are signicant at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively, but the second lag is
insignicant. Qatar (AR(8)) results imply that the intercept, the rst, the fth, and
the sixth lags are signicant at the 1% level, however, all the others remaining
variables are insignicant. According to the Saudi Arabia data (AR(6)), the intercept
and all the lagged coecients, except the third and the sixth lags, are signicant at the
5% level. In the case of Dubai (AR(8)), just the second lag is signicant at the 1%
level and all the others lags and the intercept are insignicant. In this regard, for all
the GCC stock markets, I found that returns are serially correlated (i.e. AR process),
which is typically in contrast with more developed/liquid markets like the U.S. or UK
and suggesting market ineciency.
With regard to the Quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) results of the univariate
GARCH (1,1) model for each GCC stock market (equation 2.3), Table 2.2 (Panel B)
shows that, the estimated GARCH parameters ^ !i > 0 and (^ ; ^ ) 0 for all GCC stock
markets, which is considered as a sucient condition to ensure a positive conditional
variance (ht  0). In addition, ^ 's estimated parameters are all signicant at the 1%
level for all the GCC markets, indicating the presence of own past shocks or the ARCH
eect, and ^ 's are highly signicant at the 1% level for the six GCC stock markets,
namely Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Dubai ranging from .71 in
Qatar to .86 in Kuwait, implying the existence of own past volatility or GARCH e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Figures 2.5 : 2.10 plot the conditional variance of GARCH eect for all the GCC stock
markets general indices. Moreover, ^  + ^  ' 1, which indicates a strong volatility
persistence for these markets. Worth mentioning that, I also tried lower orders AR
models for Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and Dubai and higher AR orders models for
Bahrain and Oman, however, the estimated GARCH parameters remain mostly the
same without any signicant changes.
Since the goal of this chapter is to investigate whether there exists a volatility spillover
eect among the GCC stock markets general and sectors indices, I rst consider the
one-way volatility spillover test statistic (Q1) as in equation 2.8 up to 100 M (e.g.,
M = 1;2;3:::;100), which is the number of the used sample cross correlations included
for the spillover eect, in order to detect the direction for causality in variance for each
pair of the GCC stock markets. The reason behind choosing such a high number of the
used sample cross correlations included for the spillover eect (M) is to capture any
spillover eect across the GCC stock markets, if exists, in three dierent time periods,
in particular, short-run (M = 1 : 14) days, medium-run (M = 15 : 59) days, and
long-run (M = 60 : 100) days.
Before tackling the empirical results in this chapter, Table 2.3 summarizes the overall
key ndings of this chapter. More specically and with respect to the spillover eect
among the GCC stock markets at the aggregate level, ndings show that, except for
few cases, each GCC stock market is vulnerable to past shocks that have happened in
the other GCC stock markets, conrming the existence of a pronounced
contemporaneous volatility transmission across the six GCC stock markets. The
spillover eect varies across GCC markets with regard to the time during which the
volatility transmission occurs (e.g., in the short-run (SR) and/or the medium-run (MR)
and/or the long-run (LR)). These ndings reect the fact that the GCC countries
share strong economic and nancial linkages and policy coordination by which stock
markets in the region respond similarly to common shocks. In this regard, Figures 2.11
: 2.16 plot the pairwise correlations among the GCC stock markets at the aggregate
level for each M. Furthermore, according to the equity sectors analysis, results indicate
that volatility spillover across the six stock markets studied in this chapter is driven
mainly by the linkages and spillover eects between banking sectors and, to lesser
extent, industrial sectors, while the insurance sectors played no role in the volatility
spillover eects across these markets. These results reveal that the banking sector isChapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 27
the most vital sector among the GCC stock markets sectors, which is due to its
dominating role in the nancial sectors within the GCC region as well as its market
capitalization, which is the highest of all sectors in the GCC stock markets.
Meanwhile, the industrial sector plays a relatively modest role in causing spillover
eects among the GCC stock markets. This is due to the fact that the industrial sector
is highly dependent on the oil market's basic variations and price uctuations, leading
this sector to be more vulnerable to these developments than the intra-sector spillover
within the GCC region. Finally, the insurance sector plays no role in volatility spillover
transmission among the GCC stock markets, which is due to the fact that the
insurance sector is characterised by having smallest market capitalization of all GCC
sectors, as well as having low trading activities and little investment interest from
GCC investors. This leads to the fact that the insurance sectors in some GCC stock
markets have had many days with no trading.
Turning back to details of the empirical results, Table 2.4 shows the results for testing
whether there exists a volatility spillover eect from past shocks of Bahrain's stock
market (R2t) to the other GCC stock markets' current shocks (R1t). With regard to
the volatility spillover from Bahrain stock market to Kuwait's market, the values of Q1
are 2.4, 2.03, 2.02, 1.79, and 1.64 for M = 60, 65, 70, 75, 79, 85, and 90, respectively,
suggesting a signicant long run volatility spillover eect from past innovations in
Bahrain stock market to current innovations in Kuwait stock market at the 1% level of
signicance for M = 60, at the 5% level for M = 65, 70, 75, 79, and at the 10% level
for M = 90. These ndings reect the fact that many cross-listing companies exist
between these two markets, which allows shocks in one market to be transmitted to the
other market.
Also, the results in Table 2.4 exhibit a highly signicant long run volatility spillover
from Bahrain market's past shocks to Oman market's current shocks at the 1% level
(except for M = 75 and 79), where the values of Q1 are 3.55, 3.10, 3.32, 3.09, 2.81, 2.52,
2.27, and 1.92 for M = 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75, and 79, respectively; this is due to the
fact that the Bahrain Securities Market signed on December 25, 1996, a cross listing
agreement with the Oman Stock Exchange. It is worth mentioning that, the ndings in
the case of Kuwait and Oman, which show volatility spillover eect from Bahrain stock
market to these two markets in large M (e.g. M = 45 and 60) support what Hong
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and such a processes can have a long distributed lag, such that the cross-correlation at
each lag is small but their joint eect is substantial. So, tests based on small number
of sample cross-correlation(small M) may fail to identify such alternatives.
In the case of testing volatility spillover from Bahrain to Saudi-Arabia, the values of
Q1 are 1.59, 2.82, 2.23, and 1.68 for M = 2, 3, 4, and 5, respectively, implying the
existence of a strong short run volatility spillover eect at the 1% level for M = 3 and
4, at the 5% for M = 5, and at the 10% for M = 2. These ndings can be considered
supportive evidence that recent past volatility has a greater inuence more than
distant past volatility. Moreover, these ndings contradict with the previous work of
Al-Deehani and Moosa (2006), who found that Bahrain market did not have any
volatility spillover eect on the Saudi market, and are in line with Abraham and
Seyyed (2006), who found that there existed a volatility spillover eect from Bahrain
stock market to the stock market of Saudi Arabia. Finally, the ndings in Table 2.4
suggest that there is no any volatility spillover eects from Bahrain stock market to
the stock markets of Qatar and Dubai, where the values of the Q1 are insignicant at
any reasonable level of signicance for these two markets.
My interpretation to the overall ndings, which investigates volatility spillover eects
from Bahrain stock market's past shocks to the other GCC markets' current shocks, is
that Bahrain stock market is the most liberalized GCC market, though has the second
smallest market capitalization, in terms of openness to foreign investors allowing GCC
nationals to own stocks up to 100% and non-GCC citizens up to 49%. Moreover, these
ndings diers from that of Onour (2010), who found that Bahrain stock market did
not aect the other markets in the region as there is no volatility spillover from
Bahrain stock market to any GCC stock market.
With regard to testing the existence of volatility spillover eect from past Kuwait stock
market's volatility to the other GCC markets current volatility, Table 2.5 reports the
Q1 values for dierent M as well as their signicance for each pair. The results show
that there exists a pronounced short run volatility spillover eect from Kuwait stock
market's past shocks to Bahrain stock market current ones at the 1% level of
signicance, where the values of Q1 are 3.57, 3.71, and 3.13 for M = 2, 3, and 4,
respectively, which is considered an additional supportive evidence that recent past
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occurred in Kuwait stock market will be transmitted to the Bahrain market
immediately or in the short run; and as mentioned above the spillover eect is due to
the cross-listing between these two markets. Moreover, the Q1 values, for investigating
the spillover from past Kuwait shocks to Oman current ones, are 5.38, 4.11, 3.21, 2.76
and 2.05 for M = 2, 3, 4, 5, and 20 respectively, and are 4.56, 4.13, 3.94, 3.66, 3.56,
2.91, 2.90 for M = 60, 65, 70, 75, 79, 90, and 100, respectively. These results imply a
very signicant short and long run volatility spillover eects from Kuwait market to
Oman market at the 1% signicance level (except for M = 20).
In addition, the results for testing the volatility spillover from Kuwait to Qatar are not
dierent than the other previous results, in that there exists a signicant medium and
long run spillover at the 5% signicance level for M = 34, 36, and 38, with Q1 values
are 2.06, 1.77, and 1.71 respectively, and at the 1% level for M = 100, where Q1 value
is 10.34. Furthermore and in line with the ndings of Al-Deehani and Moosa (2006)
who found that Kuwait market exerts strong volatility spillover eect on Saudi market,
results show that there is a signicant short and medium-runs volatility spillover
eects from Kuwait market to its Saudi peer at the 5% signicance level, where Q1
values are 2.57, 2.25, 1.78, and 1.69 for M = 1, 20, 24, and 28. Finally, for the
volatility spillover from Kuwait market to Dubai nancial market, ndings show that
there is a long-run volatility spillover, though weak, at the 10% level (except for
M = 50), with the Q1 values are 1.36, 1.66, 1.53, and 1.35 for M = 45, 50, 55, and 100.
To sum up, Kuwait stock exchange market past shocks aect all the other GCC market
volatility. These ndings are not surprising for a number of reasons, the Kuwait stock
exchange is the second largest stock market in the region in terms of market
capitalization; Kuwait stock market is the oldest regulated market in the GCC region;
in 2000 the GCC and non-GCC citizens were permitted access to the local market and
own shares up to 49% of stocks; nally, the Kuwait stock exchange is one of the most
active and liquid markets in the region (Al-Deehani and Moosa (2006)).
When volatility spillover from Oman stock market to the other GCC markets is
considered, with the exception of Bahrain and Dubai, ndings in Table 2.6 show that,
there is no evidence of volatility spillover eect from Oman market to the other GCC
market at any level of signicance and for any M. These ndings are indicative of the
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stock markets, and it is the most illiquid market. On the other hand, the results show
that there exists a short-run volatility spillover from Muscat Securities Market to
Bahrain Stock Exchange with Q1 values equal 1.36, 1.84, 2.08, and 1.67 for M = 2, 3,
4, and 5, respectively. These results are due to-as mentioned before-the cross listing
agreement between the two markets in 1996. Moreover, for testing the volatility
spillover from Oman market to Dubai market, the Q1 values are 10.64, 7.03, 5.36, 4.68,
3.88, 2.19, 1.80, 2.46, and 1.91 for M = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 20, 24, 45, and 50, respectively,
implying a signicant short and long-runs volatility spillover eects at the 1% level
(except for M = 20, 24, and 50 at the 5% level).
According to the volatility spillover from past innovations in Qatar market to the
current innovations in the other GCC stock markets, results in Table 2.7 imply that,
there exists a strong volatility spillover from Qatar market to all the other GCC stock
markets, despite the fact that Doha Securities Market allows both GCC and non-GCC
nationals to own up to just 25% of shares, which is the lowest regrading the limits on
foreign ownership (after that of the Saudi Arabia's market) of individual stocks
available for GCC investors in all GCC countries. In the case of investigating the
volatility spillover eect from Qatar stock market past shocks to Bahrain stock market,
the Q1 values are 1.77, 1.89, 1.82, and 1.83 for M = 65, 75, 79, and 90, indicating a
long-run volatility spillover eect at the 5% level. For Kuwait, the results demonstrate
a pronounced short-run volatility spillover eect from Qatar stock market to Kuwait
stock market at the 1% level for M = 2, 3, 4, and 5, where the Q1 values are 9.5, 7.88,
6.49, and 5.49, respectively. Again these results are considered supportive evidence
that recent past volatility has a greater eect than distant past volatility. When we
consider volatility spillover from Qatar market to Oman stock market, the Q1 values
are signicant at any reasonable level of signicance and for every M except for
M = 1, implying a strong volatility spillover from Qatar market to Oman market at
short, medium, and long runs. In the case of Saudi market, the Q1 values are
signicant at the 1% level for the rst M (M = 1) up to M = 45 (except for M = 36
and 38) and at the 5% level for M = 50 and 55, suggesting a signicant volatility
spillover from Qatar stock market to Saudi Arabia stock market over the short,
medium, and long-runs. Finally, for testing the volatility spillover from Qatar stock
market to Dubai stock market, the Q1 values are all signicant at the 1% level for all
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Dubai in all the three time periods, namely, short-run, medium-run, and long-run.
With respect to the volatility spillover from Saudi Arabia's stock market to the other
GCC markets, the overall ndings in Table 2.8, show a strong volatility spillover eects
from Saudi market to the other GCC stock markets, which come from the fact that
Saudi Arabia's stock market is by far the largest stock market in the gulf region in
terms of market capitalization, and due to the leading economic and political role that
Saudi Arabia plays not only in the gulf region but also in the Arab world. In
particular, ndings in Table 2.8 exhibit a highly medium and long-runs volatility
spillover eects from Saudi market to Bahrain market at the 1% level of signicance
for all reported Ms (except for M = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 90, and 100). These ndings are
contradict with the previous work of Al-Deehani and Moosa (2006) and Abraham and
Seyyed (2006), who found no volatility spillover from Saudi market to Bahrain market.
In the case of testing the volatility spillover eect from Saudi Arabia stock market to
that of Kuwait stock market, the values of Q1 are 3.73, 2.88, 2.24, and 1.72 for M = 2,
3, 4, and 5, respectively as an evidence of the existence of a signicant short-run
volatility spillover at the 1% level for M= 2 and 3, and at the 5% for the remaining Ms.
These results are in line with Al-Deehani and Moosa (2006) who found that the Saudi
market has a strong spillover eect on Kuwait market. Moreover, these ndings are
further evidence that nancial markets are usually more inuenced by the recent past
volatility than by the remote past events. For Oman, the results of the Q1 values
indicate a highly signicant volatility spillover from Saudi market to Oman market at
any reasonable level of signicance and for the all the reported Ms. With regard to
testing volatility spillover from Saudi stock market to Qatar market, the Q1 values are
4.68, 4.37, 3.94, 3.69, 3.2, 6.19, 5.47, 4.66, and 4.34 for M = 45, 50, 55, 60, 65, 70, 75,
79, 90, and 100, suggesting a strong medium-run and long-run volatility spillover eect
from Saudi market to Qatar market at the 1% level of signicance. These ndings
emphasize what Hong (2001) claimed regarding tests based on small number of sample
cross-correlation (small Ms), in that they may fail to capture the spillover eect when
some nancial time series may exhibit strong cross-correlation and such a processes can
have a long distributed lag, such that the cross-correlation at each lag is small but
their joint eect is substantial. Finally, the results for Dubai's nancial market are
similar to those of Oman market, in which the values of the Q1 reveal a highly
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of signicance and for all the reported Ms.
Finally, when investigating the volatility spillover eects between past shocks in Dubai
Financial Market to current shocks in the other GCC stock markets, table 2.9 reports
the results, which indicate a signicant volatility spillover from Dubai market to all of
its GCC partners. In particular, ndings show that, there exists a short-run volatility
spillover eect from Dubai market to Bahrain market at the 1% level for M = 3 and at
the 5% level for M = 4 and 5, where the Q1 values are 2.61, 1.98, and 2.06,
respectively. In the case of investigating the volatility spillover eect from Dubai stock
market to Kuwait stock market, the Q1 values are 10.66, 9.27, 9.00, 5.33, 4.93, and
4.19 for M = 28, 34 ,36, 79, 90, and 100, suggesting a highly signicant medium and
long-run volatility spillover eects at the 1% level from Dubai's past volatility to
Kuwait's current volatility. In the case of Oman, the results of the Q1 values indicate a
highly signicant volatility spillover eect from Dubai's past shocks to Oman's current
shocks at any reasonable level of signicance and for the all reported Ms. With respect
to Qatar, ndings emphasize a strong medium and long-run volatility spillover from
Dubai market to Qatar market at the 1% level for all reported Ms (except for the rst
ve Ms). In the case of Saudi market, the Q1 values are 2.33, 2.46, and 2.69 for M = 3,
4, and 5, indicating a pronounced short-run volatility spillover eect from Dubai
market to Saudi market at the 1% level of signicance. These overall ndings regarding
investigating volatility spillover from Dubai Financial Market's past shocks to the other
GCC stock markets' current shocks reect the fact that Dubai market is the third
largest market in the GCC area with regard to market capitalization; it is one of the
most liberalized markets in the region in terms of allowing a 100% of stock ownership
to the GCC citizens and a 49% for non-GCC nationals; and it is considered a nancial
hub of the GCC region. Moreover, it is worth mentioning that, in the case of Kuwait
and Qatar, which show volatility spillover eect in large Ms can be considered an
additional supportive evidence of the previous work of Hong (2001), in which the
author mentioned that some nancial time series may exhibit strong cross-correlation
and such a processes can have a long distributed lag such that the cross-correlation at
each lag is small but there joint eect is substantial. So, tests based on small number
of sample cross-correlation(small Ms) may fail to identify such alternatives.
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, when no prior information about the direction of
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equation 2.9) that neither of each GCC stock markets pair are aected by each other
past volatilities. In other words, there is no contemporaneous volatility spillover
between each GCC stock markets pairs. Table 2.10 reports the results for Q2 test for
each GCC stock markets pair-with the exception of the bi-directional volatility
spillover eects between Oman and Qatar, and between Oman and Saudi Arabia-the
results are consistent with the previous ndings obtained with regard to Q1. In
particular, the results of testing the bi-directional volatility spillover between Bahrain
and Kuwait show existence of a signicant contemporaneous short and long-run
volatility spillover eects between these two markets at the 1% level for M = 2, 3, and
4, and at the 5% level for M = 60 with Q2 values equal 2.98, 3.32, 2.58, and 2.19,
respectively. In the case of examining the bi-directional volatility spillover between
Bahrain and Oman stock markets, the Q2 values are 1.73, 1.78, 1.64, 3.09, 2.74, and
1.98 for M = 2, 3, 4, 50, 60, and 70, conrming a strong bi-directional volatility
spillover between these two markets in the short and long-run at the 1% level of
signicance for M = 50 and 60, and at the 5% level for the remaining Ms.
With respect to Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the empirical results suggest that, there
exists a signicant contemporaneous medium and long-run volatility spillover eects
between these two markets at the 1% level for M = 20 and 30, and at the 5% level for
M = 50 and 60, where the Q2 values are 5.15, 4.07, 2.44, and 1.71, respectively. On the
other hand, the Q2 values for Bahrain and Dubai (despite the fact that these two
markets are the most liberalized among the other GCC stock markets), Bahrain and
Qatar, and for Kuwait and Oman are not signicant at any reasonable level and at any
M, suggesting that there is no contemporaneous volatility spillover between each of
these mentioned stock markets pairs. With regard to Kuwait and Qatar stock markets,
results exhibit a signicant bi-directional short and long-run volatility spillover eects
between these two markets at the 1% level for M = 2, 3, 4, 5, and 100, where the
values of Q2 are 6.58, 5.20, 4.04, 3.18, and 7.11, respectively.
In the case of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia stock markets, the Q2 values are 12.39, 9.62,
9.31, 7.99, and 3.19 for M = 2 ,3, 4 ,5, and 20, respectively, indicating a strong
bi-directional short and medium-run volatility spillover eects between Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia stock markets at the 1% level of signicance. Moreover, the results for
Kuwait and Dubai are not dierent than the previous results, in which these two
markets' volatilities are a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6.22, 6.12, 5.35, 4.60, 4.13, and 3.92, which are signicant at the 1% level, for M = 30,
50, 60, 70, 90, and 100, respectively. According to identify the bi-directional volatility
spillover between Oman and Dubai, Qatar and Saudi Arabia ,Qatar and Dubai, and
Saudi Arabia and Dubai, the results show that there exist a highly contemporaneous
volatility spillover between each pair of these mentioned stock markets pairs at any
reasonable level of signicance and for all the reported Ms (except for M = 30 in the
case of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, and for M = 90 and 100 in the case of Saudi Arabia
and Dubai).
On the other hand, the only contradictory results I got are these of Oman and Qatar,
and Oman and Saudi Arabia, at which the Q2 ndings show that, there exists a
bi-directional volatility spillover eect between these two pairs. However, results from
Q1 test statistic show that there is only a one-way volatility spillover eect from Qatar
to Oman and from Saudi Arabia to Oman but the opposite does not exist. My
interpretation to these contradictory results is that, as Hong (2001) conrmed by
Monte Carlo evidence investigating the nite sample performance of the proposed Q1
and Q2 tests, the one way-test (Q1) has a better power than the two-way test (Q2).
2.5.2 Disaggregate levels
2.5.2.1 Banking sectors
Investigating volatility spillover at a disaggregated level (intra-sectoral) between
equivalent sectors across stock markets for dierent countries is sparse. My goal here is
to examine the intra-sectoral volatility spillover within the context of GCC stock
markets, namely the banking, industrial, and insurance sectors. Intra-sectoral volatility
spillover investigation enables us to assess the exposure of dierent sector-to-sector
specic past shocks within the GCC region, and it gives us more insights about which
sector is more inuential in causing volatility spillover at the aggregate level between
the GCC stock markets.
Starting with the banking sectors across the GCC stock markets, the Quasi-maximum
likelihood (QMLE) results of the univariate GARCH (1,1) model for each GCC stock
market banking sector (equation 2.3), Table 2.11 (Panel B) show, that the estimated
GARCH parameters ^ !i > 0 and (^ 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considered a sucient condition to ensure a positive conditional variance (ht  0). In
addition, ^ 's estimated parameters are all signicant at the 1% level for all the GCC
banking sectors, indicating the presence of own past shocks or the ARCH eect, and
^ 's are highly signicant at the 1% level, and ranging from .83 in Qatar to .90 in
Bahrain stock markets, implying the existence of own past volatility or GARCH eect.
Figures 2.17 : 2.22 plot the conditional variance of GARCH eect for all the GCC
stock markets banking sector indices. Moreover, ^  + ^  ' 1, which indicates a nearly
integrated GARCH process.
I rst employ the one-way volatility spillover test statistic (Q1) for each GCC banking
sector price index pair to identify the direction for causality-in-variance for each pair.
The data from Table 2.12 to Table 2.17 show that, there exists a pronounced volatility
spillover across all the GCC banking sectors pairs, with the exception of two cases
namely, past shocks volatility spillover from Bahrain's banking sector to current
volatility of Dubai's banking sector, and from Oman's banking sector to its Kuwaiti
peer. These results reveal the fact that the banking sector is one of the most vital
sectors in the GCC stock markets; this is due to its dominating role on the nancial
sectors within the GCC region as well as its highest market capitalization among all
other sectors in the GCC stock markets.
Turning back to the results for each GCC banking sector pair, Table 2.12 reports the
Q1 values for dierent Ms, as well as their signicance with regard to testing the
volatility spillover from past shocks of Bahrain banking sector to the other GCC
banking sectors current volatility. The empirical results show the presence of strong
volatility spillover from Bahrain banking sector to that of Kuwait at the 1% level of
signicance over the short-run and long-run for M = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 36, 40, 45, and
50, where the Q1 values are 7.3, 5.3, 6.4, 5.2, 4.6, 2.56, 3.07, 2.82, 2.74 and 2.37,
respectively. In the case of testing volatility transmission from Bahrain banking sector
to Oman banking sector, the values of Q1 are 4.6, 5.6, 7.1, 5.9, 3.3, 2.85, and 2.65 for
M = 1, 2 , 3, 4, 20, 24, and 25, respectively, implying the existence of a strong
volatility spillover at the 1% level over the short-run and medium-run. For volatility
spillover eect from Bahrain banking sector to Qatar banking sector, results show that,
there exists only a short-run, though signicant at the 1% level, volatility spillover
from Bahrain to Qatar banking sector for M = 3 and 4 where the Q1 values are 2.36
and 2.46. The e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counterpart is not dierent than that of Qatar, in which there exists a short-run
volatility spillover at the 5% level for M = 2 and 3 with Q1 values equal 1.77 and 1.79,
respectively. Finally, results show that there is no any volatility spillover eect from
Bahrain banking sector to Dubai banking sector at any M because the Q1 values are
not signicant at any reasonable level.
With regard to the volatility spillover from past innovations in Kuwait banking sector
to the current innovations in the other GCC banking sectors, results in Table 2.13
suggest an existence of a volatility spillover eect from Kuwait to Bahrain banking
sector at the 5% level of signicance in the medium-run and a signicant spillover
eect in the long-run at the 1% level, where the Q1 values are 2.10, 1.84, 2.07, and 2.05
for M = 13, 14, 28, 36, 40, 10, 36, and 40, respectively, and 2.99, 2.34 for M = 80, 90,
respectively. Meanwhile, the Q1 values for volatility spillover from Kuwait's banking
sector to Oman's banking sector are 1.76 and 1.79 for M = 14 and 15, suggesting a
spillover eect in the medium-run at the 5% level. When Qatar's banking sector is
considered, ndings show that, there exhibits a pronounced volatility spillover eect
from Kuwait's banking sector to that of Qatar at the 1% level over both medium-run
and long-run for M = 20 , 24, 25, 90, and 100, where the Q1 values are 2.87, 2.51, 2.33,
3.03, and 2.56, respectively. Moreover, the Kuwaiti banking sector has a signicant
volatility spillover eect on the banking sector of Saudi Arabia and Dubai only in the
short-run, where the Q1 values for Saudi Arabia are 2.67 and 1.77 for M = 2 and 3,
while for Dubai the Q1 value is 2.79 for M = 1.
When the volatility spillover from Oman's banking sector past shocks to that of its
other GCC partners current volatility is considered, results in Table 2.14 suggest that,
there is a strong volatility spillover eect at the 1% level from Oman's banking sector
to Bahrain's banking sector in the short-run for M = 2, 3, 4, and 5, with Q1 values are
3.29, 2.61, 3.11, and 2.47, respectively. In the case of Kuwait's banking sector there is
no evidence of volatility spillover from Oman's banking sector to Kuwait's banking
sector at any level of signicance. While ndings for both Saudi Arabia and Dubai
indicate a signicant volatility spillover eects from Oman banking sector in the
medium-run for Qatar and in the short-run for Saudi Arabia, where the Q1 values for
Qatar are 2.41, 2.17, and 1.68 for M = 36, 40, and 45, respectively, and the the Q1
value for Saudi Arabia is 2.72 for M = 1. Finally, ndings emphasize a strong volatility
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signicance for all reported Ms.
According to testing volatility spillover from past shocks in Qatar's banking sector to
the current volatility in the other GCC banking sectors, the empirical ndings in Table
2.15 imply that, there exist short-run and long-run volatility spillover eects from
Qatar's banking sector to that of Bahrain for M = 3, 80, 90, and 100, where the Q1
values are 2.00, 2.24, 1.79, and 2.68, respectively, which are signicant at the 5% level
(except for M = 100, which is signicant at the 1% level). With regard to investigating
volatility spillover eect from Qatar's banking sector to Kuwait's banking sector, the
Q1 values are 3.47, 2.85, and 2.24 for M = 3, 4, and 5, suggesting a signicant
short-run volatility spillover at the 1% level except for M = 5. In the case of Oman,
the Q1 values are 3.09, 2.73, 2.46, 2.96, 3.00, 2.79, and 3.39 for M = 10, 13, 14, 70, 80,
90, and 100, indicating a signicant volatility spillover in both medium-run and
long-run from Qatar's banking sector to Oman's banking sector at the 1% level. When
we consider Saudi Arabia's banking sector, results show that it is strongly aected by
Qatar banking sector past shocks in short-run, medium-run, and long-run at the 1%
level where the Q1 values are 2.82, 2.55, 2.52, 2.69, 2.42, 2.80 , 2.57, 2.72, 2.87, 2.53,
and 2.37 for M = 1, 10, 25, 28, 36, 40, 45, 70, 80, 90, 100, respectively. Also, Dubai
banking sector is vulnerable to past shocks from Qatar banking sector but only in the
medium-run, where M = 13, 14, and 15, with Q1 values equal 2.18, 2.06, and 1.86,
respectively.
Furthermore, results in Table 2.16 suggest existence of signicant volatility spillover
from the Saudi banking sector to all the GCC banking sectors. In particular, there
exists pronounced short-run and medium-run volatility spillover eects from Saudi
banking sector to Bahrain banking sector at the 1% level for M = 1, 2, 3, and 45,
where the Q1 values are 4.48, 3.67, 2.62, and 2.35, respectively; and a long-run
spillover eect at the 5% level for M = 70 and 80, with Q1 values equal 2.14 and 1.68,
respectively. In the case of Kuwait and Qatar, ndings show that, there exists strong
volatility spillover eects from Saudi banking sector to the banking sectors in these two
markets at the 1% level for all the reported Ms (except for M = 3 in the case of
Kuwait). Oman results are almost similar to the previous ndings of Kuwait and
Qatar in which there exhibits a strong volatility spillover eect at the 1% level from
Saudi Arabia's banking sector to its Oman counterpart but only in the short-run and
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15, and 20, respectively. In the case of Dubai's banking sector, there is evidence of
existing volatility spillover eect from Saudi banking sector over the short-run for M =
1, 2, 3, 4, and 5, where the Q1 values are 2.88, 1.90, 2.23, 1.83, and 2.00, respectively.
With regard to testing the existence of volatility spillover eect from Dubai's banking
sector past shocks to the other GCC banking sectors current volatilities, Table 2.17
reports the Q1 values for dierent Ms as well as their signicance levels. The results
show that, there exists a pronounced medium-run and long-run spillover eects from
Dubai's banking sector to Bahrain's banking sector at the 1% level for M = 20, where
the Q1 value is 2.51, and at the 5% level for M = 24, 25, 28, and 90, where the Q1
values are 2.14, 2.12, 1.76, 1.98, respectively. Also, ndings suggest a presence of a
strong volatility spillover from Dubai's banking sector to Kuwait's banking sector at
the 1% level but only in the short-run, where M = 1, 2, and 3, and the Q1 values are
4.46, 3.41, and 2.39, respectively. In the case of Oman and Saudi Arabia banking
sectors, there is a distinct evidence of existing volatility spillover eects from Dubai's
banking sector past shocks at the 1% level to these two markets' banking sectors for all
the reported Ms (except for M = 1, 2, 3, 4 in Oman case, and M = 70 in Saudi Arabia
case). Finally and with respect to Qatar, the Q1 values are 2.54, 3.10, 2.13, 1.66, 2.74,
2.01, 1.71, which are signicant at the 1% level for M = 1, 2, 5, and at the 5% for M =
3, 4, 10, and 13, respectively, which imply the existence of a strong spillover eect in
the short-run from Dubai's banking sector to Qatar's banking sector.
According to the Q2 test, which investigates the bi-directional volatility spillover
eects between each GCC banking sector pair, Table 2.18 reports the results, which
are consistent with the previous ndings of the Q1 test, in that all the GCC banking
sectors have a signicant bi-directional volatility spillover eect (except Bahrain-Dubai
and Oman-Kuwait). In particular, ndings suggest a presence of a signicant
contemporaneous volatility spillover between Bahrain and Kuwait banking sectors at
the 1% level for all the reported Ms, except for M = 100. In the case of examining the
bi-directional volatility spillover between Bahrain and Oman banking sectors, the Q2
values are 6.2, 6.9, 6.4, 5.2, 3.4, 3.1, and 2.9 for M = 2, 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, and 15,
respectively, implying that both banking sectors past shocks are highly aected by
each other in the short-run and medium-run at the 1% level of signicance. With
regard to Bahrain and Qatar, ndings show that, there exists a strong
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sectors at the 1% for M = 3 and 4, and at the 5% for M = 5 and 60, where the Q2
values are 3.08, 2.73, and 2.06, 2.01, respectively.
For Bahrain and Saudi-Arabia, results conrm that, these two banking sectors are
highly vulnerable to each other past innovations at the 1% level for M = 2, 3, and 4,
with Q2 values equal 3.85, 3.12, and 2.42, respectively. The results for Kuwait and
Qatar also show that, there is a strong spillover eect between these two sectors in the
short-run and medium-run at the 1% level for M = 3, 4, and 5, and at the 5% level for
M = 14 and 15, where the Q2 values are 2.58, 2.77, 2.78, and 1.90 and 1.71,
respectively. According to identifying the bi-directional volatility spillover between the
banking sectors of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, Oman and Dubai, Qatar and Saudi
Arabia, the results show that, there exhibits a highly contemporaneous volatility
spillover eects between each pair of these mentioned pairs at any reasonable level of
signicance and for all the reported Ms (except for M = 80 and 90 in the case of
Kuwait-Saudi Arabia).
For Kuwait and Dubai, the Q2 values are 3.49, 2.28, 1.74, which are signicant at the
1% level for M = 2, and at the 5% level for M = 3 and 4, indicating a strong short-run
bi-directional volatility spillover eect between these two banking sectors at the
mentioned Ms. In the case of Oman and Qatar, ndings suggest signicant
contemporaneous volatility spillover eects in the long-run between these two sectors
at the 1% level of signicance for M = 60, 80, and 100, where the Q2 values are 2.33,
2.45, and 2.65, respectively. With regard to Saudi Arabia and Oman, Saudi Arabia
and Dubai, results show that, there exists a highly bi-directional volatility spillover
eects between each pair at the 1% level for M = 2, 3, 4, 5, and 13 for both cases in
addition to M = 80 in the case of Saudi Arabia and Dubai. Finally, in the case of
Qatar and Dubai, the Q2 values are 2.20, 1.98, 1.71 for M = 13, 14, and 15,
respectively, implying a signicant medium-run bi-directional volatility spillover eect
at the 5% signicant level.
2.5.2.2 Industrial sectors
The Quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) results of the univariate GARCH (1,1) model
for each GCC stock market industrial sector (equation 2.3), Table 2.19 (Panel B)
shows that, the estimated GARCH parameters ^ !i > 0 and (^ ; ^ ) 0 for all the ve
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ensure a positive conditional variance (ht  0). In addition, ^ 's estimated parameters
are all signicant at the 1% level for all the GCC industrial sectors, indicating the
presence of own past shocks or the ARCH eect and ^ 's are highly signicant at the
1% and ranging from .62 in Bahrain to .88 in Oman, implying the existence of own
past volatility or GARCH eect. Figures 2.23 : 2.27 plot the conditional variance of
GARCH eect for all the GCC stock markets' industrial sector indices.
I rst apply the Q1 test statistic for each pair of GCC industrial sector in order to
identify the direction of volatility spillover. The results (from Table 2.20 to Table 2.24)
show that, there exists a volatility spillover across only some cases of the GCC
industrial sectors pairs. My interpretation to these results is that this sector is highly
dependent on the oil market's basic variations and price uctuations, leading this
sector to be more vulnerable to these developments than to the intra-sector spillover
eects within the GCC region.
In particular, with regard to testing the existence of volatility spillover from past
Bahrain's industrial sector volatility to the current volatility in the other GCC
industrial sectors, Table 2.20 reports the Q1 values for dierent Ms as well as their
signicance for each pair. The results show that, there exists a volatility spillover from
Bahrain's industrial sector to only two GCC industrial sectors namely, Qatar and
Saudi Arabia. For Qatar the Q1 values are 4.04, 2.91, 6.42, 5.54, 4.82, and 3.27 for M
= 1, 2, 20, 25, 30, and 40, indicating a strong short-run and medium-run volatility
spillover eects from Bahrain industrial to Qatar industrial sector at the 1% level;
while for Saudi Arabia the Q1 values are 2.00, 3.22, 2.00 for M = 25, 60, and 80,
respectively, indicating a strong volatility transmission eect in the medium-run and
long-run from Bahrain's industrial sector to that of Saudi Arabia.
In the case of investigating volatility spillover from past innovations of Kuwait's
industrial sector to its GCC counterparts, results in Table 2.21 suggest existence of
volatility transmission eect from Kuwait's industrial sector to only Bahrain and Saudi
Arabia industrial sectors, where the Q1 values for Bahrain are 4.44 and 3.61 for M = 3
and 4, and the Q1 values for Saudi Arabia are 3.17 and 2.53, for M = 60 and 80. On
the other hand, ndings in Table 2.22 show that, Oman industrial sector has a
signicant volatility spillover eect on Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia industrial
sectors at the 1% level. For Kuwait, the Q1 values are 20.31 and 18.74 for M = 90 andChapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 41
100. In the case of Qatar the Q1 values are 2.54, 3.76, 3.41 for M = 2, 10, 11,
respectively, while for Saudi Arabia the only signicant Q1 value is at M = 1 and
equal 2.32.
With respect to investigating the volatility spillover from Qatar industrial sector to the
other GCC industrial sectors, ndings in Table 2.23 show that, Qatar industrial sector
is the only sector in the GCC industrial sectors, which has a volatility spillover to all
the GCC industrial sectors. In the case of volatility spillover from Qatar to Bahrain
industrial sector, the value of Q1 is 2.29 for M = 60, while for Kuwait the Q1 values
are 5.17, 4.27, 3.70 for M = 80, 90, and 100, respectively. In the case of Oman, there
exists a volatility spillover from Qatar industrial sector to that of Oman for M = 40,
60, 80, 90, and 100, where the Q1 values are 3.18, 2.17, 1.65, 2.2, and 2.2, respectively.
Finally, the results show a signicant volatility spillover from Qatar industrial sector to
Saudi Arabia industrial sector at the 1% level for M = 10 and 11, with Q1 values 2.81
and 2.52. The main reason of these over all results regarding the signicant volatility
spillover eect from Qatar industrial sector to the industrial sectors in the GCC is
attributed to the comparative advantage that Qatar has in gas-intensive industries.
More specically, according to the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA),
Qatar holds the world's third largest natural gas reserves, and be the single largest
supplier of liqueed natural gas, as well as the world's largest liqueed natural gas
exporter.
Finally, testing the volatility spillover from Saudi Arabia's industrial sector to the
other GCC industrial sectors, the data in Table 2.24 show that, there exists a
signicant spillover to Kuwait industrial sector at the 1% level for M = 1, 2, 3, 4, 20,
25, 30, 60, 80, 90, and 100, where the Q1 values are 5.30, 4.17, 3.16, 2.48, 2.43, 2.86,
2.59, 3.80, 4.15, 3.51, and 3.05. For Oman and Qatar industrial sectors, the results
indicate a highly signicant volatility spillover from Saudi Arabia industrial sector at
any reasonable level of signicance and for all the reported Ms (except for M = 80, 90,
100 in the case of Qatar).
According to the Q2 test, which investigates the bi-directional volatility spillover eect
between each GCC industrial sector pair, Table 2.25 reports the values of Q2, which
are consistent with the Q1 previous ndings (except in the case of Oman-Kuwait) in
that there exists a bi-directional volatility spillover at the 1% level between Bahrain42 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
and Qatar industrial sectors for M = 20, 60, and 70, where the Q2 values are 2.96,
3.19, 2.58, respectively. Oman and Qatar also have a contemporaneous volatility
spillover eect for M = 10, 20, 30, and 60, with Q2 values equal 2.77, 2.09, 1.91, and
1.84, respectively. In the case of Oman and Saudi Arabia, there exists a volatility
spillover at any reasonable level of signicance and for all reported Ms. Finally, the
results suggest a presence of bi-directional volatility spillover between Qatar and Saudi
Arabia industrial sectors at M = 5, 10, 20, 30, where the values of Q2 are 6.97, 6.63,
3.13, and 3.13, respectively.
2.5.2.3 Insurance sectors
The Quasi-maximum likelihood (QMLE) results of the univariate GARCH (1,1) model
for each GCC stock market insurance sector (equation 2.3), Table 2.26(Panel B) shows
that, the estimated GARCH parameters ^ !i > 0 and (^ ; ^ ) 0 for all the ve GCC
insurance sectors, which is considered a sucient condition to ensure a positive
conditional variance (ht  0). In addition, ^ 's estimated parameters are all signicant
at the 1% level for all the GCC insurance sectors, indicating the presence of own past
shocks or the ARCH eect and ^ 's are highly signicant at the 1% level and ranging
from .75 in Bahrain to .92 in Saudi Arabia, implying the existence of own past
volatility or GARCH eect. Figures 2.28 : 2.32 plot the conditional variance of the
GARCH eect for all the GCC stock markets insurance sector indices.
Unlike the previous results for the other two sectors, volatility spillover across the GCC
insurance sectors is very weak and found to be in just seven cases or seven pairs among
all the investigated cases ( about 20 cases). In particular, in the case of investigating
the volatility spillover eect from Bahrain insurance sector to the other GCC insurance
sectors, the Q1 results in Table 2.27 indicate that, there exists a volatility spillover
eect from Bahrain's insurance sector to Kuwait's insurance sector for M = 20 and 60,
where the Q1 values are 2.28 and 2.54. On the other hand, ndings in Tables 2.28 and
2.29 show that neither Kuwait's insurance sector nor Oman insurance's sector has any
volatility spillover eect on the other GCC insurance sectors.
With regard to volatility spillover from Qatar's insurance sector to the other GCC
insurance sectors, results in Table 2.30 show that, there exists a volatility spillover
from Qatar to Bahrain for M = 75, with Q1 value is 1.81; for the case of Kuwait, theChapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 43
Q1 values are 5.65, 3.88, 3.39, and 2.43 for M = 10, 15, 20, and 25, suggesting a strong
volatility spillover at the 1% level from Qatar's insurance sector to that of Kuwait;
while data for the volatility spillover from Qatar to Saudi Arabia's insurance sectors
imply a volatility spillover existence from Qatar to Saudi Arabia for M = 75 and 90,
where the Q1 values are 12.04 and 10.50, respectively. Finally, Table 2.31 reports the
results of investigating the volatility transmission from Saudi Arabia's insurance sector
to the other GCC insurance sectors. In particular, only three cases have been found to
exhibit a volatility spillover eects from Saudi insurance sector, namely, Bahrain,
Oman, and Qatar insurance sectors. In the case of Bahrain, ndings show that, there
exists a volatility spillover eect from Saudi insurance sector to Bahrain insurance
sector at the 1% level for M = 10, 90, and 100, with Q1 values are 3.26, 2.97, 2.64, and
2.9. For testing the volatility spillover eect from Saudi Arabia insurance sector to
that of Oman, results conrm that, there exists a volatility spillover eect from Saudi
Arabia's insurance sector to Oman insurance sector at the 1% level of signicance for
M = 4, 5, 10, and 15, where the Q1 values are 7.42, 5.78, 4.00, and 2.82. The last case,
which has been found to exhibit a volatility spillover eect from Saudi insurance sector
is Qatar's insurance sector. The empirical results show that, the Q1 values are 3.36
and 2.74 for M = 4 and 5, implying a strong volatility spillover eect from Saudi
Arabia's insurance to Qatar's insurance sector at the 1% level of signicance.
According to the Q2 test, which investigates the bi-directional volatility spillover
between each GCC insurance sector pair, Table 2.32 reports the results, which are
consistent with the Q1 previous ndings in that none of the GCC insurance sector
pairs-except Oman-Saudi Arabia and Kuwait-Qatar-has any bi-directional volatility
spillover eect. In particular, the only case exhibits a bi-directional volatility spillover
eect is found to be between Qatar and Saudi Arabia insurance sectors, in that the
values of Q2 are 5.99 and 4.47, which indicate a strong long-run bi-directional volatility
spillover eect at the 1% level for M = 80 and 100. The reason behind these over all
results comes from the fact that the insurance sector is characterized by having the
smallest market capitalization of all GCC sectors, as well as having low trading
activities and little investment interest from investors. This leads to the fact that the
insurance sectors in some GCC stock markets have had many days with no trading
activities.44 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
2.6 Conclusion
In order to investigate the volatility spillover eect among the GCC stock markets at
the aggregate levels, as well as at the intra-sector levels, this chapter exploited the
causality-in-variance test pioneered by Cheung and Ng (1996) and developed by Hong
(2001), who introduced a class of asymptotic N (0,1) tests for volatility spillover
between two time series that exhibit conditional heteroskedasticity and may have
innite unconditional variances. The main ndings of this chapter showed that, except
for few cases, each GCC stock market is vulnerable to past shocks that have happened
in other GCC stock markets, conrming the existence of a pronounced
contemporaneous volatility transmission across the six GCC stock markets. The
spillover eect varies across the GCC markets with regard to the time period at which
the volatility transmission might occur (e.g., in the short-run and/or the medium-run
and/or the long-run). These ndings reect the fact that, the GCC countries share
strong economic and nancial linkages and policy coordination, such that stock
markets in the region respond similarly to common shocks. Furthermore, results of the
equity sectors analysis indicated that volatility spillover across the six stock markets
studied in this chapter is driven mainly by the linkages and spillover eects between
the GCC banking sectors and, to lesser extent, the industrial sectors, while the
insurance sectors played no role in the volatility spillover eects across these markets.
These results reveal the fact that the banking sectors are the most vital sectors among
the GCC stock markets sectors, which is due to their dominating role in the nancial
sectors within the GCC region, as well as their market capitalization, which is the
highest of all sectors in the GCC stock markets. Meanwhile the industrial sectors
played a relatively modest role in causing spillover eects among the GCC stock
markets. This is due to the fact that the industrial sector is highly dependent on the
oil and gas markets' basic variations and price uctuations, leading this sector to be
more vulnerable to these developments than to the intra-sector spillover within the
GCC region. Finally, the insurance sector played no role in volatility spillover
transmissions among the GCC stock markets, which is due to the fact that the
insurance sectors are characterized by having the smallest market capitalization of all
GCC sectors, as well as having low trading activities and little investment interest
from GCC investors, which leads to the fact that the insurance sectors in some GCC
stock markets have had many days with no trading.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 45
Despite the fact that the empirical results of this chapter found evidence of strong
linkages and spillover among GCC nancial markets, the GCC countries still have a
long path before reaching the required level of nancial integration to enhance the
GCC eorts towards achieving a well functioning monetary union. In this regard, in
order to promote nancial integration among GCC countries, GCC policy makers are
advised to adopt a comprehensive set of policies and regulations to improve the depth
of the GCC nancial markets; strengthen convergence across GCC nancial systems;
increase cross-listed stocks; relaxing the stock ownership restrictions facing both GCC
and foreign investors; and most importantly, put the GCC common market process
into practice.46 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
country start-date end-date sample size
Bahrain general index 2-1-2003 14-9-2012 2532
Bahrain banking sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Bahrain industrial sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Bahrain insurance sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Kuwait general index 31-12-1999 14-9-2012 3316
Kuwait banking sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Kuwait industrial sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Kuwait insurance sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Oman general index 22-10-1996 14-9-2012 4149
Oman banking sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Oman industrial sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Oman insurance sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Qatar general index 10-8-1998 14-9-2012 3678
Qatar banking sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Qatar industrial sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Qatar insurance sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Saudi-Arabia general index 19-10-1998 14-9-2012 3630
Saudi-Arabia banking sector 19-4-2007 6-2-2013 1515
Saudi-Arabia industrial sector 19-4-2007 6-2-2013 1515
Saudi-Arabia insurance sector 19-4-2007 6-2-2013 1515
Dubai general index 31-12-2003 14-9-2012 2273
Dubai banking sector 1-1-2004 6-2-2013 2375
Table 2.1: GCC stock markets data description.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 47
Parameter BA KU OM QA SA Dubai
Panel (A)
b0 .00007 .0004 .0003 .0006 .0009 .0003
(.41) (.0001) (.031) (.000) (.000) (.176)
b1 .158 .105 .211 .312 .071 .032
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.23)
b2 .052 .042 -.03 .042 .077
(.012) (.103) (.22) (.077) (.003)
b3 .06 .007 .007 .008
(.004) (.77) (.76) (.70)
b4 .026 -.034 .043 .033
(.24) (.139) (.028) (.19)
b5 .062 .074 .029 .054
(.001) (.00) (.169) (.03)
b6 .018 -.049 -.03 -.013
(.39) (.03) (.063) (.58)
b7 .013 .012
(.53) (.577)
b8 -.007 .037
(.71) (.106)
Panel (B)
! .0000018 .0000012 .0000061 .000001 .0000026 .00000058
(.000) (.001) (.006) (.135) (.000) (.003)
 .169 .128 .127 .269 .143 .118
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
 .799 .865 .827 .712 .856 .872
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Sample size 2530 3314 4147 3676 3628 2271
Number of lags(p) 1 6 2 8 6 8
The numbers in parentheses are the p-values for the estimated coecients.
Table 2.2: Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation of univariate GARCH (1,1) models
for GCC stock markets.48 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
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Table 2.3: summary of the overall results.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 49
M Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Dubai
1 .74 .12 -.64 .96 -.62
2 .65 1.08 -.004 1:59 -.89
3 .99 .67 -.07 2:82
 -.54
4 .52 .23 -.40 2:23 -.34
5 .79 .05 -.16 1:68 -.49
20 -.24 -1.38 -1.94 -.64 -2.04
24 -.50 -1.44 -2.12 -.56 -2.31
28 -.83 -1.58 -2.42 -.37 -2.01
34 -.30 -1.73 -2.68 -.84 -2.16
36 -.40 -1.84 -2.83 -.87 -2.22
38 -.42 -1.96 -2.93 -1.01 -2.21
45 -.75 3:55
 -2.75 -1.43 -2.28
50 -.77 3:10
 -1.71 -1.33 -2.38
55 -.93 3:32
 -1.61 -1.58 .-2.29
60 2:40
 3:09
 -1.79 -1.81 -2.37
65 2:03 2:81
 -2.02 -2.15 -2.33
70 2:02 2:52
 -2.27 -2.33 -2.42
75 1:79 2:27 -2.52 -2.16 -2.41
79 1:64 1:92 -2.58 -2.31 -2.45
90 1:43 1.22 -2.86 -2.58 -2.61
100 1.04 .61 -2.97 -2.51 -2.31
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.4: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Bahrain and
the other GCC stock markets' general price indices.50 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
M Bahrain Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Dubai
1 -.70 -.69 -.20 2:57
 -.23
2 3:57
 5:38
 -.20 1:36 -.61
3 3:71
 4:11
 -.52 .85 -.77
4 3:13
 3:21
 -.77 .58 -1.01
5 2:49
 2:76
 -.99 1:39 -1.19
20 .50 2:05 -1.38 2:25
 -1.22
24 .05 1:39 -1.62 1:78 -1.52
28 -.09 .83 -1.56 1:67 -1.19
34 .17 .33 2:06 1:31 -1.11
36 .15 .16 1:77 1.08 -1.15
38 .05 .10 1:71 .84 -.74
45 .93 -.22 1.03 1:53 1:36
50 .45 -.41 1.20 1.27 1:66
55 .97 -.20 .79 1.03 1:53
60 .70 4:56
 .82 .98 1.13
65 .50 4:13
 .53 .75 .75
70 .22 3:94
 .26 .60 .54
75 -.02 3:66
 .13 .37 .26
79 -.15 3:56
 -.15 .67 1.02
90 -.50 2:91
 -.05 .57 .91
100 -.74 2:90
 10:34
 .50 1:35
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.5: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Kuwait and
the other GCC stock markets' general price indices.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 51
M Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia Dubai
1 1.01 1.05 -.41 -.30 10:64

2 1:36 .26 -.78 -.62 7:03

3 1:84 -.17 -1.03 -.57 5:36

4 2:08 -.43 -1.24 -.49 4:68

5 1:67 -.70 -1.40 .39 3:88

20 .23 -1.30 -2.10 -1.22 2:19
24 -.07 -1.60 -2.31 -1.47 1:80
28 -.02 -1.81 -.31 -1.62 1.26
34 .10 -2.17 -.74 -1.85 1.15
36 -.10 -2.20 -.89 -1.98 1.03
38 -.33 -2.19 -1.06 -2.01 .83
45 1:54 -1.60 -.31 -1.45 2:46

50 1.27 -1.75 -.42 -1.68 1:91
55 1.13 -1.96 -.70 -1.94 1:61
60 .79 -2.04 -.79 -2.03 1.26
65 .48 -2.15 -.90 -2.21 .93
70 .27 -2.08 -1.08 -2.26 .63
75 .10 -2.17 -.34 -2.37 .40
79 -.04 -2.15 -.45 -2.60 .65
90 .59 -2.25 -.88 -2.04 .57
100 .23 -2.61 -1.04 -2.02 .42
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.6: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Oman and
the other GCC stock markets' general price indices.52 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
M Bahrain Kuwait Oman Saudi Arabia Dubai
1 -.63 -.28 -.58 22:4
 21:6

2 -.82 9:52
 5:42
 16:34
 31:6

3 -.99 7:88
 11:12
 12:93
 25:6

4 .22 6:49
 9:28
 11:31
 21:9

5 .90 5:49
 12:9
 9:97
 19:3

20 -.40 1:58 8:07
 4:50
 8:45

24 -.57 .89 7:54
 3:67
 7:33

28 .72 .33 6:61
 3.24
 6:38

34 .24 .06 5:37
 2:45
 5:26

36 .09 -.05 5:03
 2:18 4:95

38 -.13 -.24 4:78
 2:00 4:60

45 1.17 .81 5:70
 2:34
 5:06

50 1.04 .57 5:12
 1:91 4.78

55 .60 .91 4:48
 1:71 4:29

60 .31 .63 4:33
 1:32 3:80

65 1:77 .54 4:81
 .90 3:36

70 1:51 .42 4:29
 1:31 3:40

75 1:89 .26 3:99
 .92 3:21

79 1:82 .20 3:62
 .81 2:88

90 1:83 -.22 2:96
 .39 2:43

100 1:51 -.29 2:33
 .18 2:48

,, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.7: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Qatar and the
other GCC stock markets' general price indices.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 53
M Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Dubai
1 .25 .035 39:5
 .46 58:3

2 .15 3:73
 36:91
 .05 40:7

3 -.22 2:88
 29:7
 -.01 32:8

4 -.50 2:24 25:68
 -.32 28:4

5 -.51 1:72 22:9
 -.59 25:2

20 7:93
 1.27 12:04
 -1.50 12:6

24 7:07
 1:34 13:03
 -1.64 12:4

28 6:70
 .72 12:3
 -1.86 11:08

34 5:75
 .47 10:7
 -1.59 9:71

36 5:82
 .28 10:5
 -1.75 9:22

38 5:67
 .23 10:3
 -1.87 9:37

45 5:17
 1.13 9:1
 4:68
 8:19

50 4:79
 .94 8:9
 4:37
 7:59

55 4:66
 .62 8:4
 3:94
 6:90

60 4:23
 .72 8:5
 3:69
 6:51

65 3:95
 .80 8:09
 3:20
 6:05

70 3:53
 .69 8:04
 6:19
 5:81

75 3:15
 .52 7:9
 5:83
 5:39

79 2:78
 .72 7:4
 5:47
 4:96

90 1:98 .68 6:7
 4:66
 4:14

100 1:71 .86 6:2
 4:34
 3:86

,, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels respectively.
Table 2.8: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Saudi-Arabia
and the other GCC stock markets' general price indices.54 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
M Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi-Arabia
1 -.60 -.39 35:7
 -.68 -.70
2 -.88 .20 27:2
 -.73 -.96
3 2:61
 -.16 21:8
 -1.00 2:33

4 1:98 -.25 20:3
 -.89 2:46

5 2:06 -.25 18:4
 -1.11 2:69

20 1:38 -.32 9:35
 9:65
 .55
24 .80 -.73 8:42
 9:08
 .46
28 .25 10:66
 8:31
 8.15
 -.06
34 -.05 9:27
 7:84
 7:25
 -.28
36 -.10 9:00
 7:62
 6:38
 .39
38 -.25 8:59
 7:37
 6:55
 -.43
45 .68 7:67
 6:38
 6:02
 -.56
50 .51 6:99
 5:83
 6:21
 -.78
55 .09 6:38
 6:31
 5:67
 -1.09
60 .32 6:43
 5:88
 5:25
 -1.46
65 -.06 6:05
 5:46
 4:84
 -1.38
70 -.43 5:96
 5:04
 4:96
 -1.64
75 -.72 5:71
 5:23
 5:48
 -1.80
79 .60 5:33
 5:55
 5:13
 -2.02
90 .34 4:93
 4:80
 4:55
 -2.54
100 -.17 4:19
 4:66
 4:23
 -2.69
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.9: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Dubai and
the other GCC stock markets' general price indices.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 55
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Table 2.10: Q2 Two-way causality-in-variance between each pair of the GCC stock
markets' general price indices.56 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Parameter BA KU OM QA SA Dubai
Panel (A)
b0 .00001 .0003 .0003 .0002 .00008 .00001
(.25) (.05) (.04) (.08) (.73) (.51)
b1 .07 .008 .21 .13 .12 .02
(.01) (.71) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.44)
b2 .008 .026 .059 .06
(.74) (.22) (.07) (.01)
b3 .05 -.026 .008
(.02) (.39) (.72)
b4 -.02 .003 .044
(.30) (.90) (.04)
b5 .019 .07 .04
(.44) (.05) (.08)
b6 .01 -.06 .02
(.51) (.04) (.35)
b7 -.07 .03
(.01) (.15)
b8 .05 .02
(.13) (.41)
Panel (B)
! .0000029 .000003 .0000028 .000002 .000004 .0000004
(.01) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
 .06 .09 .14 .18 .11 .10
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
 .90 .883 .85 .83 .877 .88
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Sample size 2530 3314 4147 3676 3628 2271
Number of lags(p) 1 6 1 2 8 8
The numbers in parentheses are the p-values for the estimated coecients.
Table 2.11: Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation of univariate GARCH (1,1) models
for each GCC banking sector.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 57
M Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Dubai
1 7:3
 4:6
 -.62 -.68 -.67
2 5:3
 5:6
 -.55 1:77 -.43
3 6:4
 7:1
 2:36
 1:79 -.74
4 5:2
 5:9
 2:46
 1:32 -.88
5 4:6
 5:01
 1:97 1.15 -1.07
10 2:56
 3:59
 .73 -.09 -1.15
13 1:88 3:5
 .18 -.14 -1.51
14 1:65 3:2
 -.01 -.18 -1.64
15 1:65 3:13
 -.18 -.31 -1.74
20 1:35 3:3
 .14 -.62 -1.81
24 1.09 2:85
 .003 -1.12 -1.86
25 .89 2:65
 -.06 -1.08 -1.958
28 .70 2:43
 -.04 -.24 -1.79
36 3:07
 1:82 .40 -.17 -1.76
40 2:82
 1:47 .34 -.51 1.12
45 2:74
 .95 .37 -.14 .79
50 2:37
 1.1 .27 -.46 .33
70 1:99 .48 .67 .03 .34
80 1:73 .63 .60 .13 -.06
90 1:80 .32 .04 -.01 -.31
100 1:54 -.06 -.52 .0004 -.03
61 .38 -.54 1:94 1:89 -.13
65 .03 -.70 1:95 1:60 -.52
70 -.33 -1.10 1:48 1.06 -.97
74 -.59 -1.44 2:00 .71 -1.21
80 -.85 -1.81 1:99 .03 .55
90 -1.1 -1.79 1:47 -.71 .21
100 -1.3 -1.2 1.04 -.84 -.49
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.12: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Bahrain
banking sector and the other GCC banking sectors.58 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
M Bahrain Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia Dubai
1 .96 -.36 1:60 1.11 2:79

2 .33 .27 .63 2:67
 1:52
3 1.04 .87 .18 1:77 .83
4 .54 .48 1.07 1.20 .47
5 .19 .71 1:69 .77 .12
10 .58 -.47 .66 .34 -.65
13 2:10 .45 1.10 .70 -.92
14 1:84 1:76 1:68 .60 -1.05
15 1:60 1:79 1:47 .44 -1.15
20 1:79 1.03 2:87
 .37 -.89
24 1:55 .72 2:51
 .60 -.95
25 1:57 .76 2:33
 .51 -1.07
28 2:07 .38 2:24 .68 -1.13
36 2:05 -.08 1:80 .68 -1.17
40 1:72 .15 1:45 .24 -1.04
45 1:34 -.27 1.11 -.24 -.86
50 1:46 -.66 1:99 -.007 -1.06
70 2:99
 .21 1:54 .63 .34
80 2:34
 -.14 1:30 .46 .001
90 1:88 .18 3:03
 .39 -.34
100 1:56 .09 2:56
 .49 -.13
61 .38 -.54 1:94 1:89 -.13
65 .03 -.70 1:95 1:60 -.52
70 -.33 -1.10 1:48 1.06 -.97
74 -.59 -1.44 2:00 .71 -1.21
80 -.85 -1.81 1:99 .03 .55
90 -1.1 -1.79 1:47 -.71 .21
100 -1.3 -1.2 1.04 -.84 -.49
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.13: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Kuwait
banking sector and the other GCC banking sectors.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 59
M Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia Dubai
1 -.69 -.67 1.12 2:72
 12:41

2 3:29
 -.95 .31 1:58 8:34

3 2:61
 -1.15 -.05 .95 6:82

4 3:11
 -1.26 -.27 .48 5:57

5 2:47
 -1.05 -.45 .13 6:30

10 2:14 -1.10 -.72 -.67 4:08

13 1:32 -1.37 -.86 -1.01 3:70

14 1.17 -1.44 -.64 -1.10 3:60

15 1.07 -1.56 -.79 -1.23 3:32

20 .55 -.88 -.96 -1.13 2:51

24 .23 -1.25 -.74 -1.32 2:10
25 .13 -1.27 -.81 -1.41 2:05
28 -.02 -.99 .25 -1.66 3:04

36 -.54 -1.18 2:41
 -2.26 2:86

40 -.86 -1.50 2:17 -2.37 4:09

45 -.96 -1.79 1:68 -2.63 4:33

50 -.11 -2.11 1.14 -2.81 3:90

70 -.09 -2.68 .60 -3.28 5:08

80 -.03 -2.78 .46 -3.45 5:33

90 .46 -2.52 .19 -3.85 4:71

100 -.04 -2.31 .36 -3.92 4:70

61 .38 -.54 1:94 1:89 -.13
65 .03 -.70 1:95 1:60 -.52
70 -.33 -1.10 1:48 1.06 -.97
74 -.59 -1.44 2:00 .71 -1.21
80 -.85 -1.81 1:99 .03 .55
90 -1.1 -1.79 1:47 -.71 .21
100 -1.3 -1.2 1.04 -.84 -.49
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.14: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Oman banking
sector and the other GCC banking sectors.60 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
M Bahrain Kuwait Oman Saudi Arabia Dubai
1 .07 1:36 .15 2:82
 -.65
2 1.04 .46 .75 1:51 -.93
3 2:00 3:47
 .32 .87 -1.15
4 1:40 2:85
 -.03 .59 -1.05
5 .94 2:24 -.19 .22 -.23
10 .23 1:56 3:09
 2:55
 -.61
13 -.11 1.05 2:73
 1:78 2:18
14 -.27 1.00 2:46
 1:53 2:06
15 -.25 .95 2:20 1:33 1:86
20 -.55 .23 1:37 .80 1:38
24 -.23 -.14 .76 1:70 1:30
25 -.009 -.23 .65 2:52
 1.18
28 .12 1:38 .33 2:69
 1:34
36 .62 .75 -.06 2:42
 .70
40 .61 .57 .55 2:80
 .57
45 .52 .05 .24 2:57
 .14
50 1.05 -.25 1.14 2:16 -.06
70 1:45 -.93 2:96
 2:72
 -.28
80 2:24 -.79 3:00
 2:87
 .42
90 1:79 -.73 2:79
 2:53
 .06
100 2:68
 -1.15 3:39
 2:37
 -.05
61 .38 -.54 1:94 1:89 -.13
65 .03 -.70 1:95 1:60 -.52
70 -.33 -1.10 1:48 1.06 -.97
74 -.59 -1.44 2:00 .71 -1.21
80 -.85 -1.81 1:99 .03 .55
90 -1.1 -1.79 1:47 -.71 .21
100 -1.3 -1.2 1.04 -.84 -.49
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.15: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Qatar banking
sector and the other GCC banking sectors.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 61
M Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Dubai
1 4:48
 3:79
 11:55
 17:6
 2:88

2 3:67
 2:53
 13:11
 12:5
 1:90
3 2:62
 1:92 10:30
 11:07
 2:23
4 2:10 3:10
 8:67
 10:78
 1:83
5 1:60 3:54
 7:58
 9:51
 2:00
10 .88 2:46
 4:56
 7:89
 .52
13 .42 4:06
 4:38
 6:80
 .19
14 .31 3:74
 4:03
 6:46
 .07
15 .13 3:44
 3:72
 6:62
 -.10
20 .93 3:29
 2:49
 6:65
 .40
24 1:51 4:75
 2:23 8:29
 -.12
25 1:39 4:52
 2:07 8:14
 -.25
28 1.14 5:90
 1:59 7:75
 -.36
36 2:22 5:11
 1.10 7:03
 -.04
40 2:17 4:51
 .72 6:79
 .10
45 2:35
 4:10
 .28 6:85
 .59
50 1:77 3:83
 1:65 7:22
 .55
70 2:14 3:08
 1.10 7:63
 .96
80 1:68 2:69
 .50 6:69
 .65
90 1.24 2:33
 -.10 6:02
 .24
100 .76 3:29
 -.66 2:37
 .29
61 .38 -.54 1:94 1:89 -.13
65 .03 -.70 1:95 1:60 -.52
70 -.33 -1.10 1:48 1.06 -.97
74 -.59 -1.44 2:00 .71 -1.21
80 -.85 -1.81 1:99 .03 .55
90 -1.1 -1.79 1:47 -.71 .21
100 -1.3 -1.2 1.04 -.84 -.49
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.16: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Saudi Arabia
banking sector and the other GCC banking sectors.62 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
M Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia
1 -.34 4:46
 -.24 2:54
 5:04

2 -.001 3:41
 .50 3:10
 3:44

3 -.05 2:39
 .53 2:13 6:73

4 -.38 1:98 2:25 1:66 5:50

5 -.61 1:61 3:78
 2:74
 6:26

10 1:41 .76 8:35
 2:01 4:06

13 1.04 .14 7:36
 1:71 3:41

14 .84 .39 6:94
 1:49 3:10

15 .78 .27 6:64
 1:40 2:85

20 2:51
 .16 5:84
 1.00 2:15
24 2:14 .33 5:08
 .48 2:53

25 2:12 .63 4:84
 .34 2:45

28 1:76 .76 4:35
 -.01 2:72

36 1.00 .33 4:61
 -.08 3:07

40 .91 .33 4:58
 -.11 2:61

45 .48 .20 4:16
 -.31 2:64

50 .04 .50 3:70
 -.28 2:42

70 -.16 .49 5:52
 .20 1:41
80 .32 .20 5:42
 .53 3:04

90 1:98 1.09 4:70
 .23 2:45

100 1:51 .58 4:17
 .11 2:50

61 .38 -.54 1:94 1:89 -.13
65 .03 -.70 1:95 1:60 -.52
70 -.33 -1.10 1:48 1.06 -.97
74 -.59 -1.44 2:00 .71 -1.21
80 -.85 -1.81 1:99 .03 .55
90 -1.1 -1.79 1:47 -.71 .21
100 -1.3 -1.2 1.04 -.84 -.49
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.17: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Dubai banking
sector and the other GCC banking sectors.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 63
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Table 2.18: Q2 Two-way causality-in-variance between each pair of the GCC banking
sectors.64 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Parameter BA KU OM QA SA
Panel (A)
b0 -.0002 -.00009 .0003 .0003 .0005
(.02) (.83) (.02) (.18) (.11)
b1 -.02 .05 .21 .10 .06
(.71) (.07) (.00) (.00) (.03)
b2 .06 .02 .02 .02 .09
(.36) (.29) (.36) (.38) (.01)
b3 -.11 -.00 -.018
(.04) (.99) (.63)
b4 .07 .02
(.09) (.28)
b5 -.01 .04
(.69) (.09)
b6 -.01
(.66)
b7 -.00
(.96)
b8 .01
(.55)
Panel (B)
! .000008 .000001 .000001 .000046 .000005
(.00) (.06) (.00) (.00) (.03)
 .33 .12 .12 .13 .12
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
 .62 .828 .876 .86 .87
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Sample size 2530 3314 4147 3676 3628
2271
Number of lags(p) 8 2 5 2 3
The numbers in parentheses are the p-values for the estimated coecients.
Table 2.19: Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation of univariate GARCH (1,1) models
for each GCC industrial sector.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 65
M Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia
1 -.65 -.57 4:04
 -.44
2 -.71 -.90 2:91
 -.29
3 -.98 -1.10 2:10 -.63
4 -1.19 -1.28 1:53 -.70
10 -1.89 -1.79 .52 -1.38
11 -2.01 -1.82 .48 -1.42
20 -2.64 -.66 6:42
 -2.16
25 -2.99 -1.12 5:54
 2:00
30 -3.23 -1.42 4:82
 1:30
40 -3.70 -2.00 3:27
 .22
60 -4.54 -2.66 2:22 3:22

80 -5.20 -1.16 1.15 2:00
90 -5.54 -.79 .71 1:37
100 -5.80 -1.17 .63 .82
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.20: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Bahrain
industrial sector and the other GCC industrial sectors.66 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
M Bahrain Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia
1 -.63 -.63 -.60 -.69
2 -.74 -.88 -.90 -.96
3 4:44
 -1.02 -.97 -1.15
4 3:61
 -1.16 -1.05 -1.24
10 1.10 -1.73 -1.54 -1.43
11 .85 -1.83 -1.69 -1.28
20 -.55 -2.22 -2.29 -1.77
25 -1.13 -2.62 -2.13 -2.06
30 -1.59 -2.46 -2.34 -1.95
40 -2.36 -2.96 -2.07 -2.18
60 -2.91 -3.12 -2.87 3:17

80 -3.74 -3.60 -2.49 2:53

90 -4.12 -3.55 -2.91 2:24
100 -4.46 -3.90 -2.36 2:24
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.21: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Kuwait
industrial sector and the other GCC industrial sectors.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 67
M Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia
1 -.70 -.61 -.21 2:32

2 -.30 -.91 2:54
 1.20
3 .24 -1.11 1:66 .59
4 -.03 -.59 1.16 1:28
10 -.90 .24 3:76
 .27
11 -1.06 .11 3:41
 .73
20 -.97 .42 2:24 -.21
25 -1.29 .43 2:14 -.34
30 -1.56 -.16 2:06 -.58
40 .44 -1.04 1.27 -.63
60 -.73 -1.65 .43 -1.78
80 1:37 -1.15 -.09 -2.44
90 .95 20:31
 -.14 -2.09
100 1:58 18:74
 -.31 -1.57
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.22: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Oman
industrial sector and the other GCC industrial sectors.
M Bahrain Kuwait Oman Saudi Arabia
1 -.69 -.60 -.59 -.05
2 -.93 -.86 1.07 -.35
3 -.56 -.81 .57 -.64
4 -.83 -.57 1:37 -.84
10 -1.55 -1.35 .16 2:81

11 -1.63 -1.42 1:80 2:52

20 -2.22 .28 .72 .73
25 -2.59 .83 .45 .87
30 -2.60 .29 .64 .29
40 -2.51 -.51 3:18
 .94
60 2:29 -.63 2:17 .27
80 1:31 5:17
 1:65 -.48
90 1:28 4:27
 2:20 -.11
100 .86 3:70
 2:20 -.24
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.23: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Qatar
industrial sector and the other GCC industrial sectors.68 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
M Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar
1 -.34 5:30
 73:9
 22:4

2 -.49 4:17
 64:2
 16:9

3 -.78 3:16
 52:8
 13:9

4 -.89 2:48
 45:4
 11:8

10 -1.55 .48 28:7
 6:57

11 -1.64 .37 27:4
 6:11

20 -2.22 2:43
 21:6
 3:69

25 -2.49 2:86
 22:4
 5:12

30 -2.86 2:59
 19:9
 4:13

40 -2.42 1:67 16:6
 2:87

60 -2.22 3:80
 12:7
 1:60
80 -2.80 4:15
 10:5
 .89
90 -3.1 3:51
 9:8
 .71
100 -2.28 3:05
 8:88
 .43
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.24: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Saudi-Arabia
industrial sector and the other GCC industrial sectors.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 69
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Table 2.25: Q2 Two-way causality-in-variance between each pair of the GCC indus-
trial sectors.70 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Parameter BA KU OM QA SA
Panel (A)
b0 -.00006 -.0009 .0002 .0007 -.0003
(.67) (.28) (.03) (.01) (.50)
b1 -.01 -.24 .21 .004 .1
(.70) (.01) (.00) (.85) (.00)
b2 -.07 .03
(.04) (.18)
b3 -.14 .008
(.07) (.74)
b4 -.09 .03
(.48) (.13)
b5 .05 .01
(.72) (.54)
b6 .009 .01
(.86) (.67)
b7 -.002
(.92)
b8 .02
(.30)
Panel (B)
! .000007 .00001 .000001 .000006 .000009
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.22)
 .13 .17 .13 .11 .06
(.00) (.05) (.00) (.00) (.00)
 .75 .77 .86 .87 .92
(.00) (.00) (.00) (.00) (.00)
Sample size 2530 3314 4147 3676 3628
2271
Number of lags(p) 1 6 8 1 1
The numbers in parentheses are the p-values for the estimated coecients.
Table 2.26: Quasi-maximum likelihood estimation of univariate GARCH (1,1) models
for each GCC insurance sector.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 71
M Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia
4 -1.04 -.96 -.77 -1.15
5 -1.19 -1.12 -1.00 -.81
10 -.57 -1.22 -1.64 -1.52
15 .11 -1.85 -1.59 -2.10
20 2:28 -2.10 -2.06 -2.49
25 1:51 -1.96 -2.42 -2.39
60 2:54
 .87 -2.78 -2.69
75 1.23 .06 -2.35 -3.10
90 .17 -.33 -2.58 -3.11
100 -.41 -.33 -1.05 -3.34
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.27: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Bahrain
insurance sector and the other GCC insurance sectors.
M Bahrain Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia
4 -1.18 -1.15 -1.27 -1.33
5 -1.28 -1.34 -1.39 -1.49
10 -1.82 -1.99 -1.87 -2.03
15 -2.07 -2.44 -1.72 -2.37
20 -2.40 -2.79 .41 -2.70
25 -2.67 -3.15 -.10 -2.75
60 -3.52 -4.73 -1.17 -2.81
75 -3.66 -5.28 -1.50 -3.58
90 -3.92 -5.83 -2.27 -3.90
100 -4.35 -6.12 -2.78 -4.34
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.28: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Kuwait
insurance sector and the other GCC insurance sectors.72 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
M Bahrain Kuwait Qatar Saudi Arabia
4 -.96 -1.15 -1.08 -.97
5 -1.14 -1.34 -.99 -1.15
10 -.85 -1.99 -1.57 -1.66
15 -.61 -2.44 -2.05 -2.00
20 -.82 -2.79 -2.10 -2.17
25 1.05 -3.15 -1.49 -2.54
60 -.37 -4.73 -2.45 -3.85
75 -.82 -5.28 -2.97 -4.29
90 -1.44 -5.83 -3.40 -4.39
100 -1.77 -6.12 -1.71 -4.61
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.29: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Oman
insurance sector and the other GCC insurance sectors.
M Bahrain Kuwait Oman Saudi Arabia
4 .60 -1.19 -.20 -.68
5 .22 -1.37 -.46 -.92
10 .13 5:65
 -1.22 -1.11
15 -.69 3:88
 -1.12 -1.70
20 -1.14 3:39
 -1.60 -2.05
25 -1.52 2:43
 -1.94 -2.64
60 -2.84 -.98 -2.25 -3.64
75 1:81 -1.97 -2.18 12:04

90 1.02 -2.64 -2.35 10:50

100 .76 -3.71 -2.79 9:62

, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.30: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Qatar
insurance sector and the other GCC insurance sectors.
M Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar
4 .06 -.94 7:42
 3:36

5 -.25 -1.13 5:78
 2:74

10 3:26
 -1.78 4:00
 1.01
15 2:12 -2.32 2:82
 .17
20 1:41 -2.41 1:94 -.17
25 .80 -2.78 2:05 -.65
60 .17 -4.24 -.91 -2.44
75 2:97
 -4.54 -1.97 -2.79
90 2:64
 -2.77 -2.21 -3.39
100 2:90
 -3.22 -2.48 -3.30
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.31: Q1 One-way test statistic for causality-in-variance between Saudi Arabia
insurance sector and the other GCC insurance sectors.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 73
M! 1 20 30 60 80 100
COUNTRY #
BA$ KU -.71 -1.69 -1.44 -.69 -2.14 -3.36
BA$ OM -.97 -1.47 -.79 .35 -.75 -1.49
BA$ QA -.75 -1.06 -3.23 -3.98 -.65 -.20
BA$ SA -.80 1.23 -1.37 -1.78 -.37 -.31
KU$ OM -.89 -2.80 -3.92 -5.75 -6.76 -7.62
KU$ QA -.64 2.66 .72 -1.52 -2.86 -4.21
KU$ SA -.83 -2.70 -4.24 -4.49 -6.05 -5.35
OM$ QA .85 -1.98 -2.39 -3.33 -3.95 -3.19
OM$ SA 10.1
 -.159 -.83 -3.37 -4.18 -5.01
QA$ SA .61 -1.57 -2.03 -4.30 5.99
 4.47

 and 
 indicates signicant at 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2.32: Q2 Two-way causality-in-variance between each pair of the GCC insur-
ance sectors.74 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Figure 2.1: Daily observations of closing price of the GCC stock markets indices.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 75
Figure 2.2: Daily observations of closing price of the GCC stock markets banking
sectors indices.76 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Figure 2.3: Daily observations of closing price of the GCC stock markets industrial
sectors indices.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 77
Figure 2.4: Daily observations of closing price of the GCC stock markets insurance
sectors indices.
Figure 2.5: Bahrain stock market GARCH (1,1).78 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Figure 2.6: Kuwait stock market GARCH (1,1).
Figure 2.7: Oman stock market GARCH (1,1).Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 79
Figure 2.8: Qatar stock market GARCH (1,1).
Figure 2.9: Saudi-Arabia stock market GARCH (1,1).80 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Figure 2.10: Dubai stock market GARCH (1,1).
Figure 2.11: Correlation between Bahrain's stock market past shocks and the other
GCC stock markets' current shocks.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 81
Figure 2.12: Correlation between Kuwait's stock market past shocks and the other
GCC stock markets' current shocks.
Figure 2.13: Correlation between Oman's stock market past shocks and the other
GCC stock markets' current shocks.82 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Figure 2.14: Correlation between Qatar's stock market past shocks and the other
GCC stock markets' current shocks.
Figure 2.15: Correlation between Saudi-Arabia's stock market past shocks and the
other GCC stock markets' current shocks.Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 83
Figure 2.16: Correlation between Dubai's stock market past shocks and the other
GCC stock markets' current shocks.
Figure 2.17: Bahrain banking sector GARCH (1,1).84 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Figure 2.18: Kuwait banking sector GARCH (1,1).Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 85
Figure 2.19: Oman banking sector GARCH (1,1).
Figure 2.20: Qatar banking sector GARCH (1,1).86 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Figure 2.21: Saudi-Arabia banking sector GARCH (1,1).
Figure 2.22: Dubai banking sector GARCH (1,1).Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 87
Figure 2.23: Bahrain industrial sector GARCH (1,1).88 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Figure 2.24: Kuwait industrial sector GARCH (1,1).
Figure 2.25: Oman industrial sector GARCH (1,1).Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 89
Figure 2.26: Qatar industrial sector GARCH (1,1).
Figure 2.27: Saudi-Arabia industrial sector GARCH (1,1).90 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Figure 2.28: Bahrain insurance sector GARCH (1,1).
Figure 2.29: Kuwait insurance sector GARCH (1,1).Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets 91
Figure 2.30: Oman insurance sector GARCH (1,1).
Figure 2.31: Qatar insurance sector GARCH (1,1).92 Chapter 2 Volatility spillover among GCC stock markets
Figure 2.32: Saudi-Arabia insurance sector GARCH (1,1).Chapter 3
GCC stock markets contagion:
The eect of the recent nancial
crisis
3.1 Introduction
During the 1980s and 1990s, many developed and emerging economies experienced
several economic crisis episodes, such as the 1987 U.S. stock market crash, which had a
pronounced impact on many international stock markets; the 1994 Mexican peso
collapse, with its eect on other Latin American stock markets; and the 1997 East
Asian crisis, which rapidly transferred to world wide markets in European, North
America, and the rest of Asian. These events imply that dramatic movements or
shocks in one stock market can be transmitted and have truly signicant eects on
stock markets across boarders, leading many economists to examine stock market
linkages across countries in periods of nancial crisis to determine whether these
linkages vary compared to those in non-crisis times.
Recently, the nancial crisis of 2008-2009 was characterized as the worst nancial crisis
since the Great Depression of 1929-1932. Specically, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) index lost about 46% of its value within a month of Lehman Brothers lling
for bankruptcy. While the nancial crisis initially originated in the U.S., its adverse
eects rapidly spread to other developed and emerging markets around the world. The
9394 Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The eect of the recent nancial crisis
GCC stock markets were not insulated from the negative impact of this nancial crisis,
which led to sharp drops in all GCC stock markets' indices, with decreases of around
14% in Bahrain, 26% in Kuwait, 21% in Oman, 30% in Qatar, 28% in Saudi Arabia,
and 38% in the UAE from the beginning of September to October 15, 2008. Figure 3.1
graphs the GCC stock markets and U.S. stock market indices during the sample period
under investigation. In addition, during this period, the GCC's total market
capitalization fell dramatically by about 320 billion U.S. dollars, which was about 38%
of the GCC's compound GDP for 2007 (Moosa (2010)). In fact, the GCC economies
have strong economic and nancial ties with the U.S. economy. These ties are
expressed through three main channels: (i) they all shared similar exchange rate
mechanisms, in that all currencies (except Kuwait) have had an exchange rate de-facto
xed to the U.S. dollar; (ii)the dollar peg provides the external anchor for monetary
policy for all GCC countries; and (iii)the GCC countries rely heavily on oil, which is
priced in U.S. dollars, as their main source of exports and revenue.
In this regard, studying contagion is of particular interest to policy makers as well as
investors in the GCC to investigate the extent to which GCC stock markets are
vulnerable to dierent international nancial crises. If contagion exists, policy makers
need to strengthen the ability of the nancial system to absorb the adverse impact of
any nancial crisis. This can be done via improving regulations and supervisory
frameworks at domestic levels, increasing the depth of GCC nancial markets,
pursuing a coordinated set of policies among the GCC countries as a bloc (which
would also be benecial for the formation of the GCC monetary union) in order to
make the GCC capable of reducing the exposure to international nancial contagions
in periods of crisis. Understanding nancial contagion is crucial to the fact that gains
from international portfolio diversication are reduced when stock markets exhibit
correlation, a revelation that will be informative for investors and help them make
better decisions regarding portfolio diversication allocations. Finally, knowing that
contagion has occurred between two stock markets after a crisis may serve as a
\wake-up call" for investors, providing them with useful information for avoiding any
future spreads of the crisis.
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the eect of the recent global nancial
crisis, which originated in the U.S. stock market after the bankruptcy of the Lehman
Brothers bank in September 2008, on the stock markets of the GCC countries, and toChapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The eect of the recent nancial crisis 95
determine whether the sharp falls in the markets in these countries were due to the
existence of \contagion" or were simply a reection of the continuation of the strong
economic and nancial linkages between the GCC and U.S. economies, which exist in
all states of the world, during good and bad times. In particular, this chapter aims to
examine whether contagion exists from the U.S. stock market to the stock markets of
the GCC by comparing two sub-periods before (stable) and after (turmoil) the collapse
of Lehman Brothers, which was the largest bank to ll for bankruptcy in U.S. history
and which has been widely used by many economists as a benchmark for the U.S.
nancial crisis (Bekaert et al. (2012)) and (Mishkin (2010)).1
There is no generally accepted denition of contagion, as meanings for the term vary
widely across the literature. According to the World Bank, there are three dierent
denitions of contagion, which can be categorized as follows.
1. Broad denition: Contagion is the cross-country transmission of shocks or
general cross-country spillover eects. Contagion can take place during both
\good times" and \bad times". Thus, though contagion does not need to be
related to crises, However, it has been emphasized during crisis times.
2. Restrictive denition: Contagion is the transmission of shocks to other
countries or the cross-country correlation, beyond any fundamental link among
the countries and beyond common shocks. This denition is usually referred to
as excess co-movement, commonly explained by herding behaviour.
3. Very restrictive denition: Contagion occurs when cross-country
correlations increase during \crisis times" relative to \tranquil times".
In this chapter, I follow Forbes and Rigobon (2002) in dening contagion as a
signicant increase in cross-market linkages after a shock to one country or group of
countries. According to this denition, if two stock markets exhibit a high degree of
co-movement during periods of stability, even if these two markets continue to be
highly correlated after a shock to one market, their relation may not constitute
contagion. It is only contagion if cross-market co-movements increase signicantly after
the shock. Thus, if the co-movements do not increase signicantly, any continued
1Another denition of the starting of the U.S. nancial crisis will be used in the sensitivity analysis
later in this chapter.96 Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The eect of the recent nancial crisis
cross-market correlation at high levels suggests a continuation of the strong linkages
between the two markets that exist in all states of the world. In such cases, the term
\interdependence" is more aptly employed to evaluate the situation between the two
stock markets.
As argued in their paper, Forbes and Rigobon (2002)'s denition has a number of
advantages. First, it provides a straightforward framework for testing the existence of
contagion by directly and simply comparing cross-market linkages (such as
cross-market correlation coecients) between two stock markets during a relatively
stable period with cross-market linkages after a crisis. Contagion occurs whenever
there exists a signicant increase in these cross-market linkages after the shock.
Second, this denition oers a straightforward method of distinguishing between
alternative explanations for how crises are transmitted across stock markets, since the
theoretical literature on the transmission channels of contagion is broadly divided into
fundamentals linkages and irrational behaviour. In particular, some theories argue that
most shocks are transmitted through economic fundamentals, such as trade, or
nancial linkages, while other theories relate the transmission of shocks to the
\irrational behaviour" of investors, arguing that investors react dierently after a large
negative shock. By dening contagion as a signicant increase in cross-market linkages
after a shock to one country or group of countries, the Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
denition avoids measuring or dierentiating between various transmission
mechanisms, which are extremely dicult to measure and estimate.
Despite the advantages mentioned above, it is worth mentioning that this denition of
contagion is not universally accepted. Some economists argue that if a shock to one
country is transmitted to another country, even if there is no signicant change in
cross-market relationships, the transmission constitutes contagion (Calvo and Reinhart
(1996)). Other economists argue that it is impossible to dene contagion based on
simple tests of changes in cross-market linkages. Instead, they argue that it is
important to identify exactly how a shock is transmitted across countries, and that
only certain types of transmission mechanisms, such as herding or irrational investor
behaviour, entail contagion (Kodres and Pritsker (2002)).
Empirically, this chapter investigates the existence of contagion using the cross-market
correlations tests pioneered by King and Wadhwani (1990) and developed by ForbesChapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The eect of the recent nancial crisis 97
and Rigobon (2002), who criticized previous studies-in which the unadjusted
correlation coecients were used to investigate the presence of contagion across stock
markets-for the heteroskedasticity resulting from the bias in stock market returns of
the crisis country. This bias overestimates actual cross-market correlations,
particularly during the turmoil period, during which the volatility of stock market
returns in the crisis country increases. Hence, the existence of heteroskedasticity in
stock market returns has a signicant eect on the estimation of cross-market
correlations. As a result, tests based on these unadjusted correlation coecients
exaggerate the value of the estimated cross-market correlations and thus falsely nd
evidence of contagion, even if the underlying transmission mechanism does not change
between the two stock markets. In order to overcome the problem of heteroskedasticity,
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) introduced the adjustment cross-market correlation
coecient, which does not depend on the volatility (variance) of the crisis country,
especially during the turmoil period.
Findings show that, for both tests (based on(i) unadjusted and (ii) adjusted
correlations coecients), there is some evidence of contagion from the U.S. stock
market to the stock markets of Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE after the
collapse of Lehman Brothers. In the case of Kuwait, however, the empirical
investigation suggests that when the conditional correlation is applied, contagion exists
from the U.S. stock market, but that when the contagion test based on the adjusted
correlation is used, there is no signicant increase in cross-market correlation between
the Kuwait and U.S. stock markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Hence, the
relationship between the two markets is rather interdependent, and no contagion has
occurred from the U.S. nancial crisis to Kuwait stock market. According to the
theory of \fundamentals-based contagion", which demonstrates that contagion is
transmitted across countries through real or nancial linkages, the results in the case of
Kuwait might be due to the fact that the Kuwait economy is relatively less linked to
the U.S. economy than the other GCC economies, in the sense that Kuwait is the only
GCC country that does not x its currency exchange rate to the U.S. dollar and that
Kuwait has a more independent monetary policy than its GCC counterparts. This is
also supported by the empirical analyses in that Kuwait has the smallest (after
Bahrain) cross-market correlation among the GCC countries after the turmoil period.
Finally, in the case of Bahrain, neither the contagion tests based on unadjusted98 Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The e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nancial crisis
correlation coecients nor the tests based on adjusted correlation coecients found
any contagion between Bahrain and U.S. stock markets. The linkage between the U.S.
stock market as a crisis country and the Bahrain stock market as a non-crisis country
remained relatively the same after the crisis period, meaning that no contagion has
occurred. From this, one can conclude that the recent U.S. nancial crisis has not
aected the Bahrain stock market. These results might be due to the fact that the
Bahrain stock market is one of the smallest and most illiquid stock market when
compared to the other GCC stock markets.
While an extensive research agenda has been devoted to the recent nancial crisis and
its impact on both advanced and emerging markets (Chudik and Fratzscher (2011),
Ehrmann et al. (2011), Rose and Spiegel (2012), among others), only a few researches
have tried to identify a possible transmission to the GCC stock markets. In this regard,
this chapter contributes to the recent literature on contagion across stock markets after
the global nancial crisis by providing empirical evidence in the context of the GCC
stock markets. To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst study to investigate the
impact of the U.S. nancial crisis on the GCC stock markets using Forbes and Rigobon
(2002)'s denition of contagion and employing the adjusted cross-market correlation
coecients methodology. The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows:
Section 3.2 presents a brief overview of the relevant literature on contagion. Section 3.3
describes the methodology adopted to estimate cross-market correlation coecients.
Section 3.4 provides the data and the empirical results analysis. Section 3.5 concludes
the chapter.
3.2 Review of literature
There has been widespread disagreement and debate among economists with regard to
the denition of contagion and the empirical methodology used to measure it. King
and Wadhwani (1990) were the rst to dene contagion as a signicant increase in the
correlation between two stock markets. In their seminal paper, they investigated the
correlation between the US, UK, and Japan stock markets after the U.S. stock market
crash of October 1987 and found that the level of correlation between these three
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Recently, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) dened contagion as a signicant increase in
market co-movements after a shock to one country or group of countries and used this
denition to test for stock market contagion during the 1997 East Asian crisis, the
1994 Mexican peso devaluation, and the 1987 U.S. market crash. The authors
criticized the ndings of the earlier studies concerning measure of contagion, arguing
that statistical tests for cross-market correlation coecients used in these papers were
biased because the correlation coecients were conditional on market volatility over
the time period under investigation. Hence, during a period of crisis, the stock market
volatility increased and the unadjusted market correlation was biased upward. Taking
the bias caused by heteroscedasticity into account, Forbes and Rigobon (2002)
developed an adjusted correlation coecient and found evidence that-unlike the
ndings of previous studies-that there was no signicant increase in the correlation
coecients between stock markets during the three crises mentioned above and that
the contagion found in previous studies did not exist.
Loretan and English (2000) used the same approach as Forbes and Rigobon (2002), in
which they calculated the cross-country correlations for three pairs of asset
returns-namely, equities, bonds, and foreign exchange-between UK and Germany
during the 1990s, when two crises occurred: the Mexican crisis of December 1994 and
the Russian default of August 1998. The authors found that a signicant proportion of
the changes in correlations over time were explained by the dierences in sample
volatilities. After correcting for the bias in the correlation coecients using a method
that, after some algebraic manipulation, was the same as the correction proposed by
Forbes and Rigobon (2002), the adjusted correlation coecients showed only one case
of contagion among the three series, which was in the case of the exchange rates after
the Mexican crisis.
On the other hand, an alternative denition of contagion has also been used in the
literature. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) dened contagion as the cross-country
transmission of shocks or general cross-country spillover eects (broad denition). This
denition emphasizes contagion caused by the normal interdependence among
economies, which means that shocks are transmitted across countries through their
real or nancial linkages. Calvo and Reinhart (1996) called this type of contagion a
\fundamentals-based contagion". In this case, the forms of assets' co-movements are not
considered contagion because they re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just during periods of crisis. In order to investigate the issue of contagion, Calvo and
Reinhart (1996) focused on the equity markets of Latin America and Asian emerging
markets. After employing principle component analysis, they found evidence that the
degree of co-movements across weekly returns on Latin America and Asian equity
markets increased after the Mexican crisis. They Also found that, while the degree of
co-movements following the crisis increased in both Asia and Latin America, regional
patterns diered, which suggested that contagion may be more regional than global.
Bekaert et al. (2005) adopted yet another approach, dening contagion as excess
correlation over and above what one would expect from economic fundamentals
(restrictive denition). To investigate the existence of contagion during crisis periods,
Bekaert et al. (2005) applied a two-factor model to stock markets in three
regions-namely, Europe, Southeast Asia and Latin America-and dened contagion as a
cross-country correlation of the model residuals. The authors found no evidence for
increasing in correlations after the Mexican crisis, though they found some evidence of
contagion after the Asian crisis.
Finally, with regard to the GCC stock markets, to the best of my knowledge, there is
only one paper, authored by Moosa (2010), to address the impact of the U.S.
sub-prime crisis on the GCC stock markets. The main hypothesis of this study was
that the collapse of the GCC stock markets during the sub-prime crisis did not result
from the contagion. Moosa implied that the empirical results of the paper showed
rather limited evidence for the eect of U.S. stock prices on the GCC stock markets
and a much more important role for oil prices. However, neither of these variables
alone can explain the behaviour of the GCC stock markets during the period 2007-2008
because of the role played by the domestic factors that caused \bubbles and crashes".
The methodology used in this paper was based on the structural time series model.
3.3 Methodology
Tests based on cross-market correlation coecients have been the heart of the
methodologies used to empirically test for stock market contagion. These tests
measure correlation in returns between two stock markets during a stable period and
then test for a signicant increase in correlation coecients after a shock or crisis. If aChapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The e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correlation coecient increases signicantly after a crisis, it suggests that the
transmission mechanism between the two markets increased after the shock and
contagion occurred.
This study builds on the previous work of Forbes and Rigobon (2002), who showed
that cross-market correlation coecients are biased upward in the presence of
heteroskedasticity and that this bias is large during periods of crisis and thus
overestimates actual cross-market correlation coecients. This bias is due to the fact
that the volatility (variance) of the stock returns of the crisis source country (U.S.)
increases, particularly after the turmoil period (the crisis). Thus when the sample is
divided into two sub-periods (the stable period and the turmoil period) this high
volatility results in higher correlation between the two stock markets after the turmoil
period, even when the actual correlation transmission mechanism is constant or does
not change. Hence, cross-market correlation is conditional on the volatility of stock
market returns in the crisis market, and the increase in cross-market correlations does
not result from contagion, but rather is caused by the higher volatility of stock market
returns in the crisis source country, as is shown in equation 3.2. Accordingly, tests
using unadjusted (conditional) cross-market correlation coecients are inaccurate
because heteroskedasticity overstates the magnitude of the cross-market correlation
and thus wrongly nds evidence of contagion, even when the transmission mechanism
is constant or does not change and no signicant increase actually happens between
the two markets after the crisis. These cross-market correlation coecients need to be
adjusted for volatile periods such as crises in order to solve for this bias (Forbes and
Rigobon (2002)).
As we will see later in the formal proof, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) introduced an
adjusted (unconditional) correlation coecient , which does not depend on the
volatility of the crisis market after the turmoil period, as in equation 3.1.
 =

p
1 + [1   ()2]
(3.1)
where  is the unadjusted correlation coecient, which varies with high-and low-
volatility periods and is thus conditional on the volatility of the crisis market returns
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 = corr(y;x) =
cov(y;x)
p
var(y)var(x)
(3.2)
=
1var(x)
p
f2
1var(x) + var(t)gvar(x)
= f1 +
var(t)
2
1var(x)
g 1=2
where y and x are the stock returns in the non-crisis country (each of the GCC stock
markets) and the crisis country ( the U.S. stock market) in the equation
yt = c + 1xt + t, respectively;  is the relative increase in the variance of x
( 
h
xx
l
xx   1); and h
xx and l
xx are the crisis country variances during turmoil and
stable periods, respectively. Equation 3.2 clearly shows that, for a given var(t),  is
an increasing function of the variance of the crisis country's market returns and is thus
conditional on the volatility of the crisis country stock returns var(x). More specic,
an increase in var(x) leads to an increase in the cross-market correlation . As a
result, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argued that tests based on unadjusted (conditional)
correlation coecients will be biased upward and will provide misleading and
inaccurate results when used to test for the existence of contagion.
3.3.1 Proof of the bias and a proposed adjustment
The following simple model claries how heteroskedasticity aects the cross-market
correlation coecient between two markets as suggested by Forbes and Rigobon (2002).
Assume x and y are stochastic variables representing stock market returns for two
dierent markets and that these returns are related, as in equation 3.3:
yt =  + xt + t; (3.3)
where
E[t] = 0; (3.4)
E[2
t] = c < 1 where c is a constant, and (3.5)
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Since markets tend to be more volatile after a shock or crisis, I split the sample into
two groups-stable (l), or before crisis, and turmoil (h), or after crisis-so that the
variance of xt is lower in the period of stability and higher in the period of turmoil. By
assumption in equation 3.6, the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates of equation
3.3 are consistent for both groups, and h= l.
By construction, we know that h
xx > l
xx and dene
 
h
xx
l
xx
  1 as a relative increase in the variance of x in the turmoil period. (3.7)
According to equation 3.3, the variance of y is:
h
yy = 2h
xx + ee (3.8)
= 2(1 + )l
xx + ee
= (2l
xx + ee) + 2l
xx
= l
yy + 2l
xx
= l
yy

1 + 2l
xx
l
yy

when equation 3.8 is combined with the standard denition of the correlation
coecient (equation3.9):
 =
xy
xy
= 
x
y
(3.9)
Note that the standard denition of  is:
 =
xy
xx
(3.10)
Then, from equations 3.8 and 3.9,
h
yy = l
yy(1 + [l]
2
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Therefore,
h =
h
xy
h
xh
y
(3.12)
=
(1 + )l
xy
(1 + )
1=2l
x(1 + [l]
2)
1=2
l
y
= l
s
1 + 
1 + [l]
2
Equation 3.12 clearly shows that the correlation coecient is an increasing function of
. In other words, the estimated correlation coecient between x and y increases when
the variance of x increases (i.e., during periods of high volatility in market x), even
when the actual relationship, represented by , between the two markets is constant or
does not change. Hence, estimates of the cross-market correlation coecient are biased
and conditional on the variance of x, and this conditional correlation can be written as
in equation 3.13,
 = 
s
1 + 
1 + 2 (3.13)
where  is the conditional correlation coecient, which depends on the variance of x,
the crisis source country;  is the unconditional correlation coecient; and  is the
relative increase in the variance of x ( 
h
xx
l
xx   1).
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) demonstrated that conditional correlation coecients, as in
equation 3.13, have a direct eect on tests for contagion using cross-market correlation
coecients, and that this eect comes from the fact that markets tend to be more
volatile after a shock or crisis. Hence, when the crisis source market is more volatile,
the conditional correlation () will be greater than it should be after a shock, even if
the unconditional correlation () remains the same as in stable periods. Therefore,
heteroskedasticity in market returns biases the cross-market correlation coecients
results, especially after a shock or crisis. This bias is adjusted after solving for the
unconditional correlation, which does not depend on the variance of x, from equation
(3.13) yielding:
 =

p
1 + [1   ()2]
(3.14)
It is worth mentioning that Forbes and Rigobon (2002) stated that there is one
potential problem with this adjustment for heteroskedasticity, in which it is assumed
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stock markets, as in equations 3.4 and 3.6. In particular, the proof of this bias and the
adjustment is only valid if there are no exogenous global shocks or no feedback from
the stock market of the non-crisis country to that of the crisis country.
3.3.2 Base model
After showing the bias of the cross-market correlation coecients and demonstrating
how to adjust for this bias, I utilize a Vector Autoregression framework (VAR) to
estimate cross-market correlations between the U.S. stock market and each of the GCC
stock markets, as follows:2
xc
t =
p X
j=1
bc
jxc
t j +
p X
j=1
bn
j xn
t j + c
t
xn
t =
p X
j=1
bn
j xn
t j +
p X
j=1
bc
jxc
t j + n
t
Which can be re-written as:
Xt = (L)Xt + t (3.15)
Xt  fxc
t;xn
t g0 (3.16)
where xc
t is the stock market returns in the crisis country (U.S), xn
t is the stock market
returns in another market (each GCC stock market), (L) is a vector of lags for both
stock market returns, and t is a vector of reduced disturbances, which are now
assumed to have constant variances. I rst use the (VAR) model (equations 3.15 and
3.16) to estimate the variance-covariance matrices (equation 3.17) for each pair of
countries during the stable period (before crisis) and turmoil period (after crisis).
^ 
 =
2
4^ 11 ^ 12
^ 21 ^ 2
22
3
5 (3.17)
where ^ 2
11 = V ar(^ c
t)=
P
^ 2
c;t
T is the variance of the crisis country residual, ^ 2
22 =
V ar(^ n
t )=
P
^ 2
n;t
T is the variance of the non-crisis country residual, and ^ 12;21 =
Cov(^ c
t;^ n
t )=
P
^ c;t^ n;t
T is the covariance between both countries' residuals. After that, I
2In the sensitivity analysis, pairwise simple correlations between stock markets returns (instead of
using the VAR residual-based variance-covariance matrix) are employed to estimate the correlation
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use the estimated variance-covariance matrices to calculate the cross-market
conditional correlation coecients () between the U.S and each of the GCC stock
markets for each period (namely, the stable period (l) and the turmoil period (h))
as in equations 3.18 and 3.19, respectively.
l =
Cov(^ c
t;^ n
t )l
p
V ar(^ c
t)lV ar(^ n
t )l (3.18)
h =
Cov(^ c
t;^ n
t )h
p
V ar(^ c
t)hV ar(^ n
t )h (3.19)
Furthermore, in order to investigate how heteroskedasticity biases tests for contagion, I
estimate the unconditional correlation coecients () for each pair of stock markets
and for each period, stable and turmoil (equations 3.20 and 3.21, respectively).
l =
l
p
1 + [1   (l)2]
(3.20)
h =
h
p
1 + [1   (h)2]
(3.21)
After calculating the conditional and unconditional correlation coecients for both
stable and turmoil periods, I perform the test statistic to investigate the existence of
contagion from the U.S. stock market to each of the GCC stock markets. More
specically, I use t-test statistics to evaluate whether there is a signicant increase in
correlation coecients (both the conditional and unconditional) during the turmoil
period for each pair of stock markets. The hypothesises tests for conditional and
unconditional correlations are given in equations 3.22 and 3.23:
H0 : l  h (3.22)
H1 : l < h
H0 : l  h (3.23)
H1 : l < h
where l and l are the conditional and unconditional correlations during the stable
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turmoil period.
In this situation, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) have suggested using the Fisher
transformation of correlation coecients in order to improve the nite sample
properties of test statistics (Kendall and Stuart (1961)). The test statistic has the
following form (equation 3.24):3
T =
1
2ln[
1+^ h
1 ^ h]   1
2ln[
1+^ l
1 ^ l]
q
1
Nh 3 + 1
Nl 3
(3.24)
where 1
2ln[
1+^ h
1 ^ h] and 1
2ln[
1+^ l
1 ^ l] are Fisher transformations of the cross-market
correlation coecients after and before the crisis, respectively, and Nh and Nl are the
number of observations after and before the crisis, respectively. Under the null
hypothesis of no contagion, Forbes and Rigobon (2002) suggested that the Fisher
transformation test statistic is approximately normally distributed and can be
compared by applying standard t-tests. This is a one-sided t-test, with positive values
greater than any of the critical values (10%, 5% or 1%) representing evidence of a
signicant increase in cross-market correlation coecients and thereby providing
support for the existence of contagion. Therefore, contagion occurs if we reject the null
hypothesis at a reasonable level of signicance (i.e., the test statistic result is greater
than the critical value); otherwise the test indicates interdependence.
It is worth-mentioning that we should be cautioned that the variance used in
construction of the test statistic in equation 3.24 is in fact ignores the possibility of
dependence between the two portions of the sample (non-crisis and crisis). In addition,
Forbes and Rigobon (2002) actually did not derive the asymptotic normal distribution
of equation 3.24 but rather used the Fisher z-transformation, which states that under
the assumption that two samples are drawn from two independent bivariate normal
distributions with the same correlation coecient, the dierence between 1
2ln[
1+^ h
1 ^ h] and
1
2ln[
1+^ l
1 ^ l] for the two samples converges to the normal distribution N(0; 1
Nh 3 + 1
Nl 3).
3The Fisher z-transformation is generally dened as T =
zh zl
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3.4 Data and empirical results
The empirical analysis of this chapter uses continuously compounded daily closing
prices (obtained from data-stream) for general market indices of the six GCC stock
markets and the U.S. stock market, namely, the Bahrain Stock Exchange (BSE)
all-share index, the Kuwait Stock Exchange (KSE), the Oman Muscat Securities
Market (MSM) index, the Qatar Doha Securities Market (DSM) index, the Saudi stock
market (Tadawul) all-share index, the United Arab of Emirates Dubai Financial
Market (DFM) index, and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). The data cover the
period from January 2, 2003, to May 31, 2013, for each GCC stock market as well as
the NYSE. I divided the data into two sub-samples: before and after the global
economic and nancial crisis.
The goal of this chapter is to investigate the eect of the recent nancial crisis, which
originated in the U.S. stock market after the bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers bank
in September 2008, on the stock markets of the GCC countries, and to determine
whether the sharp falls in these markets were due to the existence of contagion or
whether they just reected a continuation of the strong economic and nancial linkages
between the GCC and the U.S. economies that exist in all state of the world, during
good and bad times.
Using the date of Lehman Brothers's declaration of bankruptcy as a benchmark for the
crisis date of the contagion test, I split the sample period under investigation into two
sub-periods: the stable period (before crisis), which is the period from January 2, 2003,
to September 14, 2008, and the turmoil period (after crisis), which is the period from
September 15, 2008, until the end of the sample. Then, the VAR model is estimated as
in equations 3.15 and 3.16, using the Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC) for the two
sub-periods (Tables 3.1 and 3.2). After that, I calculate the cross-market correlation
coecients (conditional and unconditional) between the U.S. and each of the GCC
counties' stock markets using the variance-covariance matrix estimates for the stable
period, the turmoil period, and the full period. Finally, I test for the existence of
contagion as a signicant increase in the correlation coecients during the turmoil
period using the Fisher transformation, as in equation 3.24.
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correlation, heteroskedasticity can bias the cross-market correlation coecients
upwards from the GCC stock markets' perspective, compared to when the adjusted or
unconditional correlation coecients are employed. As argued by Forbes and Rigobon
(2002), using the unadjusted or conditional correlation coecients can be misleading
and inappropriate in the sense that the estimated correlation coecients are
considered an increasing function of the variance of the crisis country's asset returns.
So when the sample is divided into two sub-periods (stable and turmoil periods) the
unadjusted correlation coecients are biased upwards, especially after the turmoil
period, since volatility tends to be higher in crisis time than in tranquil times, which
can lead to false inferences when testing contagion across markets.
In this regard, Figures 3.2 : 3.7 plot the conditional, or unadjusted, correlations (red
line) and the unconditional, or adjusted, correlations (blue line) between the U.S stock
market (NYSE) and each of the GCC stock markets of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. The conditional and unconditional correlation coecients
are calculated as a xed rolling window for 90 trading days, using equation 3.13 for the
conditional correlation and its adjustment specication (equation 3.14) for the
unconditional correlation.
As shown in the six graphs mentioned above, the conditional and the unconditional
correlations seem to move together; however, especially after the collapse of of the
Lehman Brothers (which is dened as the crisis period), the conditional correlation is
signicantly greater than the unconditional correlation in absolute values, which proves
the upward bias in all cases of the six GCC stock markets. These examples verify
Forbes and Rigobon (2002)'s criticism of previous studies, in which the conditional
correlation coecients were used to investigate the existence of contagion across stock
markets due to the heteroskedasticity resulted from the bias in stock market returns.
Before proceeding to the empirical results in detail, I would like to summarize the main
ndings of this section. Despite the obvious upward trend of the conditional correlation
coecients in the graphs 3.2 : 3.7, as will be shown later in this section, the tests
based on both the conditional and unconditional correlation coecients between U.S.
and each of the GCC stock markets do not contradict in their conclusions, and both
tests nd a signicant increase in cross-market correlations for Oman, Qatar, Saudi
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does not aect contagion results for these four stock markets and that one can
conclude that contagion was transmitted from the U.S. stock market to the stock
markets of Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE after the global economic and
nancial crisis in 2008. On the other hand, in the case of Kuwait, I nd some evidence
of contagion from the U.S. stock market after the Lehman Brothers collapse when
conditional correlation is applied, but when the contagion test based on the adjusted
correlation is used, I do not nd any signicant increase in cross-market correlation
between Kuwait and U.S. stock markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Hence,
the relationship between the two markets is rather interdependent, and no contagion
has occurred from the U.S. nancial crisis to Kuwait's stock market. This result can be
considered supportive evidence for Forbes and Rigobon (2002), in that the bias in the
cross-market conditional correlation coecients generated by the heteroskedasticity in
U.S. stock market returns caused this conicting conclusion. Finally, in the case of
Bahrain, neither the contagion test based on conditional correlation coecients nor the
test based on unconditional correlation coecients nd any contagion between the
Bahrain and U.S. stock markets. Hence, the linkage between the U.S. stock market as
a crisis country and Bahrain's stock market as a non-crisis country remained relatively
the same after the crisis period, and no contagion has occurred. From this, one can
conclude that the recent U.S. nancial crisis has not aected the Bahrain stock market.
Table 3.3 reports the estimated conditional (unadjusted) correlation coecients for the
U.S. and each of the GCC country pairs during the three periods (stable, turmoil, and
full sample periods) as well as the test statistic results by which contagion is indicated.
Contagion has occurred if the value of the test statistic is greater than the critical value
of the t-test at a signicant level of 10%, 5%, or 1%. Therefore, any test statistic value
greater than any of these critical values denotes contagion; on the other hand, any test
statistic value less than or equal to any of these critical values suggests no contagion.
Surprisingly, and despite the the strong economic and nancial linkages between the
U.S. economy and the economies of the GCC countries, the cross-market correlation
coecients between U.S. stock markets and each of the GCC stock markets during the
stable period (before crisis) are relatively low. In particular, the conditional correlation
coecients vary, with the highest (.07) being found for Kuwait, .05 for Bahrain, .03 for
Oman, .02 for the UAE, and -.01 for both Qatar and Saudi Arabia. However, the
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conditional correlation coecients between the U.S. and all the GCC stock
markets-except Bahrain-have increased since the turmoil period, which is considered a
prerequisite for the existence of contagion. This change is especially remarkable in the
cases of Saudi Arabia and the UAE-in which the conditional correlation coecients
increase signicantly from -.01 to .55 and from .02 to .42, respectively-as these two
markets are the largest of the GCC stock markets with regard to total market
capitalization. In the case of Qatar, the conditional correlation coecient increases
from -.01 during the stable period (before crisis) to .30 after the crisis period; with
regard to Kuwait and Oman, the conditional correlation coecient increases from .07
to .14 and from .03 to .23, respectively. Finally, Bahrain is the only case whose
conditional correlation coecient remains stable or slightly decreases after the turmoil
period, decreasing from .05 to .04.
Furthermore, the t-test results in Table 3.3 suggest a signicant increase in the
conditional correlation coecients after the turmoil period, such that the null
hypothesis of no contagion is rejected at 1% signicance level in the case of the stock
markets of Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE and at a 5% signicance level in
the case of Kuwait. According to the contagion denition adopted in this chapter,
these empirical results imply that contagion has occurred from the U.S. nancial crisis
(labelled by the collapse of Lehman Brothers) to the stock markets of Kuwait, Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE. However, in the case of Bahrain, the t-test results
show that the null hypothesis of no contagion from the U.S. stock market to the
Bahrain stock market is failed to be rejected at any conventional level of signicance.
This result indicates that the Bahrain stock markets was not aected by the U.S.
nancial crisis due to the fact that Bahrain stock market is the smallest and one of the
most illiquid stock markets of all the GCC stock markets.
However, as mentioned before, these tests, which are based on the conditional
correlation coecients, may be inappropriate and inaccurate due to the bias caused by
heteroskedasticity in the market returns. This estimated increase in the correlation
coecients might reect either an increase in cross-market linkages and/or an increase
in market volatility (Forbes and Rigobon (2002)). In order to investigate the extent to
which the bias in the correlation coecients may change or aect the test results for
contagion, I repeat the above analysis using the adjusted or unconditional correlation
coecients proposed by Forbes and Rigobon (2002).112 Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The e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Table 3.4 reports the unconditional cross-market correlation coecients between the
U.S. and each of the GCC stock markets during stable, turmoil, and full periods, as
well as the test statistic results by which one can examine whether there is a signicant
increase in cross-market correlation coecients after the turmoil period. It is obvious
that, after adjusting for the bias, there is a substantial change in the values of the
estimated correlation coecients compared to the values of the estimated conditional
correlation coecients in Table 3.3 for all the GCC countries. In particular, the
unconditional correlation coecients are signicantly smaller than the conditional
correlation coecients, with reduction of about 50% of their values, especially after the
turmoil period. More specically, in the cases of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE,
the unconditional correlation coecients' values after the crisis period are .16, .32, and
.23, respectively, while the conditional correlation coecients for the same period
(Table 3.3) are .30, .55, and .42, respectively. In the cases of Bahrain, Oman, and
Kuwait, the unconditional correlation coecients' values after the turmoil period reach
.02, .07, and .12 respectively, while the values of the conditional correlation coecients
were .04, .14, and .23, respectively, for the same period (Table 3.3).
Interestingly, and despite the notable changes in the values of the correlation
coecients after adjusting for the bias resulting from the heteroskedasticity as shown
in Table 3.4, the test statistic results still show a signicant increase in cross-market
correlation coecients and reject the null hypothesis of no contagion at the 1% level of
signicance for Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, which indicates the
existence of a contagion eect from the U.S. stock market to these markets. These
results imply that, on contrary to Forbes and Rigobon (2002), although the adjusting
for the bias aects cross-market correlation values, the adjustments do not aect the
contagion test results obtained when the conditional correlation coecients are
employed for these four stock markets. Hence, one can reach a conclusion that there
has been a contagion eect from the U.S. stock market to the stock markets of Oman,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE after the global economic nancial crisis.
On the other hand, Kuwait is the only case that has a dierent conclusion than of
what I previously found when applied the contagion tests based on the conditional
correlation coecients. Findings show that, in line with Forbes and Rigobon (2002),
there is no signicant increase in the cross-market correlation coecient after the crisis
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for the bias in the conditional correlation coecients and applying the unconditional
correlation. This result implies that no contagion occurred between the U.S. stock
market and the Kuwait stock market after the global nancial crisis and that the
linkage between the two markets can be characterized as, rather, an interdependence.
The explanation behind nding no contagion between the U.S. market and the Kuwait
market after the U.S. nancial crisis can be attributed to the theory of
\fundamentals-based contagion", which demonstrates that contagion is transmitted
across countries through their real or nancial linkages. More specically, the results in
the case of Kuwait might be due to the fact that the Kuwait economy, compared to the
other GCC economies, is relatively less linked to the U.S. economy in the sense that
Kuwait is the only GCC country that does not x its currency exchange rate to the
U.S. dollar and that Kuwait has a more independent monetary policy than its GCC
counterparts. This is also supported by the empirical analyses in that Kuwait has the
smallest (after Bahrain) cross-market correlation among the GCC countries after the
turmoil period. Furthermore, this result can be considered supportive evidence for
what Forbes and Rigobon (2002) argued about regarding the eect of the bias
generated by heteroskedasticity on contagion tests based on conditional correlation
coecients. In other words, in the case of Kuwait, due to the bias eect, ndings show
two dierent conclusions when testing for the existence of contagion. According to
tests based on conditional correlation coecients, contagion is detected; however, when
tests based on unconditional correlation coecients are applied, the contagion eect
disappears and there is no evidence of contagion between the two markets after the
global nancial crisis.
Finally, in the case of Bahrain, the results do not conict with what I previously found
when using the conditional correlation coecients. In particular, the test results in
Table 3.4 do not reject the null hypothesis at any level of signicant and, hence, one
can conclude that no contagion occurred between U.S. and Bahrain stock markets after
the global nancial crisis.
As a robustness check and in order to examine the extent to which any modications
in the base analysis would aect the main results of contagion, as shown in Tables 3.3
and 3.4, I rst change the denition of the crisis period. It is widely believed that the
global nancial crisis was initially triggered by the eruption of the U.S. mortgage
bubble ( housing market) (Phillips and Yu (2011), Mishkin (2010), and Bekaert et al.114 Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The e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(2012)). In this scenario, however, the sub-prime crisis of August 2007 is dened as an
alternative starting point to the nancial crisis. Hence, the denitions for the stable
and turmoil periods are modied to be January 2, 2003, to July 31, 2007, and August
1, 2007 to May 31, 2013, respectively. As shown in Tables 3.5 and 3.6, these
modications do not alter the primary results previously shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4.
In particular, when I apply contagion tests based on the conditional correlation
coecients, there is evidence of contagion in the same ve countries-namely, Kuwait,
Qatar, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE-and no evidence for contagion in the case of
Bahrain. On the other hand, the test also shows-as I found previously-that Kuwait is
the only case that has contradictory results between the conditional and unconditional
correlations in that the evidence of contagion disappears when unconditional
correlation coecient is used.
For a second set of sensitivity tests, I apply other test specications. More specically,
I compare the cross-market correlation coecients during the turmoil period with
those of the full period rather than the stable period for both conditional and
unconditional correlation coecients, as was previously tested in the base analysis.
These test specications do not have any signicant impact on the main results, as
shown in Table 3.7. In the nal set of robustness checks, instead of using the VAR
model to estimate the residual-based variance-covariance matrices (by which the
cross-market correlation coecients are estimated), I use pairwise simple correlations
to estimate both the conditional and the unconditional cross-market correlations of the
stock markets returns between the U.S. stock market and each of the GCC stock
markets. Tables 3.8 and 3.9 report the estimated cross-market correlation coecients
during the stable, turmoil, and full periods as well as the results for testing the null
hypothesis of no contagion for each pair of countries. Using the pairwise simple
correlation between stock markets returns in fact conrms the previous overall ndings
obtained when the VAR model was used and, hence it does not have any signicant
impact on the main results.
3.5 Conclusion
The main ndings of this chapter are that tests based on both the conditional and
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GCC stock markets did not contradict in their conclusions in that both tests found a
signicant increase in cross-market correlations for Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the UAE. These results mean that the bias caused by heteroskedasticity did not aect
the contagion results for these four stock markets and that one can conclude that
contagion has been transmitted from the U.S. stock market to the stock markets of
Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE after the global economic and nancial
crisis. On the other hand, in the case of Kuwait, I found some evidence of contagion
from the U.S. stock market after the Lehman Brothers collapse when conditional
correlation was applied, but I did not nd any signicant increase in cross-market
correlation between the Kuwait and U.S. stock markets when the contagion test based
on the adjusted correlation was used. Hence, the relationship between the two markets
is rather independent, and no contagion has occurred from the U.S. nancial crisis to
Kuwait. This result can be considered supportive evidence for Forbes and Rigobon
(2002) in that the bias in the cross-market conditional correlation coecients generated
by the heteroskedasticity in the U.S. stock market returns caused this conicting
conclusion. Finally, for Bahrain, neither the contagion test based on conditional
correlation coecients nor the test based on unconditional correlation coecients
found any contagion between the Bahrain and U.S. stock markets. Hence, the linkage
between the U.S. stock market as a crisis country and the Bahrain stock market as a
non-crisis country has remained relatively the same after the crisis period, and no
contagion has occurred. From this, one can conclude that the recent U.S. nancial
crisis has not aected the Bahrain stock market.
Furthermore, as a policy implication, ndings suggest that policy makers in the GCC
countries need to strengthen the ability of the nancial system to absorb the adverse
impact of any nancial crisis. This can be done by improving regulations and
supervisory frameworks at domestic levels, increasing the depth of the GCC nancial
markets, and pursuing a coordinated set of policies among the GCC countries as a bloc
(which would also be benecial for the formation of the GCC Monetary Union) in
order to be capable of reducing the exposure to international nancial contagions in
periods of crisis.116 Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The e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Country USA BA KU OM QA SA DU
BA 1 -.009 .15

USA 1 -.09
 .004
KU 1 -.02 -.07

USA 1 -.09
 .08

OM 1 .00 .09

USA 1 -.09
 -.01
QA 1 -.01 .33

USA 1 -.09
 .07
SA 1 -.00 .05
USA 1 -.09
 .15

DU 1 .00 .02
USA 1 -.09
 .16

, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3.1: Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) estimates for each GCC stock market and
the NYSE market before crisis (2-1-2003 to 14-9-2008).
Country USA BA KU OM QA SA DU
BA 1 -.02 .14

USA 1 -.09
 .04

KU 1 -.00 .14

USA 1 -.09
 .09

OM 1 -.02 .20

USA 1 -.09
 .22

QA 1 .031 .09

USA 1 -.09
 .32
SA 1 .14
 -.04
SA 2 .00 .02
USA 1 -.13
 .25

USA 2 -.09
 .07
DU 1 .00 -.01
DU 2 .00 .12

USA 1 -.10
 .27

USA 2 -.52 .02
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3.2: Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) estimates for each GCC stock market and
the NYSE market after crisis (15-9-2008 to 31-5-2013).Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The eect of the recent nancial crisis 117
Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
pre crisis .05 .07 .03 -.01 -.01 .02
post crisis .04 .14 .23 .30 .55 .42
full period .05 .10 .16 .18 .28 .27
Test Statistics -0.22 1.79 5.43
 8.41
 16.5
 10.36

Contagion NO YES YES YES YES YES
N pre crisis 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485 1226
N post crisis 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3.3: Lehman Brothers bankruptcy: Conditional correlation coecients.
Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
pre crisis .02 .03 .01 -.00 -.00 .01
post crisis .02 .07 .12 .16 .32 .23
full period .02 .05 .08 .09 .15 .14
Test Statistics -0.11 .92 2.80
 4.36
 8.84
 5.45

Contagion NO NO YES YES YES YES
N pre crisis 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485 1226
N post crisis 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3.4: Lehman Brothers bankruptcy: Unconditional correlation coecients.118 Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The e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nancial crisis
Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
pre crisis .04 .09 .004 -.02 -.16 -.04
post crisis .06 .14 .23 .30 .55 .42
full period .05 .11 .18 .20 .31 .32
Test Statistics .53 1.41 5.99
 8.59
 19.9
 11.76

Contagion NO YES YES YES YES YES
N pre crisis 1192 1192 1192 1192 1192 933
N post crisis 1523 1523 1523 1523 1523 1523
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3.5: U.S. sub-prime crisis: Conditional correlation coecients.
Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
pre crisis .02 .03 .01 -.00 -.00 .01
post crisis .02 .07 .12 .16 .32 .23
full period .02 .05 .08 .09 .15 .14
Test Statistics .25 .64 2.74
 3.95
 9.43
 5.45

Contagion NO NO YES YES YES YES
N pre crisis 1192 1192 1192 1192 1192 933
N post crisis 1523 1523 1523 1523 1523 1523
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3.6: U.S. sub-prime crisis: Unconditional correlation coecients.Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The eect of the recent nancial crisis 119
Country H0 :l
C > h
C H0 :
f
C > h
C H0 : l
UN > h
UN H0 :
f
UN > h
UN
Bahrain -.22 -.08 -.11 -0.04
Kuwait 1.78 1.47 .92 .58
Oman 5.43
 2.28 2.80
 1.19
Qatar 8.41
 3.82
 4.36
 2.10
Saudi-Arabia 16.5
 9.70
 8.84
 5.33

UAE 10.36
 4.67
 5.45
 2.60

, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3.7: Comparing contagion test hypothesis using stable-period (l) vs turmoil-
period (h), and full-period (f) vs turmoil-period for both conditional (C) and uncon-
ditional (UN) cross-market correlations.
Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
pre crisis .05 .01 .05 -.03 -.02 .008
post crisis .02 .10 .15 .22 .48 .35
full period .03 .06 .12 .13 .27 .23
Test Statistics -1.06 2.20 2.61
 6.31
 14.06
 8.84

Contagion NO YES YES YES YES YES
N pre crisis 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485 1226
N post crisis 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3.8: Lehman Brothers bankruptcy: Conditional correlation coecients using
pairwise simple correlations between the U.S. and the GCC stock markets returns.120 Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The eect of the recent nancial crisis
Country Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar Saudi Arabia UAE
pre crisis .03 .006 .025 -.01 -.008 .004
post crisis .009 .05 .08 .12 .27 .19
full period .03 .03 .01 -.005 -.006 .01
Test Statistics -0.54 1.11 1.56 3.38
 7.38
 4.67

Contagion NO NO YES YES YES YES
N pre crisis 1485 1485 1485 1485 1485 1226
N post crisis 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230 1230
, and 
 indicates signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3.9: Lehman Brothers bankruptcy: Unconditional correlation coecients using
pairwise simple correlations between the U.S. and the GCC stock markets returns.Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The eect of the recent nancial crisis 121
Figure 3.1: GCC Stock market general indices.
Figure 3.2: Cross-Market Correlation between the U.S and Bahrain stock markets.122 Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The eect of the recent nancial crisis
Figure 3.3: Cross-Market Correlation between the U.S and Kuwait stock markets.
Figure 3.4: Cross-Market Correlation between the U.S and Oman stock markets.Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The eect of the recent nancial crisis 123
Figure 3.5: Cross-Market Correlation between the U.S and Qatar stock markets.
Figure 3.6: Cross-Market Correlations between the U.S and Saudi Arabia stock
markets.124 Chapter 3 GCC stock markets contagion: The eect of the recent nancial crisis
Figure 3.7: Cross-Market Correlations between the U.S and UAE stock markets.Chapter 4
GCC Monetary Policies: Does
the peg matter?
4.1 Introduction
Policy makers in open economies (GCC countries are well known in the literature of
international economics as open but rather small economies (Khan (2009), Willett
et al. (2010))) are faced with a choice in terms of the impossible trinity-also known as
the open economy trilemma (Obstfeld and Taylor (1999))-which is to simultaneously
achieve three incompatible policy goals: an independent monetary policy, free capital
movement, and a xed exchange rate. A country can choose only two of the above
three goals, while the third goal has to be sacriced. In other words, under a xed
exchange rate regime and free capital mobility, it becomes impossible to use monetary
policy for the purpose of stabilising the domestic economy. Moreover, the domestic
nominal interest rate must follow the nominal interest rate of the base country-the
country to which the exchange rate is pegged. In contrast, a exible exchange rate
regime allows the domestic central bank to pursue its own monetary policy, even if
capital mobility is perfect and the domestic interest rate is set independently of
international or foreign interest rates.
This chapter explores the joint dynamics of domestic and base country interest rates in
the context of the GCC countries whose exchange rates have been pegged to the U.S.
dollar throughout either the entire history of data availability or over given sub-periods
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of this history. An extensive research agenda in international economics literature has
sought to document the extent of co-movements in interest rates experienced by
pegged versus non-pegged countries and whether non-pegged currencies truly have a
greater degree of autonomy, given the high degree of capital market integration. In a
recent debate, Hausmann et al. (1999), Frankel et al. (2004), and Calvo Guillermo and
Reinhart (2002) argued that neither pegged countries nor non-pegged (or oating)
countries, other than the major economies of the U.S., the EU, Japan, and UK, have
monetary autonomy. Hence, all countries must follow the changes in the interest rates
set by the major currencies. This debate has led to disagreements and mixed results
amongst economists with regard to the implications of xing exchange rates on
monetary policy. In other words, with the exception of the largest economies, all
countries lack monetary independence, with no dierences between xed and non-xed
exchange rate countries. Hence, xing the exchange rate does not lead to a loss of
monetary freedom because countries do not have exible monetary policies even if they
oat their currencies. Moreover, it has been argued that interest rates in exible
developing countries' regimes may be more sensitive to U.S. interest rates movements
than those in pegged countries. Shambaugh (2004), however, disagreed with these
views. The author found evidence showing that countries with xed exchange rates
follow the interest rate of the base country more closely than countries with exible
exchange rates and that those countries with oating exchange rates have more
monetary autonomy than those with pegged exchange rates.
The goal of this chapter is to investigate the linkages between domestic and U.S.
short-term interest rates in the context of six GCC countries, to explore their
distinguishing features, and to analyse country-specic factors that may aect the
strength of such co-movements. In other words, this chapter aims to assess the
sensitivity of the GCC countries' interest rates to the U.S. rate, since the theory of
interest parity suggests that xing GCC exchange rates to the U.S. dollar should force
GCC domestic interest rates to equal the U.S. interest rate. This chapter will also,
interestingly, attempt to assess the stability of this sensitivity across time and to
investigate whether there exists a pronounced decoupling for some GCC countries over
some sub-periods. Moreover, the fact that some of the GCC countries (e.g., Kuwait)
have pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar over specic sub-periods, then moved
away from the peg over other sub-periods, also gives us a rich setting in which toChapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 127
investigate the implications of xing the exchange rate on monetary policy and to
determine whether a country's interest rate has a stronger association with a base
country's interest rate under a pegged period than under a non-pegged period. Also,
studying the linkages between domestic and U.S. short-term interest rates in the
context of six GCC countries is an important issue, since the harmonization of
monetary policy among the GCC countries is a priority if the planned monetary union
is to be achieved, especially with the existence of a common central bank, which will
be in charge of conducting a single monetary policy among the member states. This is
because, if it turns out that all the GCC countries follow the U.S. monetary policy
equally, one can conclude that the GCC countries have achieved a harmonization in
their monetary policies that is required to make the common currency a success and to
allow all members to reap full benets from it.
To the best of my knowledge, this is the rst study to investigate the eect of xing
the exchange rate regime on monetary policy in the context of the GCC countries
using the Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP). In addition, none of the existing literature
on the GCC has empirically tackled the issue of whether xing GCC exchange rates to
the U.S. dollar enforces a harmonization among their monetary policies. The absence
of such a reliable empirical investigation of the integration of GCC monetary policies
makes it extremely dicult to conclude that the GCC monetary policies are integrated
due to the countries xing their currencies to the U.S. dollar.
Empirically, this chapter utilizes the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) level regression for
the UIP to investigate the implications of xing the exchange rate on the autonomy of
monetary policy in the context of the GCC countries, using the three-month U.S.
LIBOR as well as monthly data for the three-month interbank rates over the period
from January 1993 to June 2013 for all the GCC countries (except Oman).1 2 The
choice to use the interbank rates as a proxy for monetary policy rates derives from the
fact that the GCC central banks conduct monetary policy by using a diverse range of
direct instruments, for which the data are not available over a long horizon period. In
particular, the central bank overnight rate for Bahrain; the repo and discount rate for
Kuwait; the overnight central bank and certicates of deposit rates for Oman; the
Qatar Central Bank lending and deposit rates for Qatar, the reverse repo rate for
1As a sensitivity analysis, I will use another base country's interest rate, which is the U.S. three-month
treasury bill rate.
2Due to data unavailability, the Oman interbank series runs from January 1993 to June 2009.128 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
Saudi Arabia; and the certicates of deposit rate for the UAE are not available.
Additionally, the interbank interest rate has been widely used as a reection of
monetary policy transmission, and due to the fact that the three-months interbank
rate is the only short-term interest rate series that is available for all the GCC
countries over the entire sample from 1993 to 2013. Hence, the interbank rates can be
considered quite a good indicator of the monetary policy stance of GCC central banks
and monetary authorities (Espinoza and Prasad (2012)). Furthermore, I apply the
Quandt-Andrews procedure pioneered by Quandt (1960) (also called Sup-Wald
statistic) in order to assess the stability of the interest rate sensitivity of each
individual GCC interest rate to that of the U.S. rate as a base country across time and
to determine the timing of any potential structural breaks at which these interest rates
sensitivities change. Finally, I apply the Error Correction Model (ECM) in order to
capture the long-run dynamic behaviours between the GCC and the U.S. interest rates.
Findings show that, except for Qatar and the UAE, the parity condition holds for the
GCC countries, and the GCC countries' interest rates precisely follow the U.S. rate for
the entire sample under investigation. On the other hand, the empirical results conrm
that, for some countries (e.g., Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) over some periods,
particularly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there exists a pronounced
decoupling from the base country interest rate (U.S. rate), which is considered a
contradiction to the theory of interest parity. This remarkable deviation from the U.S.
interest rate is attributed to some external factors (e.g., the nancial crisis) as well as
some country-specic factors(e.g., ination and the risk premium). More specically,
while monetary authorities in the U.S. continued to lower interest rates after the global
economic and nancial crisis in 2008, the Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE economies
witnessed double-digit ination rates in the year of 2008 (with rates of 15%, 10%, and
13%, respectively). These high ination rates are caused by some country-specic
domestic factors, such as the increases in the supply of credit, strong domestic demand,
and a lack of supply in the real estate market (Morsy and Kandil (2009)). In order to
curb such high ination rates, the monetary authorities of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the UAE did not follow the U.S.'s lead in reducing interest rates, which explains their
departures from the interest rate parity during this sub-period. With regard to Kuwait,
I nd strong evidence consistent with the ndings of Shambaugh (2004). In particular,
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than during the other two periods (the pre-pegged period and the de-pegged period).
Hence, one can conclude that pegging the exchange rate forces countries to follow the
base country interest rate more than they would do if the exchange rate was not
pegged.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 undertakes a brief survey of the
relevant literature. Section 4.3 describes the methodology adopted for the study and
presents the empirical results. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter.
4.2 Literature review
In recent work, monetary autonomy has been at the heart of a debate over the nature
of exchange rate regimes and their implications on monetary policy. This debate has
led to mixed results and disagreements amongst economists. Empirically, this issue has
been investigated through comparisons of the sensitivity of a domestic country's
interest rate to changes in a base country's interest rate across pegged and non-pegged
exchange rate regimes. Some studies have found evidence consistent with an
alternative view, which argues that countries with xed exchange rate regimes are less
sensitive to changes in a base country's interest rate than those with oating exchange
rate regimes. In one of these studies, Hausmann et al. (1999) investigated the
sensitivity of domestic interest rates in three Latin American economies with dierent
exchange rate regimes to foreign interest rates from 1997 to 1999. The authors found
that Mexico, which oats its exchange rate, was the most sensitive to U.S. interest rate
changes, while Argentina, which has a xed exchange rate, reacted the least to U.S.
interest rate changes. In addition, the study concluded that there was no evidence to
suggest that oating exchange rates are better at insulating domestic interest rates
from foreign rate movements, signalling that oating exchange rate economies do not
have monetary autonomy. Furthermore, in his earlier work, Frankel (1999) conducted a
similar investigation on the eect of changes in the U.S. interest rate as a base country
on the domestic rates for Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Hong Kong, and Panama during
the period from 1993 to 1998 and found some evidence in line with the alternative
view. In particular, the author found that the eect of changes in the U.S. interest rate
as a base country is larger in countries with oating exchange rate regimes (e.g.,
Mexico and Brazil), than in countries with 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Hong Kong, and Panama). By contrast, in their recent study, Frankel et al. (2004)
used level regression to examine whether the choice of exchange rate regime aects the
sensitivity of domestic interest rates to international interest rates using a sample of 46
countries (18 industrial and 28 developing) during the period from 1970 to 1990. The
study found that the interest rates of pegged countries followed the interest rate of the
base country more closely than those of non-pegged countries. However, the authors
argued that, over the last decade, all exchange rate regimes showed high sensitivities of
domestic interest rates to international rates, regardless of their exchange rate regimes.
Finally, the authors found that only Germany and Japan did not have long-term
relationships with the U.S. interest rate, since these two countries were the only
countries that could benet from independent monetary policies in the 1990's. This
last result is consistent with the \fear of oating" phenomenon pioneered by
Calvo Guillermo and Reinhart (2002), which stated that only major economies can
benet or choose to benet from an autonomous monetary policy. These authors
showed that many countries that declare a oating exchange rate regime in fact limit
their exchange rate exibility and may not have or use the autonomy attributed to
oating rates.
Yet, in his recent paper, Shambaugh (2004) reported some evidence consistent with the
traditional view that the interest rates of pegged exchange rate countries should follow
the base country's interest rates more than those of non-pegged countries. The author
conducted a study of 100 developing and industrial countries from 1993 to 2000.
Instead of following the exchange rate regime reported by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF), the author created a de facto coding system focusing on the volatility of
the exchange rate and divided countries into pegged and non-pegged. The study
utilized panel data analysis to examine the interest rate behaviours of pegged
economies compared to those of non-pegged economies. The empirical ndings of the
study showed some strong evidence that pegged countries' interest rates followed
changes in the base country's interest rate more closely than those of non-pegged
countries. Moreover, using co-integration analysis, the author suggested that, in the
long run, interest rates of pegged countries tend to react more quickly to changes in
the base country's interest rate than those of non-pegged countries.
Finally, despite the considerable number of studies investigating the implications of
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economies, the GCC economies have received a very little attention from researchers.
Only a few researchers have examined the eect of xing exchange rates on monetary
policy in the context of the GCC countries whose exchange rates have been xed to
the U.S. dollar for a long time. To the best of my knowledge, only two studies have
tackled this issue. In particular, Abraham (1999) investigated the behaviours of
interest rates in a xed exchange rate regime, especially with respect to the ability of
the central bank to maintain its credibility and avoid speculative attacks on
government stocks. More specically, the author examined the possibility of
co-integration between the interest rates of a pegged country and that of the base
country by studying whether short-term rates in Saudi Arabia and the U.S. could be
modelled as a co-integration system from January 1988 to March 1994. The results
showed that the null hypothesis of no co-integration between the two interest rates
series was not rejected, which indicated that there was no long-run relationship
between the Saudi Riyal interest rate and the U.S. rate, despite Saudi Arabia being a
pegged country to the U.S. dollar. On the other hand, Esponza et al. (2010) assessed
money market integration among the GCC countries from 1993 to 2009 using the
measures of interest rate convergence, namely beta-convergence and sigma-convergence.
Beta-convergence evaluates whether interest rates in countries with relatively high
spreads have a tendency to decrease rapidly compared to those in countries with low
spreads. Sigma-convergence is drawn from the growth literature and tests whether
cross-country standard deviations of interest rates have a declining trend. Using Saudi
Arabia as a country of reference, the authors found strong evidence of convergence
among the interest rates of the GCC countries with, estimated half-lives ranging from
two to ve months in deviation from the Saudi Arabia interest rate, suggesting a fast
convergence. With respect to sigma-convergence, they found that convergence slowed
down after 2000 as the cross-sectional variation in interest rate spreads increased,
especially with the start of the global nancial crisis.
4.3 Methodology and empirical results
The goals of this chapter are to investigate the linkages between domestic and U.S.
short-term interest rates in the context of six GCC countries, to explore their
distinguishing features, and to analyse country- specic factors that may aect the132 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
strength of such co-movements. The theory of interest parity suggests that xing the
GCC exchange rate to the U.S. dollar should force the GCC domestic interest rates to
equal the U.S. interest rate. Figure 4.1 plots the co-movements of the GCC interest
rates and the U.S. interest rate for the entire sample under investigation. The UIP is
used to illustrate the mechanism of how the exchange rate regime aects monetary
autonomy. Interest parity is a key element in most macroeconomic models for open
economies and has been widely used in the eld of international economics analysis.
The UIP states that, based on the logic of arbitrage, the interest rate dierential
between two countries has to equal the expected change in their bilateral exchange rate
(Isard (1991)). Hence, the hypothesis of the UIP can be expressed as follows when
capital markets are open:
(1 + it) = (1 + i
t)Et(St+1)=St (4.1)
where Et(:) is the expectation operator conditional on the information set available at
time t; S is the spot exchange rate (the domestic currency price of a unit of foreign
exchange); and it and i
t are the domestic and base country interest rates, respectively.
The derivation of Equation 4.2 follows the literature by assuming rational expectations,
taking natural logarithms, and adding the risk premium (keeping in mind that
log(1 + x)  x). Also, note that when Jensen's inequality (Siegel's Paradox) is ignored
and any error related to this is negligible, the approximation
lnEt(St+1)  Et(lnSt+1) = Et(st+1) is used.3
it = i
t + Et(st+1   st) +  (4.2)
where s is the natural logarithm of the spot exchange rate S and  is the dierence in
risk of the two assets (the risk premium).
Within a credible pegged exchange rate regime, Et(st+1) = st because there is no
expected change in the exchange rate, and any risk associated with currency volatility
disappears. Hence, assuming the risk premium is very small or does not vary with the
change in interest rates, the theory of interest parity suggests that the domestic rate
3Jensen's inequality implies that the expectation of the natural log of the future exchange rate is
dierent than the natural log of the expectation of the future exchange rate logEt(St+1) > Et(logSt+1) =
Et(st+1)Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 133
should move one-to-one with the base rate, as in equation 4.3 (Shambaugh (2004)).
it = i
t (4.3)
On the other hand, when the exchange rate is not a hard peg, meaning that it is not
pegged precisely, but rather is allowed to uctuate within a small band, the tendency
of the domestic rate to follow the base rate precisely is reduced because Et(st+1  st) is
not equal to zero any more, even if the peg is credible (Svensson (1994)). In this
scenario, allowing the spot exchange rate to oat within small bands gives some room
for monetary autonomy in the short-run, meaning that interest rates do not have to
exactly respond to changes in the the base country's interest rate. In the long-run,
however, monetary independence is completely lost in order to keep the parity credible,
which means that domestic interest rates should exactly follow those of the base
country.
Finally, under a oating exchange rate, there is nothing to force domestic interest rates
to respond to changes in the base country's interest rate. Rather, the mechanism
allows the spot exchange rate to adjust in a way that lets the expected change in the
exchange rate (the left-hand side in equation 4.4) equal any interest rate dierential
(the right-hand side).
Et(st+1   st) = (1 + it)   (1 + i
t)    (4.4)
In this regard, GCC countries are considered a natural experiment when studying the
implications of xing the exchange rate on monetary policy. This is due to the long
history of GCC countries pegging their currencies to the U.S. dollar. In fact, GCC
currencies have been pegged to the U.S. dollar for three decades without any signicant
realignment. Consequently, and also due to the substantial amount of foreign exchange
reserves that the GCC countries have from oil revenue (which discourages any
speculation against their currencies), one could conclude that the xed exchange rate
regime in GCC countries be classied as a credible peg. From 1980 to 2002, Bahrain,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE were dejure (formally) pegged to the IMF's Special
Drawing Rights basket but defacto (eectively) pegged to the U.S. dollar. Meanwhile,
Oman was defacto pegged to the U.S. dollar and Kuwait to an undisclosed basket of
major world currencies of its main trading and 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the GCC countries, including Kuwait, ocially declared that their national currencies
were to be dejure and defacto pegged to the U.S. dollar as a step towards monetary
integration. This decision was taken (since all but Kuwait were already defacto pegged
to the U.S. dollar) in order to maintain stability and strengthen condence in the GCC
economies (Khan (2009)). In May 2007, Kuwait announced that it would abandon the
dollar peg and return to its previous exchange rate regime due to the inationary
pressure caused by the continuing depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the other
major currencies. Furthermore, the option of pegging the GCC currencies to the U.S.
dollar was chosen due to the importance of oil revenue, which has a dominant inuence
on the GCC economies' GDPs, government revenues, and exports. Pegging to the U.S.
dollar without any signicant current and capital account restrictions has led to a
monetary policy coordination among the GCC countries and has set common narrow
limits for the scope of domestic central bank interventions, as well as for interest rate
and foreign reserve policies (Abed et al. (2003)). The dollar peg has helped the GCC
economies remain stable, especially during signicant volatility in oil prices. It has also
helped in reducing exchange rate risk and served to stabilize uctuations in nancial
wealth, which is largely dollar-dominated. Moreover, the choice of the U.S. dollar as an
external anchor for GCC monetary policies is viewed as credible and was serving the
GCC well in maintaining stable economies until the past couple of years, when
inationary pressure has risen due to the depreciation of the U.S. dollar. The choice
has also helped GCC economies simplify trade and nancial transactions and avoid
nominal shocks from geopolitical risks feeding in the economy (Khan (2009)).
Therefore, after taking into account the special consideration of the time series
properties of the data by applying the unit root and co-integration tests, I consider the
following techniques:
 A1 I test equation 4.5 on levels for the entire sample for each individual GCC
country in order to assess the sensitivity of each country's interest rate to that of
the U.S., such that:
it =  + i
t + "t (4.5)
where it is the domestic country's interest rate for each GCC country, i is the
base country's interest rate (U.S. rate),  is the elasticity or sensitivity of the
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term, which is assumed to have a zero mean and to be independently distributed.
 A2 I utilize the Quandt Likelihood Ratio (QLR) statistic, also called the Sup-Wald
statistic, to test for the presence of a break in the sensitivity coecients () in
order to investigate the stability of the  coecient's sensitivity over time.
 A3 I consider an Error Correction Model (ECM) that will allow me to explicitly
model the transition dynamics between the interest rates of GCC countries and
the U.S. to a long-run equilibrium of the type stated in equation 4.5.
4.3.1 Time series properties of the interest rate
The data used in this chapter are monthly observations of three-month interbank
interest rates for the GCC countries as well as the three-month U.S. LIBOR over the
period from January 1993 to June 2013 for all the GCC countries, except for Oman
and Bahrain. Due to data unavailability, the Bahrain interbank rate series covers the
period from January 1993 to May 2011 and the Oman interbank series covers the
period from January 1993 to June 2009. The data for the GCC interest rates are
obtained from the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority's monthly statistical bulletin
from 1993 to 2009, and I update the data up to June 2013 using the International
Financial Statistics. The choice to use the interbank rate as a proxy for the monetary
policy rate derives from the fact that GCC central banks conduct monetary policy
using a diverse range of direct instruments; thus, the data for these series are not
available over a long horizon period. In particular, the central bank overnight rate for
Bahrain; the repo and discount rates for Kuwait; the overnight central bank and
certicates of deposit rates for Oman; the Qatar Central Bank lending and deposit
rates for Qatar; the reverse repo rate for Saudi Arabia; and the certicates of deposit
rate for the UAE are not available. Additionally, the interbank interest rate has been
widely used as a reection of monetary policy transmission, and due to the fact that
the three-months interbank rate is the only short-term interest rate series available for
all the GCC countries over the entire sample from 1993 to 2013. Hence, the interbank
rates can be considered very good indicators of the monetary policy stances of the
GCC central banks and monetary authorities (Espinoza and Prasad (2012)).
This chapter pays careful attention to the time series properties of the interest rate
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and non-co-integrated variables could be problematic and may create incorrect results.
Dierencing the data helps to avoid this problem, in a sense that levels regression will
be inadequate (spurious) because statistical tests will overestimate the dependency
between domestic and base country interest rates. On the other hand, if the variables
under investigation are stationary, levels regression will be adequate. Finally, if it turns
out that the data have unit roots and that the domestic and base interest rates are
co-integrated, the error correction specication will be considered in order to model the
transition dynamics between the GCC countries and the U.S. interest rates to a
long-run equilibrium .
Therefore, special considerations should be taken with regard to the important
properties of the interest rates. There is a debate about the uncertainty of interest rate
data persistence and how to treat interest rates in terms of stationarity in empirical
work. One view suggests that interest rates cannot be treated as an I(1) process
(Nicolau (2002), Cochrane (1991), and Stanton (1997)). This is because interest rates
are bounded below zero (they cannot be negative) and bounded above (they do not
exceed 100% in practice). Thus, we cannot treat them as pure unit root processes. It
can also be argued that unit root tests suer from low power in nite samples and have
diculty in discriminating unit roots processes from highly persistent data, such as
interest rate data. The unit root tests may not reject the existence of a unit root often
enough if the data are highly persistent (Caner and Kilian (2001)). An alternative view
states that, even if the interest rates are highly persistent processes or near unit root,
it is preferable to treat these series as if they had unit roots (Wu and Zhang (1997)
and Phillips (1988)).
Against this background, the proper choice of the methodology technique adopted in
this chapter crucially depends on the presence or absence of a unit root in the data.
Therefore, I employ the Augmented-Dickey Fuller (ADF) test (equation 4.6) with a
suitable number of lagged dependent variables, which are chosen following the Schwarz
Information Criterion (SIC) and a tted constant only (since a linear trend would not
be meaningful with the nature of the interest rates data) for each interest rate series
over the entire sample to test whether the data have unit roots.
it =  + it 1 +
p X
k=1
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where it is the interest rate series of each country, p denotes the number of lags used,
and "t is a white-nose error term with a zero mean and a constant variance. Then, I
test the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root (H0 :  = 0).
The ndings, presented in Table 4.1, show that the ADF unit root test hypothesis is
failed to be rejected at any reasonable signicance level for all the interest rate series
under investigation, implying that these interest rates are non-stationary. However,
when the rst dierence is considered, the empirical results suggest that the existence
of a unit root is rejected at the 1% signicance level for all the interest rate series,
which indicates that all the interest rate data are integrated of order one (I(1)).
4.3.2 Level regression empirical results
Having tested the stationarity of each time series of the interest rate data and
conrmed that all of the series are integrated by the same order (I(1)), and in order to
gain further insights about the long-run relationships between each of the GCC
countries' interest rates and the U.S. interest rate, I next test for the existence of
co-integrated relationships between each pair by applying the Johansen method
(Johansen (1988)). In order to perform the Johansen method, I consider the following
VAR representation of order p for each pair of GCC domestic's interest rate and the
U.S. rate, as in equation 4.7, where the optimal number of lags (p) is identied using
the SIC.
it =  + A1it 1 + A2it 2 + :::::::::: + Apit p + t (4.7)
where it is an n  1 vector of interest rate variables (in our case, n = 2 : the domestic
and the base interest rates) that are integrated of the same order (I(1)), and t is an
n  1 vector of innovations. The VAR representation can be re-written as:
it =  + it 1 +
p 1 X
k=1
 kit 1 + t (4.8)
where
 =
p X
k=1
Ak   I and  k =  
p X
j=k+1
Aj: (4.9)
If the coecient matrix  has reduced rank r < n, then there exist n  r matrices 
and , each with rank r, such that  = 0 and 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number of co-integration relationships (the co-integration rank), each column of  is a
co-integrating vector, and the elements of  are known as the adjustment parameters
in the Vector Error Correction Model. Hence, the Johansen method is to estimate the
 matrix from an unrestricted VAR and to test whether one can reject the restrictions
implied by the reduced rank of . In this respect, Johansen and Juselius (1990)
suggest two types of test statistics-the trace and the maximum eigenvalue statistics-in
order to determine the number of co-integration vectors.
Jtrace =  T
n X
i=r+1
ln(1   ^ i) (4.10)
Jmax =  Tln(1   ^ i) (4.11)
where T is the sample size and ^ i is the ith largest eigenvalue of the  matrix. The
trace statistic tests the hypothesis that there are, at most, r co-integrating vectors
against the alternative hypothesis of that there are n (full rank) co-integrating vectors,
while the maximum eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis that there are r
co-integrating vectors against the alternative hypothesis of r + 1 co-integrating vectors.
Johansen and Juselius (1990) suggested the use of the trace statistic instead of the
maximum eigenvalue statistic in cases where the two tests give contradictory results.
Cheung and Lai (1993) also demonstrateed in a Monte Carlo experiment that the trace
statistic is more robust than the maximum eigenvalue statistic. It is worth mentioning
that, through out the analysis of co-integration between the GCC interest rates and
the U.S. rate, the trace and maximum eigenvalue statistics do not show any
contradictory results. Hence, this chapter utilizes the co-integration results based on
the trace statistic test. Table 4.2 reports the empirical results of the Johansen and
Juselius (1990) trace statistic, which tests the null hypothesis that there is no
co-integration between each GCC interest rate and the U.S. rate (r = 0) against the
alternative hypothesis that there is at most one co-integration vector between each
pair. If the estimated values of the trace statistic are greater than the corresponding
critical value at any convenient level of signicance, then the null hypothesis is rejected.
In particular, for the cases of Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, the trace statistic
values are 32.47, 25.67, and 24.48, respectively, indicating that that the null hypotheses
regarding these three interest rates and the U.S. rate are rejected at the 1% level of
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results imply that there exists only a single co-integrating vector (r = 1) between these
three GCC countries' interest rates and the U.S. interest rates, which is considered
strong evidence of the existence of a long-term relationship between these GCC
countries' interest rates and the U.S. rate during the entire sample. On the other hand,
trace statistic values for Qatar and the UAE are 19.05 and 20.08, respectively, which
implies that their null hypotheses are rejected at the 10% signicance level. These
interesting ndings indicate that, with respect to co-integration strength, both Qatar
and the UAE have the lowest levels of signicance-compared with the other GCC
countries-for rejecting the null hypothesis of no co-integration with the U.S. for the
entire sample, signalling that neither country's interest rate precisely follows the U.S.
interest rate.
After conrming that each GCC country's interest rate is co-integrated with the U.S.
rate, I next use the OLS regression on levels to estimate equation 4.12 by regressing
each individual GCC interest rate series on the U.S interest rate series to assess the
sensitivity of the GCC countries' interest rates to the U.S. rate. The theory of interest
parity suggests that xing the GCC exchange rateS to the U.S. dollar should force the
GCC domestic interest rates to equal the U.S. interest rate. Hence, rather than using a
cross-section analysis, this chapter uses time dynamics for each individual country
episode, as follows:
it =  + i
t + "t (4.12)
where it is the domestic country interest rate for each GCC country; i is the U.S.
interest rate as a base country;  is the elasticity or sensitivity of the domestic interest
rate to the base country rate; and "t is the error term, which is assumed to have a zero
mean and to be independently distributed. As the theory predicts, when the exchange
rate is a hard peg and credible, capital markets are open, risk premium is very small,
arbitrage is costless, and investors are optimizing, the estimated  coecient should
equal one and the parity holds (Shambaugh (2004)).
After estimating equation 4.12, I am interested in two parameters: the sensitivity of
the domestic interest rate to that of the base country () and the constant (), which
can be dened as a country-specic eect or the level of the domestic interest rate after
controlling for the base rate. Hence,  can be viewed as reecting the level of country
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Table 4.3 reports the estimated parameters (^ ; ^ ) of equation 4.12 for each GCC
country, the results of testing the null hypothesis of  = 1, its 95% condence interval,
and the R2 for the entire sample under investigation. More specically, ndings show
that the estimated slope of the sensitivity coecient's ^  values are signicant at the
1% level and are close to one for just three countries: Bahrain (.97), Oman (.99), and
Saudi Arabia (.97). Furthermore, the results from testing the null hypothesis that the
slopes of the sensitivity coecients () are equal to one (H0 :  = 1) indicate that this
hypothesis is failed to be rejected. Hence none of the sensitivity coecients is dierent
from one for these three countries.4 This can be seen as an evidence that the parity
condition is enforced perfectly and holds for the interest rates of these three countries
and that their interest rates correspond to the U.S. rate through a one-to-one
relationship. Finally, another piece of evidence that the interest rates of the three GCC
countries mentioned above precisely follow the U.S. rate is the high values R2
throughout the entire sample, which can be explained by the considerable amount of
observed variation in the domestic rates related to the base country rate. Hence, the
U.S. rate is a dominant part of the interest rate policies of these GCC countries. On
the other hand, the estimated sensitivity coecients (^ ) for both Qatar (.83) and the
UAE (.76), though high and signicant, are not close to one and the null hypothesis
that  = 1 is rejected at any convenient level of signicance. These ndings of a
pronounced deviation from the anchor currency interest rate for both Qatar and the
UAE, which are consistent with the co-integration results shown above, indicate that
the neither country's interest rate exactly follows the base rate. This decoupling can be
seen as a sign that these two countries do not cede as much of their monetary
autonomy as their GCC counterparts, which might be due to their risk premium and
some country-specic factors such as ination.
By the same token, in order to assess the stability of the sensitivity of each individual
GCC interest rate to that of the U.S. as a base country across time, I utilize the
Quandt Likelihood Ratio statistic (QLR), also called Sup-Wald statistic, pioneered by
Quandt (1960), for the entire sample in order to determine the timing of any potential
structural break at which the estimated interest rates' sensitivity coecients (^ )
change. Hence, from equation 4.13, I am concerned with testing the null hypothesis of
no structural break or, formally, H0 : 1 = 2, when k is an unknown point of time.
4For Saudi Arabia, the 95% con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Following Andrews (1993), the rst and the last 15% of the sample is excluded,
assuming that the break does not occur during that time. The ndings in Table 4.4
show that the null hypothesis of no structural break is rejected for all the GCC
countries, with the estimated break date being July 2008 for Bahrain, July 2006 for
Oman, January 2009 for Qatar, February 2009 for Saudi Arabia, and November 2008
for the UAE. These interesting, but not particularly surprising, ndings indicate that
the break dates for all the GCC countries (except for Oman due to data unavailability)
are very close to each other and occur very soon after the commencement of the
2008-2009 global economic and nancial crisis, particularly, after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers.
it =
8
<
:
1 + 1i
t + "t t  k
2 + 2i
t + "t t > k
(4.13)
Based on the estimated break dates in Table 4.4, I split the entire sample into two
sub-periods, namely, the periods before and after the break for each GCC country.
Having done that, I estimate equation 4.12 for each GCC country and each sub-period
in order to assess the stability of the sensitivity coecients (^ ) with regard to these
two sub-periods. According to the before-break sub-period, empirical ndings in Table
4.5 show similar results to those for the entire sample obtained previously with respect
to Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. In particular, the estimated coecients values
are very close to unity for Bahrain (1), Oman (.99), and Saudi Arabia (.97), and one
cannot reject the null hypothesis that these sensitivity coecients are equal to one. On
the other hand, in the cases of Qatar and the UAE, the picture changes signicantly
compared to the results from the entire sample. More specically, the estimated
sensitivity coecients (^ ) are much higher and relatively close to one, with a value of
.95 for both Qatar and the UAE, compared to their previous values of .84 and .76,
respectively, for the entire sample. Despite the fact that the ^  values for Qatar and the
UAE are very close to one, the null hypothesis that their values are actually equal to
one is still rejected, and therefore the interest parity does not hold for these two
countries' interest rates.
With regard to the after-break sub-period, the ndings in Table 4.5 show that the
estimated interest rates' sensitivity coecients (^ ) vary across countries, with a
pronounced decoupling from the U.S. rate for Qatar (1.81), Saudi Arabia (.26), and
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rejected at any reasonable level of signicance. Figures 4.2 through 4.6 plot the
interest rate co-movements between each individual GCC country and the U.S.,
indicating that the deviations from the base rate for Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the
UAE occur solely after the 2008-2009 global economic and nancial crisis, in particular,
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2009. These ndings indicate that
the monetary authorities in these three countries do not surrender their monetary
autonomy and that the theory of interest parity does not hold in their cases during
this sub-period. My interpretation of this remarkable decoupling is that these results
depend on some external factors, such as the oil prices boom and the recent economic
and nancial crises, as well as some country-specic factors, such as ination and the
risk premium. In particular, while monetary authorities in the U.S. continued to lower
interest rates after the economic and nancial crisis in 2008-2009, the economies of
Qatar and Saudi Arabia witnessed double-digit ination rates of about 15% and 10%,
respectively, in 2008, (Figure 4.7). In order to curb such high ination rates the
monetary authorities of Qatar and Saudi Arabia did not follow the U.S.'s suit in
reducing interest rates, which explains the departure from the interest rate parity
during this sub-period. In fact, the policy rates in some countries (e.g., Qatar) which
are conducted by the central banks, did not change between September 2008 and
August 2010. However, the U.S. Federal Reserve continued reducing its policy rate to
levels very close to zero during the same period. In the case of the UAE, in addition to
the high rate of ination (13%), which also occurred in Qatar and Saudi Arabia, the
Dubai debt crisis of 2009 also played a key role in the UAE interest rate decoupling
from that of the U.S. In particular, in November 2009, Dubai proposed delaying the
repayment of its debt of 59 billion U.S. dollars, which raised the risk premium in the
UAE due to the fear of government default. Hence, the theory of interest parity does
not hold in this case due to the violation of the assumption that the risk premium does
not change, as previously assumed in equation 4.2.
Furthermore, in order to double check whether the sensitivity coecients are stable
across time, it may be visually useful to estimate equation 4.12 recursively and plot the
recursive estimates of the estimated sensitivity coecients (^ ) on a graph in which each
estimated coecient is updated for each new observation. In particular, I estimate the
(^ ) coecients for each GCC country by applying the sequential (recursive) regression
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the length of the rst estimation period, which is 20 months, and T is the number of
observations in the entire sample. Figure 4.8 plots the recursively estimated sensitivity
coecients for each GCC country across time, implying that the estimated coecients
are quite stable, especially during the period between 2003 and the beginning of 2008,
and that their values are close to one. These ndings are attributed to the fact that the
GCC countries ocially announced pegging their currencies to the U.S. dollar in 2003,
and that the GCC policy makers agreed on the key convergence criteria to be met by
all GCC countries, including convergence among their interest rates, as a step towards
the adoption of a single currency. As a result, the interest rates of these countries
follow the U.S. interest rate more closely during this period.5 However, after the
second half of 2008, and in the aftermath of the global economic and nancial crisis,
the sensitivity coecients for Qatar and the UAE signicantly decreased, indicating
that these two coecients were less sensitive to the U.S. rate after this period. These
results support the estimated break dates previously found by applying the QLR test.
It is worth mentioning that, following Shambaugh (2004), I dierence the interest rates
data and then apply the same steps as above with regard to estimating equation 4.14
for the entire sample as well as the two sub-periods obtained from applying the
structural break test (on dierences, not on levels).
it =  + i
t + "t (4.14)
where the estimated ^  is expected to be zero, otherwise there is a trend in interest rate
dierentials. As shown in Tables 4.6 and 4.7, the ndings suggest that neither the
sensitivity coecients (which are not close to one) nor the P-values from testing the
null hypothesis (H0 :  = 1) provide evidence that the GCC countries' interest rates
follow that of the U.S. as a base rate, except for in the cases of Bahrain and Saudi
Arabia in the before-break sample and Oman in the after-break sample. In addition,
the R2 values are relatively low for all the GCC countries in both the entire sample
and the two sub-samples. In this regard, the model in (equation 4.14) is misspecied
and, therefore, its results are not accurate, since dierencing the data leads to a
misspecication error if the variables are co-integrated by causing losses in long-run
information in the data (Enders (2008)). In other words, the fact that the domestic
5As mentioned before, the peg to the U.S. dollar was unocially adopted much earlier, such that all
the GCC countries except Kuwait were de facto pegged to the U.S. dollar.144 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
and base countries' interest rate series are integrated of the same order and that they
are co-integrated suggests that the model in rst dierence in equation 4.14 will be
misspecied, since it will be missing the error correction term.
4.3.3 Long-run and short-run dynamics: Error Model Correction
(ECM) representation
In order to capture the long-run dynamic behaviours of the domestic and the base
interest rates, I consider the Error Correction Model (ECM) that will explicitly allow
me to model the transition dynamics between the GCC countries' and the U.S.'s
interest rates to a long-run equilibrium of the type stated in equation (4.12). Hence, I
estimate the ECM using the two-step procedure outlined by Engle and Granger (1987),
as follows:
it =  + i
t + zt 1 +
p X
k=1
ki
t k +
p X
j=1
jit j + "t (4.15)
where  is the dierence operator, p is the number of lags of the two variables
(domestic and base interest rates respectively (i and i)), and zt is the residual from
regressing it on i
t from equation 4.12 (Figures 4.9 : 4.13).
zt = it   i
t    (4.16)
The  coecient is of particular interest. It captures the long-run relationship between
domestic and base countries' interest rates. In other words,  is the speed of
adjustment at which the GCC domestic interest rates are adjusted back from their
decoupling to their long-run equilibrium relationship with the U.S. interest rate as a
base country. The larger the absolute value of , the faster the adjustment.
Empirical ndings in Table 4.8 show that the estimated speed of adjustment (^ ) has a
negative sign, as expected, and is highly signicant at the 1% level for all the GCC
countries, which indicates that the GCC countries' domestic interest rates have to
decline in order to move back to their long-run equilibrium with the U.S. rate.
However, the values of ^  vary among the GCC countries, with a high value of 23% for
Bahrain, 10% for Oman, 11% for Qatar, 18% for Saudi Arabia, and 6% for the UAE.
In addition, I compute the half-life coecient (
ln(:5)
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interest rate. This coecient measures the time required for the GCC rates to adjust
back from their deviations to their long-run equilibrium level with the U.S. interest
rate by half (50%). In this regard, the results in Table 4.8 imply that it takes about 2.5
months for Bahrain interest rate to adjust to its long-run equilibrium relationship with
the U.S., 6.5 months for Oman, 6 months for Qatar, 3.5 months for Saudi Arabia, and
about 11 months for the UAE. These ndings are consistent with the previous results
of testing the GCC interest rate sensitivity to the U.S. rate for the entire sample, in
that the interest rates for Qatar and the UAE are the slowest to adjust back from their
pronounced deviations to their long-run relationship with the U.S. interest rate 6.
Furthermore, I split the entire sample period into two sub-periods for each GCC
country based on the estimated break date previously obtained from Table 4.4. I then
apply the ECM representation in equation 4.15 to each GCC interest rate and to each
sub-period. With respect to the before-break sub-period, estimates in Table 4.9
suggest that the speed of adjustment for interest rates in Oman(10%) and Saudi
Arabia (18%) interest rates does not change compared to its estimated values over the
entire sample period. However, in the cases of Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE, ndings
in Table 4.9 indicate that the estimated speed of adjustment is much faster than its
previously estimated values over the full sample period. In particular, before the onset
of the global nancial and economic crisis, Bahrain and Qatar interest rates were the
quickest to adjust to their equilibrium with the U.S. rate, taking less than two months
(compared to 2.5 months for the Bahrain rate and 6 months for the Qatar rate over the
entire sample), while it took the UAE interest rate about 6 months to adjust in this
sub-period (compared to 11 months over the entire sample).
Finally, empirical results in Table 4.10 imply that the speed of adjustment for the
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE interest rates, though insignicant, has reduced and
become much slower in the after-break sub-period compared to their values in the
before-break sub-period. More specically, the UAE interest rate has the slowest
adjustment speed (34 months), followed by the interest rate adjustment speeds of Saudi
Arabia (17 months), and Qatar (10 months). These ndings conrm the previous
evidence of the remarkable departure of these three countries' interest rates, from the
U.S. rate, particularly, after Lehman Brothers lled for bankruptcy, in that it took
6Oman also has a slow speed of adjustment, despite the fact that the Oman interest rate precisely
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much longer for these countries' interest rates to adjust to their long-run equilibrium
levels with the base interest rate after the nancial crisis than before the crisis.
To sum up, the overall empirical results suggest that there exists a pronounced
decoupling from the U.S. interest rate as a base country in the case of the Qatar and
UAE interest rates over the entire sample under investigation, with the slowest speeds
of adjustment to their long-run equilibrium with the U.S. rate estimated at 6 and 11
months, respectively. However, the theory of interest parity holds perfectly in the case
of Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, in that xing their exchange rates to the U.S.
dollar forced their interest rates to precisely follow the U.S. interest rate. Furthermore,
with regard to the assessment of the stability of the sensitivity of the GCC countries'
interest rates, ndings show that after the global nancial and economics crisis, which
is labelled by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there are varying degrees of notable
deviation from the U.S. interest rate with respect to Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE
interest rates. This deviation is attributed to the fact that the monetary authorities in
these three countries have decided to delay reductions in their domestic interest rates
and to not follow the U.S's interest rate due to inationary pressures, from which their
economies suered during this particular sub-period, as well as to the eect of the
Dubai debt crisis on increasing the risk premium in the UAE, which violates the
validation of the theory of interest parity.
4.3.4 The eect of pegging the Kuwaiti dinar to the U.S. dollar on
Kuwait monetary policy
One of this chapter's goals is to investigate the debate regarding the implications of
xing exchange rates on monetary policy and to determine whether a country's interest
rate has a stronger association with that of a base country under a pegged period than
under a non-pegged period. In this regard, Kuwait is considered a natural experiment
that gives us further insights when studying the implications of xing exchange rates
on monetary policy autonomy due to the fact that Kuwait has pegged its exchange
rate regime to the U.S. dollar over a particular sub-period, then moved away from the
peg over another sub-period. Hence, in this sub-section, I aim to explore the eect of
pegging the exchange rate on monetary policy in the context of Kuwait by comparing
three sub-periods, namely, before the peg (pre-pegged period), during the peg (peggedChapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 147
period), and after moving away from the peg (de-pegged period). In particular, until
2002, the Kuwait exchange rate regime was dierent than those of the other GCC
countries. The Kuwaiti dinar was pegged to an undisclosed basket of its major trading
and nancial partners. Despite the fact that the weights on the compositions of this
basket were not disclosed, it was strongly believed that the U.S. dollar had the largest
share of this basket due to the fairly small uctuations that occurred vis- a-vis the U.S.
dollar (Sturm and Siegfried (2005)).
After more than 25 years, on the rst of January 2003, analogous to the other GCC
countries, Kuwait ocially pegged its national currency to the U.S. dollar with a
margin (band) of 3:5%. This step was taken as a part of Kuwait's commitment,
along with the commitments of the other GCC countries, towards the formation of a
GCC monetary union and the launching of a single GCC currency. However, Kuwait
moved away from the dollar peg in May 2007 and returned back to its previous
exchange rate regime in order to reduce the inationary pressure caused by the severe
depreciation of the U.S. dollar against the major currencies. This action has been
considered one of the obstacles to the GCC monetary union preparation.
In order to investigate the implications of xing the Kuwaiti dollar to the U.S. dollar
on Kuwait monetary policy, I repeat the methodologies applied in sections (4.3.1, 4.3.2,
and 4.3.3) with respect to Kuwait, comparing the three sub-periods mentioned above.
More specically, I rst check whether the Kuwait interest rate series has a unit root
by applying the ADF unit root test. Then, I utilize the Johansen method to test for
the existence of a co-integration relationship between Kuwait and U.S. interest rates
over the three sub-periods and explore whether xing the Kuwait exchange rate aects
the strength of co-integration between the two interest rates. After conrming that the
Kuwait and U.S. interest rates are co-integrated, I test equation 4.17 on levels-as done
before for the other GCC countries-to investigate whether the Kuwait interest rate
under the pegged sub-period has a stronger linkage with the U.S. rate than it does
under the other two non-pegged sub-periods, as the theory of interest parity predicts.
Figure 4.14 plots the interest rate co-movements between Kuwait and the U.S. over the
entire sample, which visually indicating that the Kuwait interest rate follows that of
U.S. more closely under the pegged period than it does under the two non-pegged
periods.
iku
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where iku
t is Kuwait's domestic interest rate; ius
t is the U.S. interest rate as a base
country;  is the sensitivity of the Kuwait interest rate to the base country rate; and "t
is the error term, which is assumed to have a zero mean and to be independently
distributed. Finally, I apply the ECM specication (equation 4.18) to capture the
long-run dynamic behaviour between Kuwait and U.S. interest rates and to evaluate
whether the estimated speed of adjustment (^ ) of the Kuwait rate to its long-run
equilibrium with the U.S. rate would be faster under the pegged period than under the
other two sub-periods.
iku
t =  + ius
t + zt 1 +
p X
k=1
kius
t k +
p X
j=1
jiku
t j + "t (4.18)
where  is the dierence operator, p is the number of lags of the two variables
(domestic and base interest rates, respectively (iku and ius)), () is the speed of
adjustment, and zt is the residual from regressing iku on ius
t from equation
(4.17)(Figures 4.15 : 4.17).
zt = it   i
t    (4.19)
The empirical results in Table 4.11 show that the ADF null hypothesis of the presence
of a unit root in the Kuwait interest rate series in level is failed to be rejected at any
convenient level of signicance over the entire sample period or over any of the three
sub-periods mentioned above. On the other hand, when testing the rst dierence, the
null hypothesis of the ADF unit root test is rejected at the 1% level of signicance,
implying that Kuwait interest rate is I(1). Moreover, ndings in Table 4.11 show that
there exists only one co-integrated vector between the two interest rates for all the
sub-periods and for the entire sample as well. However, the strength of the
co-integration is stronger during the pegged sub-period than during the other two
non-pegged sub-periods. In particular, the trace statistic value for the pegged
sub-period is 22.6, compared with 18.62 and 18.99 for the pre-pegged and de-pegged
sub-periods respectively, indicating that the null hypothesis of no co-integration is
rejected at the 2.5% level for the pegged period and at the 10% level for the other two
sub-periods. These results can be seen as further supportive evidence with regard to
the implications of xing the exchange rate on the monetary policy, showing that a
country's interest rate has a stronger association with that of a base country under a
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rate spreads between Kuwait and U.S. interest rates (iKU   iUS) during the three
sub-periods. The data in Table 4.12 show that the mean of the of the spread is smaller
under the pegged sub-period (January 2003 to May 2007) than over the pre-pegged
sub-period (January 1993 to December 2002) and that the values are .032 and .12,
respectively. This result suggests that xing the Kuwaiti dinar to the U.S. dollar
narrowed the interest rate gap between the domestic (Kuwait) and base (U.S.) interest
rates. However, comparing the spread within the pegged and the de-pegged
sub-periods tells us a dierent story, in that the interest rate dierential is wider,
though only slightly, under the pegged sub-period than under the de-pegged sub-period,
with values of .03 and .027, respectively. One possible reason for this result is that the
de-pegged sub-period (2007-2013), includes the global economic and nancial crisis,
which aected many economies around the world, including these two economies. This
crisis led the policy makers in both economies to take some extraordinary actions, such
as loosening their monetary policies and reducing short-term interest rates to near-zero
levels in order to help stabilize their economies and their nancial systems.
Having conrmed that both U.S. and Kuwait interest rate series are integrated of order
I(1) and co-integrated, I estimate equation 4.17 on levels for the three sub-periods
mentioned above as well as for the entire sample. I then test the null hypothesis that
H0 :  = 1 for each sub-period in order to investigate the eects of xing the Kuwait
exchange rate to the U.S. dollar on the Kuwait monetary policy autonomy. The
ndings in Table 4.12 show that the sensitivity coecient ^  of the Kuwait interest rate
to that of the U.S. as a base country is higher under the pegged period (.84) than
under the other two sub-periods, which were the pre-pegged period and the de-pegged
period (.71 and .70, respectively). This nding, which is in line with Shambaugh
(2004), is considered supportive evidence for the theory of interest parity that a
domestic country's interest rate is more sensitive to that of the base country under a
pegged period than under a non-pegged period and that a pegged country's interest
rate follows that of the base country more closely than the interest rates of non-pegged
countries do. On the other hand, the null hypothesis testing whether the sensitivity
coecient is actually equal to one (H0 :  = 1) is rejected even under the pegged
sub-period, which indicates that the theory of interest parity does not hold and that
the Kuwait interest rate does not precisely follow the U.S. interest rate under the
pegged sub-period. This result can be attributed to the fact that, under the pegged150 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
period, the Kuwaiti dinar was pegged to the U.S. dollar within a band of 3:5%, which
made the Kuwait domestic interest rate less sensitive to changes in the U.S. rate. In
particular, since the Kuwaiti dinar was not a hard peg but rather a oating peg within
a band of 3:5%, so when we go back to equation (4.2) [it = i
t + Et(st+1   st)], the
second component in the right hand side (Et(st+1  st)) is not zero any more, as it was
in the case of the hard peg. Thus, there is no reason to force the Kuwait interest rate to
respond exactly to changes in U.S. interest rate as a base country. Rather, any changes
in the U.S. rate allow Kuwait's spot exchange rate (st) to adjust within this band in a
way that lets the expected change in the exchange rate equal any interest rate
dierential between the two interest rates [Et(st+1   st) = it   i
t]. This mechanism
provides more room for Kuwait monetary policy autonomy in the short-run, which
means that the Kuwait interest rate does not have to exactly follow the U.S. rate.
Finally, I apply the Error Correction Model (ECM) specication to capture the
long-run dynamics behaviour of Kuwait and U.S. interest rates (equation 4.18).
According to the results in Table 4.12, the speed of adjustment coecient (^ ) under
the pegged sub-period is faster than that of the pre-pegged sub-period (-.19 vs -.06),
implying that it takes about 3 months for the Kuwait interest rate to adjust to its
long-run equilibrium level with the U.S. rate under the pegged sub-period, compared
to 11 months over the pre-pegged sub-period, according to the half-life estimation.
This nding adds further supportive evidence to the theory of interest parity, as well as
to the previous ndings, in that the interest rate is more sensitive to that of the base
country under a pegged period than under the non-pegged period. However, ndings
in Table 4.12 show that the speed of adjustment over the pegged and de-pegged
sub-periods are relatively very close to each other and that it takes about 3 months for
the Kuwait interest rate to adjust in both sub-periods. This, as mentioned before, can
be interpreted as a cause for the worldwide nancial and economic crises in 2008-2009,
which aected both economies through a common shock in which global interest rates,
including those of the U.S. and Kuwait, were kept at very low levels. All in all, the
overall ndings in the case of Kuwait support the theory of interest parity as well as
the previous work of Shambaugh (2004). From this, one can infer that pegging the
exchange rate forces the interest rates of pegged countries to follow the base country's
interest rate more closely than the interest rates of non-pegged countries and that,
therefore, countries with hard peg exchange rates do not have monetary policyChapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 151
autonomy.
Finally, as a robustness check and in order to examine the extent to which any
modications in the base analysis with regard to the choice of the base interest rate
would aect the main results, I use the U.S. treasury bill (T-bill) rate as a base rate
instead of the U.S. LIBOR rate and repeat all the methodologies done throughout this
chapter for the GCC countries as well as for the special case of Kuwait. As shown in
Tables 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15, changing the base rate does not alter the main ndings
obtained previously. More specically, when considering U.S. T-bill as a base rate,
ndings in Tables 4.13 and 4.14 show that, except for in the cases of Qatar and the
UAE, the parity condition holds for the GCC countries, and the GCC countries'
interest rates precisely follow the U.S. rate for the entire sample under investigation.
On the other hand, the empirical results conrm that, for some countries (e.g., Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and the UAE) over some periods, particularly, after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, there exists a pronounced decoupling from the base country interest
rate (U.S. rate), which is considered to be a contradiction to the theory of interest
parity. With regard to Kuwait, I nd strong evidence in Table 4.15 consistent with the
ndings of Shambaugh (2004). In particular, under the pegged period, Kuwait's
interest rate is more sensitive to the U.S. rate than it is under the other two periods
(the pre-pegged and the de-pegged periods). Hence, one can conclude that pegging the
exchange rate forces countries' interest rates to follow the base country interest rate
more closely than they would under non-pegged exchange rate regimes.
4.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I investigated whether xing the exchange rate aected monetary
policy independence in the context of GCC countries. In particular, I tested whether
the GCC interest rates precisely followed the U.S. interest rate as a base country. This
chapter found strong evidence that there exists a pronounced decoupling from the U.S.
interest rate as a base country in the cases of the Qatar and UAE interest rates over
the entire sample under investigation, with their slowest speed of adjustment to
long-run equilibrium with the U.S. rate estimated at 6 and 11 months, respectively. On
the other hand, ndings show that the theory of interest parity holds perfectly in the
cases of Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia, in that xing these countries' exchange152 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
rates to the U.S. dollar enforced their interest rates to precisely follow the U.S. interest
rate. Furthermore, with regard to the assessment of the stability of the sensitivity of
the GCC countries' interest rates, ndings show that, in the aftermath of the global
nancial and economics crisis, which labelled by the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
there were varying degrees of notable deviation from the U.S. interest rate with respect
to the Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE interest rates. This remarkable deviation is
attributed to the high ination rates faced by these countries, which were caused by
some specic domestic factors such as increases in the supply of credit, strong domestic
demand, and a lack of supply in real estate markets (Morsy and Kandil (2009)); and to
the eect of the Dubai debt crisis on increasing the risk premium in the UAE (which
violates the validation of the theory of interest parity in the case of UAE). More
specically, while the U.S. monetary authorities continued to lower interest rates in
order to curb high levels of ination, monetary authorities in Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the UAE did not follow these reductions. Hence, in order to make the GCC monetary
union a success, policy makers in these countries may consider adopting some policies
that might help in curbing ination, which caused a distortion in a country's monetary
integration with its GCC peers over specic periods. Options of these policies include
increasing the supply of real estate by encouraging private investment in this sector
and slowing down the growth of private credit. Finally, in the case of Kuwait, this
chapter found strong evidence consistent with the ndings of Shambaugh (2004), in
that the Kuwait interest rate responded to the U.S. rate as a base country more closely
under the pegged sub-period than under the two non-pegged sub-periods, implying
that countries do not have monetary autonomy under pegged exchange rate regimes.
Moreover, according to the long-run dynamics behaviour between Kuwait and U.S.
interest rates, the speed of adjustment coecient (^ ) under the pegged sub-period is
faster than that of the pre-pegged sub-period (-.19 vs -.06), implying that it took
about 3 months for the Kuwait interest rate to adjust to its long-run equilibrium level
with the U.S. rate under the pegged sub-period (compared to 11 months under the
pre-pegged sub-period), according to the half-life estimation. However, ndings show
that the speed of adjustment over the pegged and de-pegged sub-periods are relatively
very close to each other and that it takes about 3 months for the Kuwait interest rate
to adjust in both sub-periods. This, as mentioned before, can be interpreted as a cause
for the worldwide nancial and economic crises in 2008-2009, which aected both
economies through a common shock in which global interest rates, including those ofChapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 153
the U.S. and Kuwait, were kept at very low levels.154 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
Country Levels First Dierence
Bahrain -.80 -12.18

Oman -1.18 -11.19

Qatar -1.67 -5.27

Saudi Arabia -1.46 -7.87

UAE -1.95 -6.38

USA -.98 -11.02

MacKinnon critical values are -2.87 and -3.45 for the 5% and 1% levels, respectively.

 indicates rejection of the null of a unit root test at the 1% level of signicance.
The lag length is chosen using (SIC).
Table 4.1: ADF unit root tests on levels and rst dierence for each GCC country
and the U.S. interest rates series over the entire sample.
Country Jtrace (r=0) Jtrace (r=1)
Bahrain 32.47
 1.22
Oman 25.67
 1.76
Qatar 19.05 4.18
Saudi Arabia 24.48 1.40
UAE 20.08 5.76
,  and 
 indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of no co-integration at the 10, 2.5, and 1% levels, respectively.
(17.98), (20.26), (22.40), and (25.07) are the critical values of the null hypothesis for 10, 5, 2.5 and 1%
signicance levels respectively.
Table 4.2: Johansen Co-integration Test between the GCC and U.S. interest rates
over the entire sample: Trace Statistic.Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 155
Country ^  ^  H0 :  = 1 95% Conf. Interval for ^  R2
Bahrain .02
 .97
 .06 [.94 1.00] .96
Oman .03
 .99
 .70 [.94 1.03] .83
Qatar .03
 .84
 0.0 [.80 .88] .87
Saudi .04
 .97
 .015 [.95 .99] .96
UAE .09
 .76
 0.0 [.73 .79] .90
, and 
 indicates rejection of the null that ^  or ^  = 0 at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
Robust standard errors are used in the computation of the t-ratios when testing H0 :  = 1.
Table 4.3: GCC interest rates' sensitivity to that of the U.S. in levels over the entire
sample.
Country Break date (^ k) P-value
Bahrain July-2008 0.0001
Omana July-2006 0.0000
Qatar January-2009 0.0000
Saudi February-2009 0.0000
UAE November-2008 0.0000
Table 4.4: Sup-Wald test for the stability of the sensitivity coecients (^ ).
aThe apparent earlier Sup-Wald break date for Oman is inuenced by the restricted sample.156 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
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Table 4.5: GCC interest rates' sensitivity coecients (^ ) to that of the U.S. in levels.Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 157
Country ^  ^  H0 :  = 1 R2
Bahrain -0.0 .63
 .008 .28
Oman -0.0 .62
 .003 .22
Qatar -0.00 .60
 .007 .20
Saudi -0.00 .71
 .008 .34
UAE 0.00 .74
 .01 .60

 indicates signicant at 1%
Table 4.6: GCC interest rates' sensitivity coecients (^ ) to that of the U.S. in
dierences over the entire sample.158 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
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Table 4.7: GCC interest rates' sensitivity coecients (^ ) to that of the U.S. in
dierences.Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 159
p = 0 p = 1 p = 2
Country ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  half-life (in months)
Bahrain .67
 -.21
 .63
 -.22
 .62
 -.23
 2.65
Oman .64
 -.083
 .6
 -.089
 .59
 -.10
 6.5
Qatar .72
 -.27
 .68
 -.14
 .68
 -.11
 5.9
Saudi .82
 -.16
 .74
 -.17
 .70
 -.18
 3.5
UAE .72
 -.05
 .64
 -.04 .60
 -.06
 11.2
 and 
 indicates signicant at 5 and 1% levels, respectively.
half-life is calculated using ^  from the ECM with 2-lags (p = 2).
Table 4.8: Long-run dynamics between GCC domestic and U.S. interest rates over
the entire sample:ECM representation.
p = 0 p = 1 p = 2
Country ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  half-life (in months)
Bahrain .96
 -.29
 .91
 -.27
 .91
 -.30
 1.9
Oman .57
 -.10
 .64
 -.11
 .58
 -.10
 6.6
Qatar .76
 -.68
 .72
 -.46
 .71
 -.35
 1.6
Saudi .82
 -.17
 .74
 -.17
 .70
 -.18
 3.5
UAE .74
 -.09 .62
 -.07 .61
 -.11
 5.9
, , and 
 indicate signicant at 10, 5, and 1 % respectively.
half-life is calculated using ^  from the ECM with 2-lags(p = 2).
Table 4.9: Long-run dynamics between GCC domestic and U.S. interest rates over
before-break sub-period:ECM representation.160 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
p = 0 p = 1 p = 2
Country ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  half-life (in months)
Bahrain .14 -.39
 .32 -.51
 -.49 -.66
 .64
Oman .76
 -.19 .67
 -.24 .66
 -.25 2.4
Qatar .31 -.07 .07 -.06 .30
 -.07 9.6
Saudi .39
 -.02 .21
 -.06 .12 -.04 16.9
UAE .61
 -.04 .02
 -.02 .60 -.02 34.3
, , and 
 indicate signicant at 10, 5, and 1% levels, respectively.
half-life is calculated using ^  from the ECM with 2-lags (p = 2).
Table 4.10: Long-run dynamics between GCC domestic and U.S. interest rates over
after-break sub-period:ECM representation.
Test Full sample pre-pegged period pegged period de-pegged period
Unit root(levels) -1.35 -.16 -1.22 -2.12
Unit root(rst dierence) -9.67
 -7.35
 -4.45
 -6.53

Jtrace (r=0) 21.9 18.62 22.6 18.99
Jtrace (r=1) 1.72 1.87 6.9 4.35
The lag length is chosen using (SIC).
, ,  and 
 indicate rejection of the null hypothesis of no co-integration at 10, 5, 2.5 and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 4.11: Johansen Co-integration between Kuwait and U.S. interest rates as well
as ADF unit root test on levels.Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 161
statistic pre-pegged period pegged period de-pegged period
Mean Spreads .121 .03 .027
Std .089 .068 .07
Min -.015 -.147 -.126
Max .463 .122 .138
^  .24
 .07
 .06

^  .71
 .84
 .70

R2 .54 .78 .84
H0 :  = 1 0.0 0.0 0.0
ECM
^ short run .34
 .7 .32

^  -.06
 -.19
 -.23

half-life (in months) 11.20 3.2 2.7

 indicates signicant at 1% level.
Table 4.12: Impact of pegging Kuwaiti dinar to U.S. dollar on Kuwait monetary
policy.162 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
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Table 4.13: GCC interest rates' sensitivity coecients to the U.S. 3-month T-bill
rate in levels.
aThe 95% condence interval for the sensitivity coecient for Bahrain is [1.04 1.09]which is very
close to 1.Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 163
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Table 4.14: Long-run dynamics between GCC domestic interest rates and U.S.
3-month T-bill rate.164 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
sub-period ^  ^  half-life in months
pre-pegged .79
 -.06
 11.2
within pegged .87
 -.16
 3.9
de-pegged .81
 -.19
 3.2

 indicates signicant at 1% level.
Table 4.15: Impact of pegging Kuwaiti dinar to U.S. dollar on Kuwait monetary
policy using U.S. 3-month T-bill rate as a base rate.Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 165
Figure 4.1: GCC and U.S. interest rates co-movement over the entire sample.166 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
Figure 4.2: Bahrain and U.S.interest rates co-movement over the entire sample.
Figure 4.3: Oman and U.S. interest rates co-movement over the entire sample.Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 167
Figure 4.4: Qatar and U.S. interest rates co-movement over the entire sample.
Figure 4.5: Saudi Arabia and U.S. interest rates co-movement over the entire sample.168 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
Figure 4.6: UAE and U.S. interest rates co-movement over the entire sample.
Figure 4.7: GCC ination rates over the entire sample.Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 169
Figure 4.8: GCC recursively estimated sensitivity coecients over the entire sample.
Figure 4.9: Bahrain residuals for the entire sample.170 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
Figure 4.10: Oman residuals for the entire sample.
Figure 4.11: Qatar residuals for the entire sample.Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 171
Figure 4.12: Saudi Arabia residuals for the entire sample.
Figure 4.13: UAE residuals for the entire sample.172 Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter?
Figure 4.14: Kuwait and U.S. interest rates co-movement over the entire sample.
Figure 4.15: Kuwait residuals before pegged to the U.S. dollar.Chapter 4 GCC Monetary Policies: Does the peg matter? 173
Figure 4.16: Kuwait residuals within the pegged to the U.S. dollar.
Figure 4.17: Kuwait residuals after the de-pegged from the U.S. dollar.Chapter 5
Conclusion
Economic integration has been pursued by Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC)
for more than three decades, ever since the six member states agreed to establish the
GCC in 1981. In 1982, the Unied Economic Agreement (UEA) among the GCC
countries was signed, aiming to coordinate the GCC economic, monetary, and nancial
policies, with the ultimate objective of adopting a common currency for the six
countries. In 2001, the UEA was replaced by a new economic agreement, in which the
initiative of forming the GCC monetary union by 2010 was ocially declared and a
particular timetable was laid down in order to accomplish the necessary requirements
for the planned monetary union.
This dissertation aimed to explore economic integration in the context of the GCC
countries, which planned to form a monetary union, by assessing three dierent but
related empirical research questions regarding GCC nancial markets and monetary
policies. Investigating the linkages between stock markets in the context of the GCC
countries is a central issue by which GCC policy makers gain further insights on how
and to what extent the GCC nancial markets are integrated. Financial integration
among the GCC countries is a vital issue, especially in the critical stage before
introducing the GCC common currency, to determine whether these countries full one
of the main requirements of the potential monetary union, which enhances the union's
macroeconomic stabilization. Moreover, nancial integration improves risk sharing
among the member states and the nancial stability of such a union, which are very
important aspects to be considered by GCC policy makers in order to avoid any
175176 Chapter 5 Conclusion
negative impacts and spillovers to the monetary union as a whole. Furthermore,
GCC-integrated stock markets will enhance the eciency of capital allocation as well
as the liquidity of stock markets within the GCC region. For example, when the GCC
markets are integrated, the liquidity of the stock markets will be improved due to
increases in the trading of individual nancial assets caused by increases in
cross-boarder ows of funds. This improvement in stock markets liquidity will, in turn,
lead to a decrease in the cost of capital for companies willing to raise capital and lower
transaction costs for GCC investors.
On the other hand, investigating GCC stock markets contagion is of particular interest
to GCC policy makers as well as GCC investors to investigate the extent to which the
GCC stock markets are vulnerable to dierent international nancial crises, which may
cause destabilizations in the GCC economies. With regard to GCC investors,
understanding nancial contagion is crucial to the fact that gains from international
portfolio diversication are reduced when stock markets exhibit correlation, and thus
will be informative for investors in helping them to make better decisions regarding
their portfolio diversication allocations. Finally, studying the co-movements between
domestic and U.S. short-term interest rates in the context of six GCC countries is an
important issue, since the harmonization of monetary policies among the GCC
countries is a priority if the planned monetary union is to be achieved, especially with
the existence of a common central bank, which will be in charge of conducting a single
monetary policy among the member states.
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the empirical ndings of this
dissertation is that, while the peg to the U.S. dollar has resulted in notable monetary
integration among the GCC countries in the long-term by converging their monetary
policies (though short-term divergence has been found for some countries over some
periods), the GCC's nancial integration is still in its primitive stage, and signicant
eorts are needed to promote nancial integration among the GCC countries in order
to enhance the success of the planned monetary union, if such a union is to be
achieved. In this context, in order to promote nancial integration among GCC
countries, GCC policy makers are advised to adopt a comprehensive set of policies and
regulations to improve the depth of the GCC nancial markets; strengthen convergence
across GCC nancial systems; increase cross-listed stocks; relax the stock ownership
restrictions facing both GCC and foreign investors; and, most importantly, put theChapter 5 Conclusion 177
GCC common market process into practice. In addition, given the evidence found in
the second essay regarding the existence of contagion from the U.S. stock market to
the GCC stock markets after the global economic and nancial crisis originating in the
U.S., GCC policy makers need to set some coordinated and precautionary policies to
strengthen the ability of their nancial systems to absorb the adverse impacts of any
future nancial crisis and to be capable of reducing the exposure to international
nancial contagions, which might cause destabilizations in the GCC economies. On the
other hand, in order to make the GCC monetary union a success, policy makers in
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE (if UAE reconsiders re-joining the GCC monetary
union), may consider adopting policies that might help in curbing ination, which
causes a distortion in the country's monetary integration with peers over specic
periods. Among these policies are the options of increasing the supply of real estate by
encouraging private investment in this sector and slowing down the growth of private
credit.
More specically, the rst essay, which was presented in Chapter 2, investigated the
pairwise linkages and volatility spillover between the GCC stock markets. In particular,
the goal of Chapter 2 was to investigate the extent to which past volatility is
transmitted from one GCC stock market to another at the aggregate level (e.g., the
general stock markets' price indices), and, at a more disaggregate level, among
equivalent sectors across the GCC stock markets (namely, the banking, industrial and
insurance sectors). The empirical results of Chapter 2 suggested that, on the aggregate
level, except for few cases, each GCC stock market is vulnerable to past shocks that
have happened in other GCC stock markets, conrming the existence of a pronounced
volatility transmission across the six GCC stock markets. These ndings reect the
fact that the GCC countries share strong economic and nancial linkages and policy
coordination, such that stock markets in the region respond similarly to common
shocks. Furthermore, results of the equity sectors analysis indicated that volatility
spillover across the six stock markets studied is driven mainly by the linkages and
spillover eects between banking sectors, and to lesser extent, industrial sectors, while
the insurance sectors played no role in the volatility spillover eects across these
markets. These results reveal that the banking sector is the most vital sector among
the GCC stock markets sectors, which is due to its dominating role in the nancial
sectors within the GCC region as well as its market capitalization, which is the highest178 Chapter 5 Conclusion
of all sectors in the GCC stock markets. Meanwhile, the industrial sector plays a
relatively modest role in causing spillover eects among the GCC stock markets. This
is due to the fact that the industrial sector is highly dependent on the oil market's basic
variations and price uctuations, leading this sector to be more vulnerable to these
developments than to the intra-sector spillover within the GCC region. Finally, the
insurance sector plays no role in volatility spillover transmission among the GCC stock
markets, which is due to the fact that the insurance sector is characterised by having
the smallest market capitalization of all GCC sectors, as well as having low trading
activities and little investment interest from GCC investors. This leads to the fact that
the insurance sectors in some GCC stock markets have had many days with no trading.
Chapter 3, the second essay, examined the eect of the recent global nancial crisis
originating in the U.S. stock market on the stock markets of the GCC countries and
determined whether the sharp falls in these markets were due to the existence of
\contagion" or they just reected a continuation of the strong economic and nancial
linkages between the GCC and the U.S. economies that exist in all states of the world,
during good and bad times. The results of Chapter 3 found some evidence of contagion
from the U.S. stock market to the stock markets of Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and
the UAE after the collapse of Lehman brothers. However, in the case of Kuwait, I did
not nd any signicant increase in cross-market correlation between the Kuwait and
U.S. stock markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Hence, the relationship
between the two markets is rather interdependent, and no contagion has occurred from
the U.S. nancial crisis to Kuwait. According to the theory of \fundamentals-based
contagion" which demonstrates that contagion is transmitted across countries through
their real or nancial linkages, the results in the case of Kuwait might be due to the
fact that the Kuwait economy is relatively less linked to the U.S. economy than other
GCC economies in the sense that Kuwait is the only GCC country that does not x its
currency exchange rate to the U.S. dollar and that Kuwait has a more independent
monetary policy than its GCC counterparts. This is also supported by the empirical
analyses in that Kuwait has the smallest (after Bahrain) cross-market correlation of
the other GCC countries after the turmoil period. Finally, results did not nd any
contagion between the Bahrain and U.S stock markets. Hence, the linkage between the
U.S. stock market as a crisis country and the Bahrain stock market as a non-crisis
country remained relatively the same after the crisis period, and no contagion hasChapter 5 Conclusion 179
occurred. From this, one can conclude that the recent U.S. nancial crisis has not
aected the Bahrain stock market. These results might be due to the fact that the
Bahrain stock market is one of the smallest and most illiquid of all the GCC stock
markets.
The last essay was presented in Chapter 4, in which I investigated the implications of
xing exchange rates on monetary policy in the context of the GCC countries whose
exchange rate regimes have been xed to the U.S. dollar for a long time. In particular,
Chapter 4 aimed to assess the sensitivity of the GCC countries' interest rates to the
U.S. rate, as the theory of interest parity suggests that xing GCC exchange rates to
the U.S. dollar should enforce the GCC domestic interest rates to equal the U.S.
interest rate. In addition, Chapter 4 interestingly attempted to assess the stability of
this sensitivity over time and to investigate whether there exists a pronounced
decoupling for some GCC countries over some sub-periods. Furthermore, the fact that
some of the countries (e.g., Kuwait) have pegged to the U.S. dollar over specic
sub-periods, then moved away from the peg over other sub-periods, also gave us a rich
setting in which to investigate the implications of xing the exchange rate on monetary
policy and to determine whether a country's interest rate has a stronger association
with that of a base country under a pegged period than under a non-pegged period.
The results of Chapter 4 showed that, except for Qatar and the UAE, the parity
condition holds for the GCC countries, and the GCC countries' interest rates precisely
follow the U.S. rate for the entire sample under investigation. On the other hand, the
empirical results conrm that, for some countries (e.g., Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE)
over some periods, particularly, after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, there exists a
pronounced decoupling away from the base country interest rate (the U.S. rate), which
is considered to be a contradiction to the theory of interest parity. This remarkable
deviation from the U.S. interest rate is attributed to some external factors (e.g., the
nancial crisis) as well as some country-specic factors (e.g., ination and risk
premiums). More specically, while the monetary authorities in the U.S. continued to
lower the interest rates after the economic and nancial crisis of 2008, the Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, and UAE economies witnessed double-digit ination rates in the year 2008 (
with rates of 15%, 10%, and 13%, respectively). These high ination rates were caused
by some country-specic domestic factors, such as increases in the supply of credit,
strong domestic demand, and a lack of supply in real estate markets (Morsy and180 Chapter 5 Conclusion
Kandil (2009)). In order to curb such high ination rates, the monetary authorities of
Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE did not follow the U.S.'s suit in reducing interest
rates, which explains their departure from the interest rate parity during this
sub-period. With regard to Kuwait, I found strong evidence consistent with the
ndings of Shambaugh (2004). In particular, Kuwait's interest rate was more sensitive
to the U.S. rate under the pegged period than under the other two period (the
pre-pegged period and the de-pegged period). Hence, one can conclude that pegging
the exchange rate enforces countries to follow the base country's interest rate more
than they would if their exchange rates were not pegged.References
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